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Abstract 
CISGENDERISM IN GENDER ATTRIBTUIONS: THE WAYS IN WHICH SOCIAL, 
COGNITIVE, AND INDIVIDUAL FACTORS PREDICT MISGENDERING 
by 
Erica Jayne Friedman 
Advisor: Dr. Sarit A. Golub 
 The current program of research investigated the ways in which social representations of 
gender, cognitive processes, and individual factors can be integrated to predict "misgendering," 
an example of cisgenderism in which people are categorized as a gender with which they do not 
identify. I proposed an (In)consistency Processing Model of Gender Attribution in which 
perceivers make a gender attribution by interpreting the stereotype-(in)consistencies of a target's 
gender characteristics through either a biology- or identity-based schema. Five studies were 
conducted to test different aspects of this model, the first of which was a secondary data analysis 
on a sample of students from Hunter College who participated in the lab. Participants from the 
remaining studies participated online and were recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk. 
 Participants were more likely to reject a target's gender identity when the target's genitals 
and chromosomes were stereotype-inconsistent with the target's gender identity. Gender 
judgments were made quickly overall, but slower when target characteristics were stereotype-
inconsistent. In other words, people processed gender consciously, rather than automatically, 
when characteristics were unexpected. Participants who knew transgender people were less 
likely to misgender and faster at making gender judgments, but only when targets had 
stereotype-inconsistent chromosomes suggesting limitations to the knowledge they gained from 
their contact with transgender people. Allies to transgender people and people with less gender 
essentialist beliefs were less likely to misgender people and did so with similar response times to 
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the rest of participants, suggesting they spent time consciously attempting to affirm targets 
gender identity. People who were initially found to be less likely to misgender ("adjusters") were 
more likely to misgender when their efforts to affirm target identity were constrained by a 
distraction or by added stereotype-inconsistent information about the target.   
 Study findings imply that cisgenderism operates implicitly on the gender attribution 
process. While some people may be able to temporarily focus their efforts on affirming people's 
genders, these efforts are conditional and easily destabilized. These findings have important 
practical implications for researchers, activists, service organizations, and governments invested 
in the ethical recognition of people's own gender self-designations.  
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
How is asking if someone is transgender or a man poking fun? She has the body of a women 
[sic] and the facial characteristics of a man. This is honestly the first fucking time I have 
heard/seen a woman with that amount of facial hair, but it would not be the first time I've 
seen a transgendered individual. I'm a fucking asshole because I relate things to what I know. 
--Kayoh44, 2012 (emphasis added) 
 This quote is one of many comments posted in September 2012 to an online forum called 
“Reddit” (reddit.com). An individual had posted a photo categorized under Reddit’s “funny” 
section with the title “I’m not sure what to conclude from this.” The photo was of a Sikh woman 
(information that was learned later) who was glancing at her iPhone while waiting in line. She 
wore a t-shirt and sweatpants, a Dastar,1 and she appeared to have breasts and facial hair. At first, 
some of the Reddit users commented on the photo in an attempt at explaining her gender. Some 
pondered if she was a woman or a man, while others wondered if she might be a person who is 
transgender. Additionally, a myriad of gender-based jokes were quipped and commenter's 
reactions suggested an overall “gender panic” (Cavanagh, 2010; Lorber, 2012, p. 598).  
The woman pictured in the photo, Balpreet Kaur, found out from friends that her photo 
had been posted on Reddit. In response, she commented on the post and gave her own 
explanation of her gender presentation. In her explanation, she acknowledged that her facial hair 
made her gender appear “confusing,” but that her gender presentation was dictated through her 
baptized Sikh faith—not through her gender as a woman. She explained: 
Yes, I'm a baptized Sikh woman with facial hair. Yes, I realize that my gender is 
often confused and I look different than most women. However, baptized Sikhs 
believe in the sacredness of this body - it is a gift that has been given to us by the 
Divine Being [which is genderless, actually] and, must keep it intact as a 
submission to the divine will. Just as a child doesn't reject the gift of his/her 
parents, Sikhs do not reject the body that has been given to us.  (balpreetkaur, 
2012; bracketed text are balpreetkaur’s remarks) 
                                                          
1A turban traditionally worn by Sikh men. 
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Statement of the problem 
Kaur’s experience helps illustrate the kinds of gender judgments that people make, the 
fact that these judgments can result in misgendering others, and the ways in which perceptions of 
gender can shift depending on perceivers' interpretation of the stereotyped characteristics of the 
individual being judged. Misgendering has been posited as an example of cisgenderism; “the 
ideology that delegitimizes people's own designations of their genders and bodies” (Ansara, 
2013) in favor of externally assigned designations of their genders and bodies.2 Misgendering 
occurs when people describe or refer to others as a gender different from the gender with which 
they have identified or designated for themselves. Whether people misgender deliberately or 
unintentionally, the effect is just the same: A gender has been designated for the person rather 
than allowing the person to designate it for themselves. Kaur identifies as a woman. She does not 
detail her own gender history, i.e., whether or not she has a gender independent from the one 
assigned to her at birth. But she does acknowledge, in her own words, that people may 
misgender her because her appearance contrasts with normative expectations of women in 
society. 
Kaur’s public defense of her gender parallels some of the experiences of seeking gender 
affirmation for people who self-designate their genders independent from the gender assigned to 
them at birth. Both Kaur and many people (e.g., some transgender people) tell others their gender 
identity, or personal experience of their gender, in order to have their self-designated gender 
affirmed. Kaur corrects people’s confusion about her gender by stating that she is a woman. 
Similarly, people who self-designate their genders sometimes ask the people in their lives to 
                                                          
2 See Namaste (2000) for background supporting this concept and Ansara & Hegarty (2012) for another published 
description. 
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refer to them by their self-designated gender (e.g. woman) rather than the one they were given 
(e.g. male).  
One intention of seeking gender affirmation is to motivate people to adjust their initial or 
previously held gender attribution (or lack thereof) to affirm a person’s self-designated gender. 
Gender acceptance and affirmation is argued by psychologists and activists to be necessary in an 
effort to promote the well-being of people with self-designated genders (Ansara & Hegarty, 
2012; Hegarty, 2009; Menvielle & Tuerk , 2002; Mullen & Moane, 2013; Wilchins, 2004). For 
example, the American Psychological Association (APA, 2008) created guidelines encouraging 
the “legal and social recognition of transgender individuals consistent with their gender identity 
and expression” in an effort to resolve the “detrimental” effects of such discrimination on 
people’s “psychological, physical, social, and economic well-being” (APA, 2008). Nevertheless, 
social psychologists have found evidence that misgendering and other forms of cisgenderism 
continue to be enabled at multiple levels of society. Studies have shown specific evidence of 
cisgenderism at the institutional level, e.g., in scientific journals and medical settings (Ansara, 
2010; 2012; Ansara & Hegarty, 2012; 2013) and interpersonal level, e.g. between lay individuals 
(Boenke, 2003; Cooper, 2000; Gamson, 1998; Israel, 2005; Namaste, 2000; Schilt & Westbrook, 
2009; Serano, 2007). 
In a review of peer-reviewed psychology journal articles, Ansara and Hegarty (2012) 
found cisgenderism in the form of pathologizing (e.g. suggesting that a child’s gender self-
designation is abnormal or invalid) and misgendering (e.g. referring to a child as a boy when she 
has self-designated her gender as a girl). Ansara (2010; 2012) also found through patient 
testimonies that people who seek basic healthcare or gender affirmative hormone therapies and 
surgeries regularly experience cisgenderism in their interactions with health professionals. For 
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example, therapists and endocrinologists often turn patients down, in spite of their psychological 
“fitness,” for gender affirmative care, especially when patients were perceived by their doctors as 
not "adequately" demonstrating or presenting themselves as the gender in which they wanted to 
be affirmed (Ansara, 2010; 2012; Meyerowitz, 2002). In other words, people are denied basic 
care because doctors interpret their gender presentations in cisgenderist ways—in this case, as 
inconsistent with their gender self-designations. Patients seeking gender affirmative hormones 
and surgeries have many reasons for presenting their genders as they do, ranging from personal 
aesthetic or grooming preferences to the need to feel safe in a world that tends to be hostile 
toward those who do not pass3 as women or as men (Ansara, 2010; 2012).  
Efforts to affirm a person’s self-designated gender are not always easily achieved even if 
a strong effort is made to adjust (Boenke, 2003; Cooper, 2000). Some psychologists have 
suggested that social knowledge about gender that is interpreted as irrefutable common sense 
(e.g., that men have penises and women have vaginas) makes it difficult to accept a person’s 
gender if they do not “pass” or are perceived to have characteristics that conflict with such 
knowledge (Garfinkel, 1967; Kessler & McKenna, 1978). Other psychologists have suggested 
that the difficulties around affirming another person’s self-designated gender may have to do 
with the cognitive effort it takes to revise the mental profile that someone has already created 
about another person (Bessenoff & Sherman, 2000; Devine, 1989; Israel, 2005). Still other 
psychologists suggest that individual differences, e.g., people’s beliefs about gender, are a 
reliable predictor of whether or not a person will outright reject the gender that people have 
designated for themselves (e.g. King, Winter, & Webster, 2009; Tee & Hegarty, 2006).  
                                                          
3 Passing occurs when others make a judgment about a person’s gender that accords acceptance of that person’s self-
designated gender. Passing is considered a privilege “…often taken for granted by people whose gender identities 
match their assigned genders, while being considered ‘deception’” for those who self-designate their genders 
(Ansara, 2010, footnote 7). 
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Research has not yet empirically examined the links between these social, 
cognitive, and individual factors and their mutual or combined potential as predictors of 
cisgenderist responses to people’s self-designated gender identities and expressions. 
Thus, the central question that motivated the current research was: What is the role of 
social representations, cognitive processes, and individual traits, knowledge, 
motivations, and beliefs in lay people’s judgments about other people’s gender? 
Augoustinos and Walker’s (1995) integration of social representations theory with 
various cognitive theories and constructs provides a useful framework for this area of 
empirical inquiry. First, I present an overview of this theoretical lens and then integrate 
its integration with social cognition. Later, I outline the program of research studies 
conducted, the results found, and the conclusions drawn. 
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Chapter 2: 
Review of the Literature –Applying a Social representations Lens 
For an instance of cisgenderism to occur, there first must be an ideological system of 
knowledge about gender in place that impacts our gender attributions. While social cognitive 
concepts and constructs (e.g., stereotypes) provide a basis for measuring the gender attribution 
process, social representations theory provides the lens through which a prerequisite, ideological 
system of knowledge can initially be identified and then interpreted. Social representations 
theory defines social cognitive constructs as "...the visible tip of an iceberg whose submerged 
portion comprises the very structures which enable the subject to construct meaningful attitudes 
and attributions" (Duveen & Lloyd, 2013, p. 175). These submerged structures in social 
representations theory resemble what ethnomethodologists refer to as our taken-for-granted or 
"common sense" understandings about the world (Garfinkel, 1967; Kessler & McKenna, 1978; 
Medin & Ortony, 1989; Speer, 2005). The common sense understandings are what people trust 
in, usually without question, to help them interpret the world around them. Thus, the current 
research refocuses cisgenderism as the delegitmization of people’s designations of their own 
genders by relying on social representations to make that designation for them.  
Researchers have suggested that social representations theory can be used by social 
psychologists to reposition our interpretation of various social cognitive processes within the 
context of macro social systems (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995; Duveen & Lloyd, 2013; Rateau, 
Moliner, Guimelli, & Abric, 2012). Below, I build toward an analysis of cisgenderism as a 
knowledge system that can be measured through manipulating the variables that determine 
people's gender attributions. First, I provide an overview of Serge Moscovici’s (1981) social 
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representations theory and then I integrate his theory with relevant cognitive concepts and 
constructs in the sections that follow. 
Overview 
Social representations (Moscovici, 1981) are a useful concept for any study of people’s 
perceptions because they help define how people interpret or judge objects, events, and other 
people in their social and personal world. People gather information about their abstract 
surroundings through their senses (e.g., sight, hearing, etc.) and then give it meaning or a 
“representation” (Moscovici, 1981). Social representations are not the result of a passive process, 
according to Moscovici. They are the result of humans acting as agents to describe their social 
surroundings. The functional role they play is to enhance understanding and to communicate a 
complex array of social phenomena, e.g., gender. Moscovici emphasized the functional role of 
social representations between individuals and among cultures by explaining them as: 
A system of values, ideas and practices with a twofold function; first, to establish 
an order which will enable individuals to orientate themselves in their material 
and social world and to master it; and secondly to enable communication to take 
place among the members of a community by providing them with a code for 
social exchange and a code for naming and classifying unambiguously the various 
aspects of their world and their individual and group history. (1973, p. xiii) 
Moscovici’s description emphasizes the role of social representations in the facilitation of 
individual thought as well as social communication around information that would otherwise 
remain ambiguous and unfamiliar. Ambiguous or unfamiliar information is generated into social 
representations through two processes: anchoring and objectification. Anchoring represents the 
assimilation of unfamiliar information into existing knowledge structures and objectification 
represents the transformation of unfamiliar information into its own common sense reality 
independent of existing knowledge structures. 
 
8 
 
Anchoring 
We anchor unfamiliar social phenomena in what we already know when we do not have 
enough information about it, or enough practice encountering it, to do otherwise. Augoustinos 
and Walker (1995) explain anchoring as a cognitive process by which people classify social 
phenomena that is unfamiliar to them by comparing them to culturally informed prototypes of 
different categories. Anchoring is similar to the cognitive process of "subgrouping" which 
explains the processes through which people sometimes mentally categorize individuals who 
disconfirm group stereotypes as similar to those who confirm group stereotypes (see Richards & 
Hewstone, 2001). For Moscovici (1984), this categorization process occurs at a group level such 
that all people within a culture agree, without question, that individuals are categorized in a 
particular way. Moscovici (1984) believed humans have a tendency toward categorizing aspects 
of culture—especially unfamiliar aspects—within existing categories in order to give objects 
shared meaning and shared understanding. Thus, anchoring has a positive role to play in 
facilitating the communication of social knowledge 
Simultaneously, anchoring can cause significant limitations in our interpretation of social 
phenomena and in our ability to communicate accurately about social phenomena. Philogène 
(2001) explains that anchoring occurs “through a socially created metasystem...that interferes 
with us beyond our control… [and] shapes what we think and how we act toward [social 
phenomena]” (p. 40). For example, scientists tend to explain new and unfamiliar phenomena in 
supposedly "objective" ways when they actually rely on metaphors or analogies anchored in old 
knowledge constructs to interpret their findings (see Hegarty & Pratto, 2010). When we anchor 
new objects in old understandings, we are shaping them in old terms that may no longer be 
relevant or may generalize them to the point that their unique qualities are made irrelevant. But 
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we discuss new information via the old because doing so facilitates order and understanding in 
our social interactions.  
Objectification 
The development of social representations independent of previously existing ones begins 
with individual acts of agency, but these representations then become established and serve 
functional purposes at the social level (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995). Hence, they are social 
representations and not individual representations. The difference is elucidated in discussions of 
exemplars in cognitive psychology in which people draw on their personal memories about 
certain objects and phenomena in order to make generalizations about new, unfamiliar stimuli 
(see Murphy, 2002). Exemplar theory emphasizes individual representations that are formed as a 
result of people's subjective experiences, while social representations theory emphasizes social 
representations that are formed as a result of an entire population's perpetuation of some object 
or phenomenon as fact. According to Moscovici (1981), when social representations—including 
ones that were once unfamiliar—become established in collective thought, they are processed as 
common sense. The transformation of certain social phenomena into common sense defines the 
objectification process. At the individual level, common sense understandings inculcate our 
thoughts, behaviors, and interactions. As individuals, we can actively contribute to the 
construction of social representations, but they simultaneously define and construct our own 
thinking and behaviors. This social psychological process of constructing and being constructed 
carries with it the risk that specific individuals’ interests and identities may be overlooked, 
misperceived, and underrepresented.  
To further understand how the objectification process operates, Abric (2001) posited that 
social representations are structured around a central core of social knowledge. The central core 
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includes pieces of information that have already gone through objectification and are taken for 
granted or considered irrefutable common sense. The core has two functions: (1) it gives 
meaning and value to the representation; and (2) it helps organize links between its various 
elements that help stabilize the representation across contexts. The latter function suggests that 
representations have a certain amount of resistance to change. Without its stabilizing central 
elements, a representation would be socially discounted or thrown out at the slightest challenge. 
Indeed, Moscovici (1984) believed that social representations do eventually “die out” as their 
origin becoming “forgotten” (p. 13). Abric (2001) suggested that it is easier to change peripheral 
elements than the elements that make up a social representation’s central core. 
Peripheral elements have adaptive qualities that allow the representation to evolve 
through different socio-historical contexts. In other words, the central core of a social 
representation can go unchallenged even if peripheral elements are changed by new and 
unfamiliar social phenomena. Abric (2001) explained that peripheral elements can actually help 
to defend the stability of the central core by (1) marginalizing the new phenomena; (2) 
reinterpreting the new phenomena; or (3) rendering the new phenomena as exceptional. 
Cognitive psychologists might refer to this as "subtyping" which explains instances in which the 
mental categorization of people who disconfirm membership in a group category are interpreted 
as exceptions to their superordinate category "rule" (see Hewstone, 1994, for a review). 
Defending the stability of the central core, or supporting their membership in a superordinate 
category, explains how objects, events, or people can be peripherally incorporated into a social 
representation without actually changing or threatening its underlying common sense notions. 
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Objectification of expert knowledge 
There are many authoritative sources from which social knowledge is transformed into 
common sense including from religion, science, and government, to name a few. To describe the 
effect of these authoritative sources on the objectification of knowledge, Moscovici (1981) 
posited how scientific knowledge is transformed (objectified) from the reified, scientific universe 
to the consensual, common sense universe. Scientists claim to identify and make sense of 
phenomena in the social world “impartially and submissively” and with “intellectual precision 
and empirical evidence” by “concealing [their personal] values and advantages” (Moscovici, 
1984; p. 22). The view that this knowledge is objective gives people reason to accept it as fact. 
This knowledge is then reappropriated by the press so that it can be exposed to and understood 
by lay individuals (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995).  
As an example, Moscovici and Hewstone (1983) posited that the theory of hemispheric 
specialization in the brain was made accessible to the public when neuroscience introduced the 
idea that the left brain is the rational side and the right brain is the emotional side (also see Fine, 
2010; Jordan-Young, 2010). Lay people and the press went on to use the split brain view to make 
dualistic interpretations of a wide range of human and cultural behaviors, including the 
explanation of gender differences through the essentialist notion of a feminized or masculinized 
mind (Moscovici & Hewstone, 1983; Fine, 2010). Augoustinos and Walker (1995) sum up this 
transformative process by explaining that the “split brain view has proliferated so widely that it 
is now endowed with an objective reality and has become part of common-sense knowledge: a 
social representation” (p. 142).  
Common-sense knowledge derived from science provides people with explanations of 
certain groups over others (e.g., woman/men) and allows differences between groups to “operate 
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invisibly and seem legitimate” (Hegarty & Bruckmüller, 2013, p. 178) because science is 
socially regarded as “objective.” The result is that people may subconsciously or consciously use 
expert knowledge to justify their judgments and, ultimately, their differential treatment of others.  
Criticisms 
Social representations are a compelling concept for understanding how social knowledge 
develops and is established in society, but the theory has faced criticism for its theoretical 
vagueness. Moscovici (1981) generally avoided specificity of sociological constructs in this 
theory because he believed it would undermine the complexity and diversity of the kinds of 
social representations that could be identified and studied. Moscovici (1981) maintained that 
vagueness, especially around the methods needed to study social representations, is beneficial to 
the discovery of the kinds of social phenomena that are central to societies. Especially when a 
research topic has been fairly unexplored, such as representations of gender, an approach that 
allows for a greater degree of discovery is particularly valuable. The social phenomena to be 
examined, and the specific cognitive constructs in which those social phenomena may be 
measured, are numerous. Researchers would need to decide which are the most beneficial to 
achieve the goals of their particular inquiry. Therefore, methodological flexibility is appropriate 
when studying collective thinking around diverse social phenomena. New ideas and 
methodological approaches used to uncover such phenomena should, therefore, be as varied as 
the societies and concepts upon which a study focuses. Inevitably, the theory has yielded a wide 
range of methodological approaches (Breakwell & Canter, 1993) from both positivist traditions, 
such as quantitative experiments (Doise, Clemence, and Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993) and less 
conventionally positivist traditions, such as ethnography (Jodelet, 1991; Psaltis & Duveen, 
2006).  
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An integrated solution 
Augoustinos and Walker (1995) argue that the criticisms about the vagueness of social 
representations theory could be resolved through a deliberate cognitive interpretation of the 
theory. In turn, they suggest that criticisms about the lack of external validity of many cognitive 
approaches to the study of social phenomena could benefit from the sociological perspectives 
embedded in the social representations lens. In sum, the integration of these perspectives should 
help resolve some of the criticisms of both.  
Moscovici’s (1963) theory easily supports the incorporation of a cognitive perspective. 
He saw the social and cognitive as intertwined, such as when he said that “…there is no break 
between the exterior universe and interior universe of the individual (or the group). The subject 
and the object are not fundamentally distinct” (Moscovici, 1969, p. 9). Moscovici was consistent 
in his view that people help to construct social representations at the societal level and are 
simultaneously impacted and influenced by them at the cognitive level in a mutually constitutive 
relationship. The measurable objects or constructs of people's individual cognitions (e.g., 
stereotypes) correspond to representations that are socially agreed upon and taken-for-granted by 
all people within social systems. Taking this a step further, Sampson (1981) argued for his fellow 
cognitive psychologists "...to test and challenge the structures and practices of larger society 
within which the various subjectivisms have developed" (p. 737) so that "...we would no longer 
spend our time describing what is, thereby participating in its production; our aims would be 
more transformative, designed to increase human welfare and freedom" (p. 741-742). Focusing 
on identifying the ideological structures of cisgenderism and determining how they operate at the 
social and individual levels may lead to conclusions that suggest the kind of transformation that 
Sampson suggested. 
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 For Augoustinos and Walker (1995), this may be accomplished by integrating cognition 
with social representations theory. Other researchers have shared this perspective such as Rateau, 
Moliner, Guimelli, & Abric (2012) who reviewed the breadth of research into social 
representations and concluded that "...the fruit of [social cognitive] processes (categories, 
stereotypes, causal attributions) are to be found in the contents and the structure of social 
representations" (p. 492). Cognition is viewed as a defining feature of social representations 
theory such that social representations mediate our cognitive processes to give objects their 
meaning (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995). Augoustinos and Walker (1995) describe several 
cognitive theories and relate them to social representations. Following from their work and 
other's work, I propose interpretations of social schema theory and attribution theory in the next 
sections to help build a socio-cognitive methodological approach to studying social 
representations. 
Cognitive activation of social representations: Schemas 
Augoustinos and Walker (1995) defined schemas as mental constructs made up of 
knowledge derived from society. As in exemplar theory, schemas involve the use of our 
memory. We commit information that comes from our social interactions and our individual 
experiences to memory so that we may access it later on. Having access to schemas helps us to 
make interpretations about the stimuli we encounter and gain a sense of mutual understanding 
about our social world as we interact with others within it. Similar to anchoring processes under 
social representations theory, we organize stimuli into pre-existing categories for easy access and 
to help us encode stimuli at a later date. The categorization process is considered an integral 
component to social schema theory. Similar to anchoring in social representations theory, 
15 
 
categorization gives order to situations we encounter that are filled with a complex array of 
social stimuli.  
Schema theory differs from social representations theory in that it has been used to posit 
a decontextualized, individualistic theory of information processing (Axelrod, 1973). Once 
outside information is incorporated into memory, cognitive constructivists—as opposed to social 
constructivists4—consider the process to be entirely cognitive and individual from that point on 
(Derry, 1996). A benefit of this approach is that the focus on individual cognition yields simple 
quantitative measurement, such as response time, confidence, and memory during categorization 
tasks. Measurements of these tasks provide insight into the extent to which a person has access to 
a schema to categorize stimuli and the content that defines the schema that gets applied. Past 
research has found that there is a positive relationship between shared features of stimuli and 
categorization confidence, and a negative relationship between shared features of stimuli and 
categorization response time (Rosch, 1978; Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, & Knippenberg, 2003). As 
the features of new stimuli to a category increase in similarity, confidence increases and the time 
it takes to make the categorization decreases. Recall of a sequence of items will typically show 
content clusters in people’s categorical processing of the information from memory.  
The cognitive approach to studying schemas has not yielded reliable results, however. 
Meta-analyses (Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor & McMillan, 1992) of social schema 
research have found inconsistencies across studies examining response time and memory. For 
example, experimental effects changed people's motivation to form either a complete impression 
of a target or a straightforward impression of a target, which altered the accuracy of people's 
recall of either incongruent or congruent information (see Stangor & McMillan, 1992, for a 
review). Augoustinos and Walker (1995) suggested that these experimentally-created 
                                                          
4 See Driver, Asoko, Leach, Mrtimer, and Scott (1994) for a review of the debate between these two groups. 
16 
 
inconsistencies across studies may correspond with the effects of social representations on 
information that is schematically processed outside the lab.  
Taking this work in the direction of social representations theory through experimental 
manipulation would be consistent with the intellectual roots of social schema theory. Its roots are 
found in the work of Bartlett (1932) who emphasized social context rather than the idea that 
cognitive structures “originate” and “exist” in people’s heads, e.g., in their personal memories. 
Reflecting these roots, Murphy and Medin (1985) posited that people's cohesive categorization 
of objects are based in theories derived from world knowledges. Thus, schema research may 
benefit from going back to its roots and applying a deliberate sociological lens, such as social 
representations theory, to the methods and the interpretation of its study findings. The social 
representations lens takes the emphasis off of individuals as responsible for the schemas they 
have developed and, instead, emphasizes that the social environment influenced and helped to 
sustain those schemas. With this lens, some instances of misgendering may be interpreted as 
accidental products of circumstance, despite individuals' otherwise good intentions. 
Cognitive application of social representations: Attributions 
Much like schema theory, Augoustinos and Walker (1995) propose that attribution theory 
is another area of social-psychological study that would benefit from a social representations 
perspective. On the one hand, attribution theory focuses on the processes and conditions 
involved in assigning certain kinds of explanations to different events. On the other hand, social 
representations theory focuses on the social development and perpetuation of these explanations 
through social interactions. According to Augoustinos and Walker (1995), social representations 
theory can help identify the kinds of attributions people will make and under what conditions 
they will make them.  
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The study of attribution processes began with Fritz Heider (1958) who laid the 
groundwork for attribution theory. He states that the theory tests the individual or “…the person 
as the basic unit to be investigated” (p. 1).  Heider posited a “common sense psychology” in 
which individuals are “naïve scientists” who intuitively organize objects, events, and behaviors 
into cause and effect relations. Similar to social representations theory, attribution theory 
highlights the human need to assign meanings and explanations to understand their social world. 
People are so inclined to organize their world that they will attribute cause and effect relations 
even where no causal relationship exists (Heider and Simmel, 1944). Heider (1958) theorized 
that causal relationships are more likely to be attributed to single causes rather than a complex 
array or combination of causes, they are more likely to be made when there is similarity and 
proximal closeness between two objects or events, and they are typically attributed to either 
dispositional, internal causes or situational, external causes. 
Research on attributions exposed evidence that cognitive processes in the judgment of 
others often results in observable biases (for a full review, see Augoustinos & Walker, 1995). For 
example, Jones and Harris (1967) found the first empirical support for the “fundamental 
attribution error” in which people tend to overestimate dispositional causes and underestimate 
situational causes of other people’s behaviors. Biases, such as the fundamental attribution error, 
are conceptualized as biases because they deviate from the model that theorists, like Heider 
(1958), previously prescribed as the rational rules for making attributions. Traditional attribution 
theory proposes that people are cognitively capable of arriving at a logically formed judgment. In 
the case of the fundamental attribution error, people theoretically should consider dispositional 
and situational causes equally when judging other people’s behaviors, but this is not typically the 
case.  
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Social representations theory can help identify and interpret the cultural conditions that 
cause individuals to asymmetrically rely on certain cognitive interpretations of people's 
behaviors over other interpretations in their attributions. According to Hewstone (1989), social 
representations mediate the attribution process by providing the normative expectations that 
influence people’s cognitive judgments. For example, cross-cultural differences demonstrate that 
the fundamental attribution error has its roots in the individualism that defines much of American 
collective thought (Miller, 1984; Moscovici and Hewstone, 1983). Miller compared the 
attributions of Americans and Indian Hindus on various prosocial and deviant behaviors. He 
found that older Americans and Hindus differed significantly. Americans made more references 
to personality characteristics as the agent of behavior than did Hindus. Furthermore, an age 
analysis demonstrated that Americans become more fixated on dispositions in their causal 
attributions as they get older, while Hindu’s become more fixated on situations in their causal 
attributions as they get older. These findings suggest that such fixations in the attribution process 
are not innate; bias in attributions originates in the communication of widely held social and 
cultural meaning systems. People's fixations should, therefore, shift in correspondence with 
cultural shifts in attributions. 
Measuring the current state of social representations 
Despite the fact that attribution bias results from the apparent perpetuation of meaning 
systems in societies and the resistance of social representations’ central core elements, social 
representations are depicted as states, not traits, of societies. Moscovici (1988) proposed that all 
people have the ability to create and/or modify social representations. In other words, there is 
potential for misattributions or asymmetrical explanations of some people's behaviors over others 
to be challenged or avoided if opposing theories are realized. 
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Duveen and Lloyd (2013) framed social representations as a genetic or developmental 
theory that has a psychological impact on people at three different sociological time points: 
socio-genesis, onto-genesis, and micro-genesis. At each of these points, individuals have a 
chance to instigate modifications or adjustments to social representations. Socio-genesis is 
defined as the interactional exchange of social knowledge between social groups throughout 
society. Onto-genesis is defined as the interactional exchange of social knowledge to children 
and elaborated on by children.  Micro-genesis is defined as the interactional exchange of social 
knowledge in everyday interactions and communications between individuals. Onto-genesis and 
socio-genesis develop out of the processes and experiences that take place at the micro-genetic 
level (Duveen & Rosa, 1992). In other words, without small interactions and influences that take 
place between individuals, social knowledge that is shared throughout society and communicated 
to children would not evolve. The exchange of new and unfamiliar knowledge challenges the 
current state of what we deem to be common sense.  
Although an experiment conducted in a lab or lab-like setting changes the conditions of 
everyday environments (micro-genesis), an experiment may provide a window into everyday 
situations if it examines people’s individual processing of social phenomena that lead to 
misattributions. Opposing theories that are starting to be realized within a culture may be 
highlighted in people's individual processing of social phenomena. Some individuals may 
attempt to avoid misattributions if they can recognize it before acting. The ability to recognize 
misattributions and change them depends on the unique ability to hold two competing positions 
at a time. Multiple explanations of reality can be present and at odds with each other within the 
same culture or even the same person. For example, social representations theorists point to 
cognitive polyphasia, which is described as the capacity for individuals (and societies) to 
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maintain different kinds of knowledge despite their conflicting explanations of reality 
(Jovchelovitch, 2002; Voelklein & Howarth, 2005; Wagner, Duveen, Verma & Themel, 2000). 
However, the extent to which these explanations actually destabilize a social representation—
i.e., the extent to which gender identity replaces biological characteristics (e.g., a beard) as a 
typical measure of an individual’s gender—will depend on different factors related to the context 
and the individual. Therefore, in the next section I describe which variables in the schema 
activation and attribution processes may be beneficial to measuring the current state of a social 
representation. 
Response time: Automaticity and control 
Earlier, I proposed response time as an example of a quantitative, cognitive measure used 
to discern the time it takes people to activate particular schematic knowledge in order to make a 
categorical attribution. People gain access to a schema through their awareness of and agreement 
with relevant knowledge related to a social representation. Social representations may be 
manipulated experimentally to determine their effects on cognitive processes such as the time it 
takes people to categorize certain stimuli. This would help develop an understanding about 
which social representations more strongly impact cognitive processes. For example, response 
time may only differ as a result of manipulations of stimuli that are more strongly associated 
with shared knowledge about those stimuli.  
Awareness and agreement with that shared knowledge is established through a process 
that is comparable to the development of other sociological constructs in social psychology 
(Augoustinos & Walker, 1995). For instance, norms and stereotypes work similarly to schemas 
in that they are established at the cognitive level through a step-by-step social-interactive 
process. People gain exposure to specific categorization methods through interactions with others 
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in society. The perpetuation of those methods by others aids in its commitment to memory over 
time. Eventually, certain stimuli, individuals, or groups become viewed as more typical or 
representative of a particular category than others (Cherniak, 1984; Rosch, 1975; Mummebdey & 
Wenzel, 1999; Shafir, Smith, Osherson, 1990; Waldsuz, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Weber, 2003). 
The features of new stimuli are compared to a prototype, or average of the category members, to 
determine if it fits that category. As a result, stimuli may be judged subconsciously as typical or 
atypical to their assumed category.  
Kahneman and Miller (1986) posit a similar process in their theory of norms.5 They 
propose that when people judge stimuli they form a mental visualization or representation in the 
form of a prototype that influences their perceptions of those stimuli as typical or atypical. This 
visualization process is important to defining the features that people will reference as a basis for 
comparison to new and unfamiliar stimuli that they encounter. Kahneman and Miller (1986) 
suggest that visualized prototypes are informed by exemplars of stimuli and attributes that are 
commonly associated with the stimuli in society. If a person is making a judgment about the 
differences between two groups, social norms associated with each group inform people’s 
prototype visualizations of those groups when making intergroup judgments. Often, these 
visualizations produce asymmetric responses such that one group—usually the atypical group—
becomes a greater focus of people’s cognitions. For example, McGill (1993) found that 
participants asymmetrically judged the performance of women and men on different tasks. 
Participants contrasted unsuccessful men with successful men, regardless of the task, and 
unsuccessful women with successful men on tasks typically performed by men and with 
                                                          
5Augoustinos and Walker (1995) did not mention norm theory in their integrated approach probably because the 
majority of research on norm theory has been conducted in the last decade or so (5 years after publication of their 
book). They did, however describe norms and stereotypes as important constructs in the cognitive assessment of 
social representations. 
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successful women on tasks typically performed by women. In other words, the basis for 
comparison was asymmetric in favor of successful men, unless the task was woman-specific and 
women were performing it. 
Through cognitive experiments like McGill's (1993), studies have demonstrated a 
tendency for people to be asymmetrical in their judgments of groups depending on which group 
was perceived as typical or atypical. When a social group has attributes that are processed as 
surprising or atypical, the group often becomes “the effect to be explained,” or the target person 
focused on that draws a greater need for explanation in comparison to groups with more typical, 
unsurprising features (Bruckmüller, Hegarty, & Abele , 2012; Hegarty, 2006; Hegarty & 
Buechel,2006; Hegarty & Pratto, 2001; 2004; Miller, Taylor, & Buck, 1991; Pratto, Hegarty, & 
Korchmairos, 2007). Norm theory studies show one way of accomplishing Augoustinos and 
Walker's (1995) suggestion for the integration of macro-social understandings in the assessment 
of individualized thinking about others. They provide a cognitive interpretation for the 
occurrence of asymmetries in people's explanations at the micro-genetic level and tie these 
explanations to shared knowledge at the socio-genetic level. The results from studies based in 
norm theory give insight into the effect of shared knowledge on the attribution process. 
When traits are perceived as typical or expected, researchers have suggested that people 
process this information at a fast-paced, automatic or implicit level (Bargh, 1989; Langer, 1989). 
The above list of studies on norms in intergroup processing supports this claim. Specifically, 
norm theory studies imply that people pay more attention to groups or persons with traits that are 
rendered atypical or that go against a person’s social schema than to groups or persons with traits 
that are typical or support a person’s social schema. Thus, determining which traits tend to be 
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relied on and seen as typical or atypical in the attribution process will be key to understanding 
the implicitness of certain traits as either defining or contracting people's social representations. 
The processing of expected norms is so automatic that explanations for those norms 
simply “go without saying.” In fact, in naturalistic settings, people tend to explain situations that 
are perceived as unexpected or negative (Weiner, 1985). For example, people are more likely to 
make causal attributions for a sports team that wins a game if they do not originally expect that 
team to perform well (Lau & Russell, 1980). If an undefeated team wins another game, the lack 
of an explanation demonstrates that there is collective agreement about why an undefeated team 
won again. Moscovici might suggest that the social representation (expected norm) of the team is 
that it is a winning team. Therefore, the team’s victory is interpreted as common sense and it is 
processed automatically. Indeed, research in many related areas of social-psychology, e.g., 
schemas (Bem, 1981), causal attributions (Rumelhart, 1984), heuristics  (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; 
Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972) and norms (Bruckmüller, 
Hegarty, & Abele , 2012; Hegarty, 2006; Hegarty & Buechel,2006; Hegarty & Pratto, 2001; 
2004; Miller, Taylor, & Buck, 1991; Pratto, Hegarty, & Korchmairos, 2007), have all 
demonstrated that people make quick judgments when expectations related to social 
representations are met, but slow down to explain the unfamiliar or unexpected. 
Shifts in attention can also take place simply as a result of categorical learning procedures 
(Kruschke, 2003).  The frequency of encountering certain stimuli can cause shifts in attention 
when infrequent stimuli are presented. According to the inverse base-rate effect (Medin & 
Edelson, 1988), people tend to associate distinct features with infrequently encountered 
categories more often than they associate distinct features with frequently encountered 
categories. When we are exposed to a new target after being frequently exposed to an old target, 
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we focus attention on the new target and its unique features, while cognitively blocking out the 
features it shares with the old target (Kruschke, 2003). This occurs simply due to the frequency 
with which we were originally exposed to the old target; not just its unexpectedness. 
Individual differences: Outcomes and prejudice 
While some people may respond to unexpected stimuli by asymmetrically attending to 
them, others may not. To help explain this, Gilbert (1989) drew on past research to posit that 
people tend to make attributions sequentially. For example, when people favor situational 
explanations over dispositional explanations of other people’s behaviors, Gilbert suggests that 
people apply situational explanations second. People first “characterize” or apply dispositional 
causes to explain a person’s behaviors. Then, if they do it at all, they “correct” or apply 
situational causes to explain a person’s behaviors (Gilbert, 1989). For an example, recall that the 
default in American society is to respond by overestimating dispositional causes of behaviors 
(Jones and Harris, 1967). Characterization reflects the use of this default schema when analyzing 
other people’s behaviors. But then, some people will recognize a misattribution and make the 
decision to adjust their initial judgments. They actively choose to apply a different schema—one 
based in applying situational causes to explain people’s behaviors.  
Although some researchers have contested the notion that this process is sequential by 
advocating for the idea that these processes occur simultaneously (see Chaiken & Trope, 1999), 
the point that correction occurs for some people is highlighted here. Research on stereotypes and 
prejudice explain how and why some people, under the right conditions, “correct” or adjust their 
misattributions while others do not (e.g., Bargh, 1999; Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001; Devine, 1989; 
Fiske, 1989; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). Stereotypes have been proposed as having a life of their 
own as socially shared definitions or representations of certain types of persons or groups. 
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Stereotypes are rehearsed so much by all members of society that all people automatically 
associate stereotypes with their respective groups. At the same time as implicit measures 
demonstrating these stereotyped associations, attitude measures show that people vary with 
regard to their demonstration of prejudice toward certain groups (see Hoffman, Hawronski, 
Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005, for a review). For example, Devine (1989) hypothesized that 
individual differences in levels of prejudice do not correlate with the activation of stereotypes, 
only with the subsequent application of them. Devine (1989) conducted several studies that 
supported the idea that stereotypes are separate from prejudice in cognitive processing of social 
representations. The primary result from these studies was that participants were similar in their 
explicit or implicit generation of stereotypes regardless of measures that categorized them as low 
in prejudice or high in prejudice. 
Prejudice can be the result of an automatic response, but prejudice can also be avoided 
through effortful control. Research on gender stereotyping suggests that it takes more effort for 
people to adjust for prejudice than to simply allow automatic processes to take control of the 
judgments they make (Bessenoff & Sherman, 2000; Boenke, 2003; Cooper, 2000; Devine, 
1989). Prejudice can result if cognitive resources taken to overcome prejudice are depleted. 
Research has found that low levels of prejudice correlate with making less sexist attributions, but 
this correlation disappears depending on the expense of cognitive resources at the time of making 
the attribution. One study found that cognitive busyness through a distraction task caused people 
to use sexist language who otherwise adjust for sexism in their attributions of women (Cralley & 
Ruscher, 2005). In this example, the distraction task was able to reveal the strength of social 
representations of women that cause people to use sexist language when describing people's 
gender in spite of their individual efforts to counteract it. The impact of manipulations of 
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attention on stereotyping has been supported in other research as well (e.g., Gilbert & Hixon, 
1991; Harris & Perkins, 1995; Sherman, Macrae, Bodenhausen, 2011) 
Gender and social representations 
 Up until this point, I have proposed different cognitive processes through the lens of 
social representations. I’ve proposed that the socio-genesis, or current state, of social knowledge 
can be interpreted through measuring the amount of time it takes to apply a schema (i.e., 
response time) and through individual differences in the actual outcomes of people’s attributions 
(i.e., the content of people's attributions). But in order to truly understand the benefits of these 
approaches, central and peripheral elements of social representations about gender need to be 
identified. I begin with a brief explanation of the terms that I use when discussing the topic of 
gender since my own perspectives and reasons for use of certain terms sometimes differ from 
other theorists’ perspectives and use of similar terms. Then, I consider the findings of past 
research to help delineate the relationship of gender-related traits and roles as well as physical 
and biological characteristics to social representations about gender. After that, I propose gender 
identity as a characteristic that is unique to current knowledge that may impact the social 
representations that people have about gender. The focus on new knowledge has implications 
that will help guide the next section on individual differences. 
Gender and sex 
 Gender and sex are often viewed as distinct—gender being posited as the “psychological, 
social, and cultural aspects of maleness and femaleness” and sex being the “biological 
components of maleness and femaleness” (Kessler & McKenna, 1978, p. 7). In my own research, 
I assume that both gender and sex are social constructions. This configuration of gender is 
appropriate in keeping with a social representations lens because a widely held belief that people 
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take for granted is the idea that sex is biological and therefore concrete, immutable, and binary. 
Meanwhile, biological aspects of gender are just as diverse as the gender identities that are 
encountered in society (see Fausto-Sterling, 2000). This interpretation of gender aligns with the 
work of Kessler and McKenna (1978) who inform the direction of the studies conducted in this 
dissertation. Therefore, when I refer to gender in my own writing, I adopted their approach, 
which is the following: 
We will use gender, rather than sex, even when referring to those aspects of being 
a woman (girl) or man (boy) that have traditionally been viewed as biological. 
This will serve to emphasize [my] position that the element of social construction 
is primary in all aspects of being female or male, particularly when the term we 
used seems awkward (e.g., gender chromosomes). The word ‘sex’ will be used 
only for references to reproductive and love-making activities and, at times, in 
reference to purely physical characteristics when explicating the position of 
someone else who uses this word. (Kessler & McKenna, 1978, p. 7) 
Peripheral elements: Traits and roles 
Bem (1981) explains that people develop a schema for categorizing their own genders 
through a social process called sex-typing. She defines sex-typing as “the process by which 
society transmutes male and female into masculine and feminine” (Bem, 1981, p. 354). 
According to Bem, in a mutually constitutive process, people dichotomously link women and 
men to traits and roles that are perceived as feminine or masculine, respectively. She developed 
the Bem Sex-Role Inventory (BSRI) to measure sex-typing of traits according to this dichotomy, 
but on a continuum in which androgyny would represent the mid-point of the scale. Spence 
(1981) has criticized Bem's scale for placing femininity and masculinity as endpoints that make 
it difficult to distinguish the midpoint as androgyny or as a refusal to type the target as masculine 
or feminine. She also suggested that the scale, as well as the Personal Attributes Questionnaire 
(PAQ; Spence & Helmreich, 1978), does not measure sex-typing or schematization, and instead 
measures gender identity as multifactorial. She found that most people identify their genders 
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according to traits that are gender-congruent while ignoring the fact that they do not have certain 
gender-congruent traits and/or that they simultaneously possess gender-incongruent traits. But 
how susceptible to change are people’s social representations of gender-related traits and roles 
with regard to other people? 
López-Sáez, Morales, and Lisbona (2008) measured schemas as stereotypes of others. 
They looked at the stereotyping of traits and roles at two different time intervals in Spain: 1993 
and 2001. Classical trait-based dimensions were used which dichotomize expressive-communal 
traits (e.g., friendly) from instrumental-agentic traits (e.g., assertive). In 1993, these traits were 
assigned to women and men respectively. In 2001, they found that the content of Spanish 
people's schematic stereotyping were still dichotomous. However, they found that they seemed 
to change their perceptions of traits that are typically assigned to men such that women were 
assigned to instrumental-agentic traits just as often as men. López-Sáez, Morales, and Lisbona 
(2008) argued that this adjustment in trait-stereotyping explains the changes in role stereotyping 
that co-occurred in the general, worker population of Spain. During this period, gender-based 
stereotyping significantly decreased with regard to roles related to paid work outside the home. 
Thus, traits and roles were susceptible to changes over time just as peripheral elements are 
depicted as mutable under social representations theory. 
Similar to social representations, Bem (1981) acknowledged that the application of 
gender schemas (sex-typing) as a universal process that has content that differentiates cross-
culturally in accordance with a culture’s enforced social roles. Furthermore, Bem (1981) 
emphasized that gender schemas and their application to stimuli can evolve within a single 
culture. According to Bem (1981), sex-typing contributes to an “evolving gender schema” used 
“to evaluate and assimilate new information” as it is encountered throughout everyday life (p. 
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355). The evolution of social representations of gender is depicted through the changing 
attribution of traits and roles to certain genders in societies.  
Like schema theory in general, Bem’s theory may benefit from a deliberate social 
representations lens. Instead, she draws from social learning theory to explain that individuals 
engage in sex-typing as a result of learning from adults and peers that there is a general social 
agreement that sex determines certain roles and behaviors are meant either for females or for 
males. Although social context is considered, this position neglects to account for how people 
come to accept the woman-man and femininity-masculinity dichotomies in the first place. 
Emphasizing this point is Bem’s (1981) persistence in using the term “sex-typing.” Spence's 
(1993) emphasis on the multiple factors that contribute to gender identity was an improvement 
on this. But Bem's (1981) use of the term “sex” rather than “gender” is an example of the 
cisgenderist characterization of “female” and “male” biology as immutable. Use of the term 
"sex" reproduces the social representation of a factual, essentialized, and binary gender 
regardless of her separate perspective on the fluidity of gender traits and roles. Use of the term 
sex while only questioning why people attach certain roles to sex suggests a personal acceptance 
of a common sense biological dichotomy between women and men. A social representations lens 
would question the assumption of this dichotomy as well as the ethnocentric assumption inherent 
in her definition of sex-typing since not all cultures treat gender as binary. For example, at least 
five gender categories are have been documented in Bugis society in Indonesia (Davies, 2007). 
Next, I turn to research on gender attributions which takes into account the underlying 
importance of physical and biological characteristics in people’s cognitive processing of other 
people’s genders in the general population of Western/American society. 
Central elements: Physical and biological characteristics 
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There have been a limited number of empirical studies that consider the social 
representations of gender involved in the attribution process. Gender attribution studies in social 
psychology that follow a traditional causal attributions model have been in the majority (see 
Alexander & Andersen, 1993; Deaux & Emswiller, 1974; Galper & Luck, 1980; Koch, Muller, 
& Sieverding, 2008; López-Sáez, Morales, and Lisbona, 2008). These studies helped reveal 
additional role and trait-based gender biases in the perceptions of women and men similar to 
Bem’s (1981) interpretation of “sex-typing.” Such studies challenge some of the peripheral, 
flexible elements of social representations around gender, but neglect to address the social 
representations that are central to forming people’s common sense notion of the woman-man 
dichotomy. Researchers who developed studies from the perspective of ethnomethodology were 
the first to ask questions that addressed the foundation upon which traits and roles are ultimately 
built, i.e., "essential" features such as physical and biological characteristics (Garfinkel, 1967; 
Kessler & McKenna, 1978; Medin & Ortony, 1989). 
Garfinkel’s ethnomethodogical perspective6 has much in common with social 
representations theory. Social representations theory and ethnomethodology are extremely 
similar in terms of how they describe the sharing of social knowledge. Both discuss 
communication (in various forms) as the means through which social knowledge is shared in 
societies (see Potter and Edwards, 1999). However, they differ in approach to doing research. 
Ethnomethodologists seek to identify the methods through which people make sense of their 
surroundings while social representations theorists seek to explain why those methods are there 
in the first place. Moscovici (2001) actually criticized ethnomethodology for focusing too much 
on identifying norms and explaining how they are used in communication practices without 
                                                          
6Garfinkel developed his ethnomethodological perspective in critique of structuralist interpretations of people’s 
relationship to society (for review of this critique, see Heritage, 1984). 
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explaining their collective representation in social discourse. In turn, Potter and Edwards (1999) 
have criticized social representations theory for its disinterest in analyzing micro-interactions 
(e.g., through conversation analysis). 
Regardless, researchers from both camps seem to similarly theorize that social knowledge 
transforms into common sense understandings that are then applied (and are able to be studied) 
at the individual level. In the opening to their gender attributions research, Kessler and McKenna 
(1978) propose that ethnomethodologists question taken-for-granted understandings about our 
world by seeking to identify the “objective facts” that people and societies create. 
Ethnomethodologists seek to uncover how people individually (re)produce the existence of these 
facts in their everyday lives in specified situations. Instead of calling them common sense 
understandings or the central core elements of social representations, Garfinkel called them 
“natural attitudes.” From this perspective, shared social knowledge about gender is viewed as a 
belief system. Ethnomethodologists do not suggest a wrongness or rightness to these beliefs; they 
are recognized as real to their believers. The motivation is to identify the methods used to 
perpetuate social knowledge as real to those who believe them.  
Garfinkel identified gender as an example of a concept imbued with common sense 
notions. He mainly used case studies to derive several natural attitudes central to people’s 
knowledge about and (re)production of gender in Western culture (see Garfinkel, 1967). Kessler 
and McKenna (1978) paraphrased these into eight natural attitudes: 
1. There are two, and only two, genders (female and male). 
2. One’s gender is invariant. (If you are female/male, you always were female/male 
and you always will be female/male.) 
3. Genitals are the essential sign of gender. (A female is a person with a vagina; a 
male is a person with a penis) 
4. Any exceptions to two genders are not to be taken seriously. (They must be jokes, 
pathology, etc.) 
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5. There are no transfers from one gender to another except ceremonial ones 
(masquerades). 
6. Everyone must be classified as a member of one gender or another. (There are no 
cases where gender is not attributed.) 
7. The male/female dichotomy is a “natural” one. (Males and females exist 
independently of scientists’ [or anyone else’s] criteria for male and female.) 
8. Membership in one gender or another is “natural.” (Being female or male is not 
dependent on anyone’s deciding what you are.) (pp. 113-114, all parentheses and 
emphases are Kessler and McKenna's remarks) 
In line with other ethnomethodologists, Kessler and McKenna (1978) temporarily suspend a 
belief in the above “realities” in order to understand how those realities are constructed and 
reconstituted in people’s everyday lives.  
Kessler and McKenna (1978) identified the process of assigning a gender to another 
person (“the gender attribution process”) as an everyday process that could answer the question: 
How do people construct their “natural attitudes” toward gender? Resembling the 
objectification of social representations, Kessler and McKenna suggest that social ideologies 
become so widely accepted and engrained in our understanding of the world that we do not even 
question them—they are common sense. They conceptualized the attribution process as a general 
process in which information is inferred and interpreted through” implicit rules” that involve 
“deep structure[s] of social interaction” (p. 18). In other words, attribution processes determine 
the central elements that form people’s social representations, and these elements act implicitly 
on cognitive processes to produce potentially prejudiced interpretations and judgments.  
Kessler and McKenna’s (1978) studies sought to assess people’s attributions of the 
categories “female” and “male.” Information in the form of different characteristics about a 
hypothetical person was manipulated in ways that contradicted or aligned with stereotypical 
notions of “female” and “male.” This manipulation helped reveal which of the hypothetical 
person’s characteristics were relied on the most when people made a gender attribution. To 
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accomplish this, Kessler and McKenna (1978) conducted two major studies: The first was their 
“Ten Question Gender Game” and the second was their “Overlay study.”   
For the Ten Question Gender Game, gender information was communicated through 
questions generated by the participant, which might include questions about gender role 
behaviors (e.g. having a 9-5 job), genitals (e.g. penis), “secondary” physical characteristics (e.g. 
breasts), gender expression through clothing (e.g. wearing skirts) and more. Their questions were 
then either confirmed or disconfirmed by the experimenter through randomized “yes” or “no” 
responses. The participants had to make a gender attribution and explain their answers after each 
time the experimenter gave a response. Based on participants' responses, Kessler and McKenna 
concluded that: (1) the gender attribution process involves assessing and giving meaning to 
information that is socially shared, and that information such as biological or physical 
characteristics, in particular genitals, are more important than other information (gender roles) in 
determining other people’s gender; (2) modifying Garfinkel’s (1967) claim that genitals are 
equally essential to both genders, knowledge about the presence of a penis provides more insight 
into a person’s gender than presence of a vagina; and (3) the first gender attribution made about 
someone else acts as a filter for explaining the rest of that person’s behaviors/characteristics. 
The first two of these conclusions are compelling and I elaborate on them below. The last 
conclusion, regarding the finality in people’s decision when assigning a gender, may be the result 
of a limitation with the ten questions game. First, people received gender information 
sequentially. Second, participants were asked to make a dichotomous decision and commit to it 
verbally to the researcher after every answer was given to their questions. This format may have 
caused people to become defensive when they were then given subsequent and conflicting 
information. In natural settings, people may receive several pieces of information upfront or at 
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once. They may have the opportunity to assess several characteristics at once or pick and choose 
which ones to consider that they deem relevant, even if some of those characteristics must be 
imagined or assumed to exist (e.g., genitals beneath clothing). The next study they conducted 
overcame this limitation.  
For the Overlay study, participants were asked to attribute “female” or “male” to 96 
variations of the same line-drawing image of an individual by using overlays to create different 
combinations of hypothesized gender-related characteristics. Characteristics included: long/short 
hair, wide/narrow hips, breasts/flat chest, no visible body hair/body hair, vagina/penis, and 
"unisex" shirt/pants. When participants were expected to provide an even number of female 
attributions as male attributions to certain figures (e.g. a figure with genitals covered), they 
disproportionately used a male attribution. They applied a male attribution to figures more often 
regardless of whether the genital regions were covered or uncovered. People tended to view 
“female” characteristics as “male” more often than male characteristics were viewed as female. 
People had a tendency to perceive different figures as male regardless of other available 
information. For example, in figures with the genital region uncovered, the presence of a penis 
almost always (96 percent of the time) resulted in a male gender attribution, while presence of a 
vagina was not as definitive. The vagina needed the presence of two other characteristics (e.g., 
breasts and long hair) to come close to receiving a female attribution as often as the presence of a 
penis received a male attribution. Kessler and McKenna (1978) concluded, “Penis equals male 
but vagina does not equal female” (p. 151) in the attribution process. 
Combined results from these studies revealed empirical support for Garfinkel’s (1967) 
suggestion that our society holds several “natural attitudes” toward gender. The findings suggest 
several important interpretations of the ways in which people think about, interpret, and make 
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judgments about other people’s genders.  First, information is shared in the same sense that 
Moscovici described about social representations. Their findings demonstrate a collective 
agreement about genitals as the ultimate characteristics that constitute women and that constitute 
men. Social representations explains that genitals have been communicated by authorities and 
then perpetuated by members of society to establish them as common sense, irrefutable 
characteristics that define women and men. Although children early on in their development 
often believe that women and men have some essence that makes them women and men, 
children do not usually identify genitals as the essential characteristic (see McConaghy, 1979). 
Children eventually learn that genitals are significant through social communication over time 
(Gelman, 2004). Often, this communication is derived from authoritative sources, e.g., parents 
and doctors. When it comes to determining gender, the typical method used by authorities (e.g. 
doctors, scientists) in U.S. society and other Western societies is to identify and measure 
biological markers (e.g. genitals) to make a gender assignment in utero or at birth (see Fausto-
Sterling, 2000). Therefore, a biologically deterministic schema for gender attribution that relies 
on similar markers is likely to be a core social representation that gets communicated at a young 
age and is easily accessed, supported, and perpetuated throughout people’s lives.  
Kessler and McKenna (1978) concluded that gender attribution is genital attribution—
even when genitals cannot be physically seen. Garfinkel (1967) proposes the cultural genital as 
the gender that people attribute to a person based on assumptions about their genitals because 
they cannot actually see a person’s genitals. In Kessler and McKenna’s (1978) studies, the 
corresponding genitals are assumed to be there even when a figure’s genital region is covered by 
clothing. After all, people cannot see a person’s genitals when they are making a gender 
attribution in everyday situations. People visualize or assume the genitals are there after 
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assessing other characteristics. According to the research on categorization processes outlined 
above, this visualization should be automatic (unless our judgments of a person's characteristics 
are inconsistent with our interpretation of other characteristics). 
Findings also specified that gender attribution is not only genital attribution—but penis 
attribution, specifically. The male cultural genital (penis) was assigned more often than the 
female cultural genital (vagina). For Kessler and McKenna (1978), these results emphasized 
androcentrism in society. Androcentrism involves the tendency to view maleness as normative 
and femaleness as representative of differences in gender. Males are often equated with humanity 
and seen as the default gender (see Bem, 1981). Recent research has demonstrated that 
androcentrism has not dissipated in nearly thirty-five years since Kessler and McKenna’s (1978) 
studies (Braun & Kitzinger, 2001; Hegarty & Buechel, 2006). Thus, genitals appear to be a core 
element of social representations of gender that result in misattributions of people's gender. 
A recent study by Speer (2005) demonstrates further support that the cultural genital is a 
persistent, core element of social representations of women and men in contemporary society. 
Speer (2005) demonstrated people’s propensity to make binary gender attributions that reflect 
Kessler and McKenna’s (1978) cultural genital finding. With its roots in ethnomethodology, 
Speer’s (2005) study applied conversation analysis to transcripts of individuals in focus groups 
who were asked to determine what was happening in different photographs held up by the 
experimenter. Through this level of analysis, nearly thirty years after Kessler and McKenna’s 
(1978) work, people still tended to take cues from the context of the photograph or the external 
characteristics of the target person depicted in the photographs and then applied binary 
(female/male) notions of gender to identify their genders (Speer, 2005). Furthermore, they did so 
without the constraint of a split gender choice when making those attributions. Most of the time, 
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participants implicitly attributed gender to the person or people in the picture by discussing the 
scene with binary gender pronouns like “she” or “him.” Speer (2005) noted that participants had 
difficulty identifying the gender of the pictured person and would attempt to come up with an 
explanation for their gender; a reflection of past research findings that demonstrated people's 
asymmetric explanatory focus on the unexpected or atypical group (e.g., Hegarty & Pratto, 
2001). When trying to identify the gender of the pictured person, participants tended to 
rationalize their way to assigning a female or male gender label by taking into account different 
contextual and target cues. In other words, people had methods or ways of producing a dual 
gender interpretation of the photographs, even if people perceived the photographs as depicting 
gender in an ambiguous or atypical way. Findings such as these suggest that the cultural genital 
norm is still a central component of social representations about gender today. 
Methodological concerns and considerations 
One observation of Kessler and McKenna’s (1978) studies is that—similar to the binary 
gender anchors in Bem's sex-typing scale—their experimental design may have reinforced a 
gender dichotomy through the instructions given to participants. For the Ten Questions Gender 
Game, Kessler and McKenna (1978) told people to decide between the binary gender categories, 
female and male. Similarly, in the Overlay study they asked people to determine if a female or 
male was pictured. As a result, people could only assign people as one gender or the other. This 
experimental constraint limits the study to pointing out binary miscalculations, rather than 
miscalculations that derive from making an ambiguous calculation about other people’s genders. 
After all, judging people as neither a woman nor a man or less of a woman or less of a man 
because they are perceived to be inauthentic in their womanness or manness is equally as 
cisgenderist as making a binary gender attribution that opposes a person’s gender identity. All of 
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these gender judgments similarly delegitimize people’s self-designated genders (see Ansara, 
2010).  
The dichotomous choices that Kessler and McKenna (1978) implemented were, however, 
appropriate to their intentions with the study, however. They intended for their approach to 
demonstrate “…what transexualism can illuminate about the day-to-day social construction of 
gender” (p. 112). Here, transsexualism refers to characteristics that contradict stereotypical 
notions of “female” and “male.” Thus, Kessler and McKenna (1978) were interested in how 
contradicting characteristics cause people to rely on certain characteristics over others to make a 
determination that supports the gender dichotomy. They did not suggest that the contradicting 
characteristics might cause people to deny others a position in that dichotomy altogether. 
Furthermore, Speer's (2005) study suggested that people tend to rationalize their way to a 
dichotomous gender attribution regardless. 
Nevertheless, the experimenter reinforcement of a two-category choice may limit the 
ability to identify when perceivers' social knowledge about gender has developed to challenge 
this dichotomy. Participants in the Ten Questions Gender Game broke the “rules” twice by 
spontaneously suggesting the gender labels “hermaphrodite” and “transsexual.” This suggests 
that at least some people at the time of their studies (the 1970s) had knowledge of gendered 
groups that may be depicted as “outside” the woman-man dichotomy. When people have the 
opportunity to assign non-binary categories, they may essentialize the target person as distinct 
from the traditional binary similar to how they distinguish between groups in research on 
subgrouping (see Richards & Hewstone, 2001). While being essentialized as a non-binary gender 
is unproblematic for people who identify with that category, this form of misgendering can be 
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problematic for people who do identify as either a woman or a man. In the next section, I 
consider the impact of this differentiation. 
The special case of gender identity in attributions 
Gender identity is a special Western concept and characteristic that, like the cultural 
genital, is difficult to perceive from the outside. Gender identity has to do with the feelings that 
people have about their own gender—information that is difficult for a perceiver to know for 
certain without asking the individual (Kessler & McKenna, 1978). The concept of gender 
identity is sometimes defined in such a way that it re-essentializes gender as a biological, innate, 
and immutable characteristic that is “between the ears” rather than “between the legs” (see 
Laqueur, 1990). This definition is commonly used among psychologists and other authoritative 
individuals who are invested in distinguishing between “sex” and “gender” (e.g., Diamond, 
2002; Unger, 1979), potentially making it into a new kind of social representation about gender 
particularly in the discourse of American/Western society.7 Many individuals experience their 
gender identity as distinct from their physical sex and want to be perceived only as the gender 
that corresponds with their identity (see Prosser, 1998). For example, Sandy Stone (1991) 
examined the autobiographies of women with a self-designated gender that was independent 
from the male gender assigned to them at birth and found that they persisted in their belief in the 
existence of two, distinct, biological genders.8 
However, as discussed earlier in this introduction, not all people are perceived as their 
gender identity to others. Recall Kaur’s experience as a self-identified woman: she 
acknowledged that the presence of her beard was perceived as inconsistent with normative 
                                                          
7 Gender itself, including gender identity, has been argued to be an ethnocentric concept that does not translate to 
other cultures. See Oyěwùmí (1997) for a discussion about inapplicability of gender to some African societies. 
8 For an example of an “intersex” person’s position reflecting this same perspective, see Garfinkel’s (1967) case of 
“Agnes.” 
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expectations of women, a perception that caused confusion about her gender. Misattributions 
having to do with a discrepancy between a perceiver’s gender attribution and a target person’s 
gender identity can arise when people make assumptions about a person’s gender based on their 
perceptions of external information. Since gender identity is an internal characteristic, people 
must be told or they must ask in order to know it. Even the very idea that gender identity 
qualifies gender suggests that gender identity and a person's gender are purportedly two separate 
concepts with two potentially different values. For instance, people rely on social representations 
about gender that do not include asking someone their own perceptions of their gender as the 
foremost method for making a gender attribution. People attempt to identify other people’s 
genders using other characteristics, e.g., their voices, their body hair, their genitals, etc. As I have 
described, reliance on these other characteristics can result in misgendering. Therefore, 
cisgenderism includes instances of all judgments or positions that deny the legitimacy of a 
person’s own gender self-designation, such as denying their gender self-designation if they were 
not born with the gender identity they designate for themselves, if they did not present “cross-
sex” behaviors in childhood, or if they do not have brain or genetic characteristics that 
stereotypically align with their designated gender. Although some individuals may personally 
interpret their gender identity or gender experience as innate, moving beyond cisgenderism 
involves granting people the right to designate their gender for themselves regardless of its cause 
or origin (see Ansara, 2010). Again, cisgenderism is the delegitmization of people’s designations 
of their own genders by relying on social representations to make that designation for them. 
According to the socio-genesis of social representations, social practices and norms may 
eventually change as micro-genetic interactions such as those with Kaur continue to challenge 
normative expectations of gender. Increases in attention to individuals like Kaur may contribute 
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to more people adopting social practices that lead to a full cultural shift, e.g., a shift toward a 
common practice of asking people their gender identities before authoritatively assigning a 
gender to them. Information about the amount that the media has covered stories that include 
people with self-designated genders is limited. However, one magazine article claims that from 
2006 to 2007 news coverage of people with self-designated genders (e.g., “transgender people”) 
and their experiences nearly doubled (Hollar, 2007). Recently, Barney's began a campaign 
featuring transgender models with an over 30-minute documentary-style video about their stories 
affirming their genders socially, medically and administratively. Barney's collaborated with the 
National Center for Transgender Equality to produce the campaign "... with hopes to help break 
stereotypes and build social acceptance of the transgender community" (Brothers, Sisters, Sons 
& Daughters, 2014). With such coverage about people with self-designated genders in the media, 
gender identity may be starting to be a characteristic that people want to know about and may 
factor into their judgments before they take people’s appearance, the sound of their voice, or 
other characteristics at face value and jump to conclusions about their genders.  
Similarly, increasing media coverage and emphasis on the importance of genetics and 
chromosomes in health and science may suggest that characteristics such as chromosomes are 
also becoming an important consideration in the profile of determining people's gender (Hansen, 
2006). Future studies may consider including gender identity and chromosomes as elements that 
inform the gender attribution process. Pairing these elements with greater flexibility in the 
gender choices that perceivers can attribute would provide insight into the socio-genesis of social 
representations about gender and their correlation with gender misattributions. With information 
about personal identity, genitals, and chromosomes provided, categorizing people as anything 
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other than people’s personal gender identities would suggest a cognitive bias stemming from 
their social representations. 
Individual differences in attribution processes and social representations 
Challenges to normative expectations related to gender (Kessler & McKenna, 1978; 
Speer, 2005) may result in individual differences in the attributions that people make—especially 
when one of those challenges has to do with information that is provided about a person’s gender 
identity. Recall Gilbert’s (1989) description of the sequential attribution process. People first 
automatically make dispositional attributions of other’s behavior because these come from 
American social representations regarding individualism. Then, some people correct for these 
misattributions by considering the situational attributions of other’s behavior. I predict that 
gender attributions will be made in a similar step-by-step process. But what are the individual 
differences that predict people’s propensity to engage in the second, “correcting” step of this 
process? 
Moscovici (1963) initially used the construct of individual attitudes to account for the 
structure of social representations. He posited that representations of objects simultaneously 
constitute people’s attitudes toward those objects. Attitudes, while seen by many social 
psychologists as individualized, mental constructs (e.g., Allport, 1935; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), 
are depicted here as social because they are linked to social values (Jaspars & Fraser, 1984). In 
other words, an assessment of attitudes toward an object provides a window to understanding the 
social representation of that object. Subsequently, Doise (1989) once explained that attitudes 
depend on people’s individual exposure to particular social knowledge. Thus, the two 
overarching individual measures that may predict differences in people’s gender attribution 
outcomes are:  (1) exposure to social information that challenges common sense understandings 
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of gender, i.e., when the reliability of individuals’ genital attribution practices are challenged; 
and (2) attitude measures that, in the past, have been found to correlate with less prejudice 
toward persons with self-designated genders and the groups with which some of these persons 
identify, e.g., transgender persons. Below, I outline the research that suggests why these two 
overarching individual measures may relate to differences in the outcome of misgendering. 
Quantity and quality of contact with perceived out-groups 
Contact with particular groups with which people do not share membership ("outgroups") 
and certain personality traits that facilitate the frequency and quality of such contact may predict 
some of the variance related to gender misattribution. This relationship was first examined by 
sociologist Robin Williams, Jr. (1947), who published a review of ingroup relations research that 
primarily focused on racial and ethnic prejudice. His findings confirmed researchers’ and 
practitioners’ early speculations that contact between groups has a positive effect on people’s 
attitudes toward each other. Williams’ findings provided the needed support for Gordon Allport 
(1954/1979) to introduce the intergroup contact theory to the field of social psychology. He 
proposed that prejudice between groups is reduced when several contextual factors are met: (1) 
equal status between groups; (2) common goals between groups; (3) intergroup cooperation; and 
(4) cultural or authoritative support. 
Many studies were subsequently conducted to examine the intergroup contact theory. 
Reviews of this literature have shown conflicting results. Some reviewers concluded that 
increases in prejudice among study participants may not extrapolate to entire outgroups (Forbes, 
1997; McClendon, 1974) , that increases in prejudice rely on the nature of the relationship 
between individuals  (e.g., friends v. acquaintances) from each group (Riordan, 1978), and that 
many other contextual factors must be present for contact to reduce prejudice (Stephan, 1987). 
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As a result, some social psychologists have concluded that “the initial hopes of contact theorists 
have failed to materialize” (Hopkins, Reicher, and Levine, 1997, p. 306). 
Nevertheless, these past reviews have been criticized for missing the inclusion of 
important publications in their analyses, for lacking strict rules for inclusion of certain 
publications over others, and for the inclusion of research that was not quantitative (see 
Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) suggested that simple exposure to other 
groups increases people’s overall liking of them. They hypothesized that the other factors cited 
by Allport, such as having equal status or common goals, simply help facilitate the effect already 
set in motion by exposure alone. Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) conducted a meta-analysis that 
strictly focused on studies that examined intergroup contact as the independent variable and 
prejudice as the dependent variable, studies that looked at contact between specific social groups 
rather than interpersonal groups, and studies that measured direct intergroup interaction that took 
place rather than the proximity of two groups. The results of their rigorous meta-analysis clearly 
suggested that intergroup contact reduces prejudice between groups.  
Some social psychologists debate that contact theory overlooks actual experiences of 
contact in favor of ideal experiences of contact (Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2005). Thus, a 
reorientation in the design of research on the contact hypothesis has been suggested. For 
example, focusing on individuals' own interpretations of the contact they have with outgroups 
may be important to isolating contact with outgroups that is interpreted as positive rather than 
negative.  A focus on people's own interpretations—e.g., whether or not those contacts are 
perceived as friends—may accomplish the goal of assessing people's actual experiences with 
outgroups. Recent research also suggests the importance of flipping the coin to examine the 
impact of contact on the historically disadvantaged group. In some social contexts, contact may 
45 
 
reduce disadvantaged groups motivation to fight for equality because of the positive relationships 
they develop with advantaged groups (see Durrheim, Jacobs, Dixon, 2013). 
Some researchers have become interested in studying the impact of personality traits on 
the contact-prejudice effect. Who is more likely to have contact with outgroups in the first place? 
Who is more likely to have contact that results in positive experiences that strengthen the 
contact-prejudice effect? Jackson and Poulsen (2005) proposed a mediation model where the Big 
Five Personality traits were hypothesized to influence the contact-prejudice effect. For instance, 
the authors drew on research showing that people higher on the openness to experience trait are 
more likely to seek out and enjoy new experiences (see McCrae & Costa, 1997). Thus, people 
who are more open to experience are more likely to initiate contact with outgroups and come 
away from that contact with positive feelings about the outgroups. The authors also drew on past 
research showing that people higher on the agreeableness trait tend to have more positive 
interpersonal relations with people from friends to strangers suggesting that agreeableness also 
facilitates positive outcomes of contact with outgroups (see Asendorpf & Wilpers, 1998). Indeed 
their model was supported in a study measuring the mediation of personality traits between 
contact and prejudice toward Asian and African Americans. Results suggested that openness and 
agreeableness mediate the contact-prejudice effect such that greater openness increases 
frequency of contact and both openness and agreeableness raise the quality of the contact, 
resulting in an overall reduction in negative attitudes toward Asian and African Americans. 
Although a peer-reviewed analysis has not yet published clear evidence, increases in 
media coverage (Hollar, 2007) and advertising campaigns like Barney's recent one (Brothers, 
Sisters, Sons & Daughters, 2014) suggest people may be becoming more aware of concepts like 
gender identity as an important characteristic to defining people’s genders. One hypothesis 
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derived from this is that individuals, who might refer to themselves as "allies," may be becoming 
more supportive of certain groups, e.g., transgender people, who experience disproportionate 
amounts of gender-related prejudice in society (Stone, 2009; Stotzer, 2009). In primarily 
qualitative studies, ally status was found to be commensurate with positive attitudes and less 
prejudice toward the group to which they are allied. In alignment with contact theory, ally status 
has also been found to be a product of prior exposure to individuals within the allied group 
(Stone, 2009; Stotzer, 2009). Therefore, ally status to groups, e.g., transgender people, may 
contribute to fewer gender misattributions. Examining ally status may be a promising area to 
explore in light of recent concerns among researchers about the reduction in motivations to fight 
for inequality among disadvantaged groups as a result of contact with advantaged groups (see 
Durrheim, Jacobs, & Dixon, 2013). In contrast, the title "ally" is often given because of cause-
related support and resources that allies provide to fighting equality (see Stone, 2009).  
The above research on prejudice demonstrates that contact and ally status with 
transgender people as well as the personality traits that facilitate the frequency and quality of 
such contact may be related to gender misattributions. People’s exposure to transgender people 
may inform them about concepts, such as gender identity, that may impact the ways in which 
people view other people’s genders. Thus, contact with transgender people may contribute to less 
gender misattributions.  
The impact of attitudes and beliefs about gender on cisgenderist responses 
Cisgenderism defines institutionalized assumptions that cause gender misattributions and 
delegitimizations that affect a large number of individuals and social groups. There are no 
existing attitude scales or measures of prejudice that represent cisgenderist attitudes in the same 
way that concepts such as sexism, heterosexism, or transphobia have previously been measured. 
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Therefore, I turn to existing measures that may invoke some of the underlying assumptions that 
promote cisgenderist outcomes. Recall that the core of cisgenderism is denying others the right 
to determine their own gender. Instead of allowing people the authority to define their genders 
however they see fit, people tend to impose gender on others based on their own preconceived, 
social representations of what gender is supposed to look like.  
Drawing on what Kessler and McKenna (1978) found, the cultural genital is a biology-
based social representation of gender that seems to be the core element used to inform people’s 
perceptions of a target person’s gender. In their study conducted in the United Kingdom, Tee and 
Hegarty (2006) created a Biological Gender Beliefs scale, a measure developed out of a scale 
measuring "beliefs about trans people," which found that higher endorsement in the belief that 
gender is determined by biology predicted more negative attitudes toward trans people’s rights. 
They also measured people’s Beliefs about Gender, a scale that was originally developed to 
assess for attitudes that correspond with Garfinkel’s (1967) natural attitudes about gender. 
Although this measure was not found to significantly correlate with attitudes toward trans 
people’s rights, the scale is new and has not been tested widely enough to conclude whether or 
not higher endorsement of these beliefs increase people's tendency to misgender. Furthermore, 
no study to date has determined the extent to which the endorsement of either the Biological 
Gender Beliefs scale or the Beliefs about Gender scale impact the relationship between 
stereotype-inconsistencies in a target person’s gender characteristics and a perceiver’s rejection 
of the target person’s gender identity. 
Biology-based social representations may be measured by the concept of essentialism as 
well. Allport (1954/1979) proposed that prejudice results from the perception that others—who 
often form certain out-groups—share dispositional or essential characteristics. Essentialism 
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involves the tendency to explain outward appearances or behaviors as indicative of underlying, 
stable characteristics (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Heyman & Dweck, 1998). Some 
psychologists have pointed out the significance of essentialist beliefs about gender in social 
perception by identifying its endorsement by children as young as pre-school age (Gelman, 
Taylor, & Nguyen, 2004). In an effort to define essentialism, Gelman (2004) explained that 
essentialism describes "human constructions" rather than natural realities (p. 405). In other 
words, humans construct sex as reality rather than identify its existence in reality. Haslam and 
Levy (2006) found that essentialism includes the endorsement that the characteristics and 
behaviors of certain groups (e.g., women and men) are biologically immutable, have defining 
features, and are universally consistent across time and space. People who have essentialist 
beliefs tend to have a cognitive preference for stereotype-consistency over stereotype-
inconsistency when making judgments about others (Bastian & Haslam, 2007). Therefore, 
essentialist beliefs should similarly affect the gender attribution process such that essentialist 
beliefs moderate the relationship between gender characteristics that are stereotype-inconsistent 
and gender misattribution. 
Measures such as gender essentialism and biological gender beliefs may incorporate the 
social representations involved in cisgenderism that other measures, e.g., trans-related prejudice, 
do not include. For example, essentialism gets at the root of people making gender 
misattributions and includes the delegitimization of multiple existing and not-yet-realized 
gendered groups by exposing the assumptions that underlie gender in the first place. A major 
criticism inherent in the essentialism and cisgenderism concepts is that measuring negative 
attitudes toward specific groups reifies the existence of those groups by neglecting to call into 
question the assumptions that establish those groups from the start. For example, measures of 
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trans-prejudice are important to identifying who discriminates against “trans people” and 
measures of transphobia are important to identifying who fears or is disgusted by “trans people.” 
These measures accomplish the task of exposing that the prejudice exists, that certain people are 
more likely to be prejudiced in this way, and that the prejudice has a negative impact on the 
specific group of trans people (Ansara & Friedman, in press).  
However, this focus on attitudes toward “trans people” does not identify what it is about 
people’s perceptions of trans people that causes such prejudice in the first place. Measures of 
trans-prejudice and transphobia also neglect to assess for assumptions that are made about trans 
people that are harmful, but may, in fact, be involuntary or come from a place of goodwill.  
People can hold opinions about a particular group that are positive while simultaneously holding 
assumptions that they are not fully aware of that impact their judgments when interacting with a 
member of that group (Hoffman, Hawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Nosek, et al., 2007; Plant & Devine, 1998). Thus, people who are 
motivated to be less prejudiced tend to still be prejudiced at an implicit level (Ajzen, 2005; 
Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Devine, 1989; Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 
2002). For example, research on implicit racism has clearly demonstrated this effect. The 
implicit association test (which measures race-related stereotyping) captures significantly more 
variance than self-report measures of racial attitudes by showing that most people tend to 
asymmetrically favor “White” people over “Black” people (Nosek, et al. 2007). Implicit 
measures reveal asymmetries that exist behind people's otherwise egalitarian beliefs toward 
certain groups in modern culture, e.g. that black people should be treated equally to white people 
(see Augoustinos & Walker, 1995). Thus, measures of attitudes toward transgender people (e.g., 
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Genderism and Transphobia scale, Hill and Willoughby 2006) are not necessary to accomplish 
the goals of the present research. 
Additionally, the focus on trans people as the subjects of trans-prejudice and transphobia 
has been criticized for its intracultural and intercultural exclusion of groups and individuals who 
may not fall into the very Western category of “trans,” but who experience discrimination for 
similar, underlying reasons, e.g., the experiences of Sikh-American Balpreet Kaur, Thailand’s 
Kathoey people, or Indonesia’s Bissu people (Ansara & Hegarty, 2013). Although the present 
study is constrained to an American population, cisgenderism offers more flexibility in the 
measurement of these similar experiences of discrimination (Ansara & Hegarty, 2012). 
Essentialism and biological gender beliefs may define two ways of measuring the underlying 
assumptions that contribute to cisgenderist responses experienced by many different groups. 
Authoritarianism & Conservatism 
In their examination of anti-trans rights in the United Kingdom, Tee and Hegarty (2006) 
examined authoritarianism as a construct that relates to prejudice against transgender people. 
They found that part of the variance predicting opposition to trans people’s civil rights was 
explained by authoritarianism, an expected outcome given the correlation between sexual 
prejudice and authoritarianism in previous studies (see Herek, 2000; Whitley, 1999). 
Augoustinos and Walker (1995) explained that people who score high on authoritarianism are 
inclined to be prejudiced toward all groups perceived as out-groups. They explained that the 
correlation has to do with a greater propensity to comply with norms, rather than just having the 
personality construct of authoritarianism. However, endorsement of authoritarian beliefs can be 
used to identify individuals’ willingness to comply with social norms. Zakrisson’s (2005) Right-
Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale accomplishes this at least in part. The RWA is a 
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psychometrically sound measure based in social-learning theory that defines three components or 
factors: conventionalism, authoritarian submission, and authoritarian aggression. 
Conventionalism, in particular, has to do with strict conformity to social norms. Since the 
underlying components of this measure have to do with norms and gender characteristics are 
often stereotyped according to those norms, I suspect that endorsement of authoritarianism 
would impact the gender attribution process. 
Sexual prejudice has traditionally been correlated with conservatism and right-wing 
politics in the United States (see Brewer, 2003). Brewer’s Conservativism scale measures two 
components: moral traditionalism and egalitarianism. Moral traditionalism is defined by beliefs 
about the threat of changing moral standards in society. Egalitarianism is defined by beliefs 
about all people’s right to equal treatment in society. This measure was originally developed to 
examine shifting public opinion in response to the gay rights movement. While there has been 
much correlation between measures of sexuality-related attitudes measures and measures of 
gender-related attitudes measures in past research (e.g., Tee & Hegarty, 2006), this measure’s 
items are general enough to explain other outcomes. Thus, conservative beliefs may be measured 
in relation to its impact on the gender attribution process.  
Conclusion 
 In summary, social representations theory provides a theoretical framework for 
examining the impact of institutionalized cisgenderism on the schemas people use to make 
gender attributions at the cognitive level. Individual differences in gender attributions that lead to 
affirming other people’s own gender self-designations may reveal the beginnings of a cultural 
shift in social representations about gender. Looking to a person’s own gender self-designation 
(e.g., their personal gender identity) may eventually replace biology as the model for determining 
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a target person’s gender. However, previous research findings and scholarship on gender 
attributions, stereotyping, schemas, attitudes and prejudice, and cognitive busyness have 
highlighted several human tendencies that affect people's attributions about others. These 
tendencies reveal some of the central elements involved in social representations about gender 
that may be responsible for  the persistence of cisgenderism over time. The tendencies are:  
(a) people rely on characteristics perceived as essential (e.g., biological characteristics) 
when categorizing other people; 
(b) people demonstrate an implicit, asymmetric preference for people perceived to have 
stereotype-consistent rather than stereotype-inconsistent characteristics;  
(c) people categorize stimuli faster the more features of those stimuli are perceived as 
categorically similar;  
(d) people enact cognitive control to correct for or adjust their misperceptions or 
misattributions if they are aware of and motivated to adjust them, but they will default to 
these perceptions or attributions if their cognitive resources become depleted (e.g., 
through the presentation of a distraction task);  
(e) people differ in their level of prejudice toward particular groups depending on certain 
individual differences, e.g., having an open and agreeable personality, less contact with 
outgroups, being an ally to outgroups, essentialist beliefs, authoritarian beliefs, and 
conservatism relate to greater prejudice. 
These tendencies inform the theoretical model, study aims, and methods that were used in the 
research outlined henceforth. 
The theoretical model 
Based on the above analysis of the literature, I have developed a theoretical model to 
explain the relationships among the gender attribution process, individual differences, and 
cisgenderist outcomes (Figure 1). According to the model, people automatically process some 
aspects of gender at the cognitive level through gender visualization (A) and application of a 
default schema (B) to help interpret the visualization and make a final gender attribution (D). 
Gender visualization is proposed as an important part of the process since Kessler & McKenna 
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(1978) emphasized how people assume a person's genitals—even when they are not physically 
shown—based on other characteristics of the individual. Congruent with past research on 
stereotypes and automaticity (Bargh, 1999), this model suggests that this process is automatic, or 
little time is spent visualizing, when characteristics are described as stereotype-consistent with 
other characteristics. Similarly, application of the default schema is quick when characteristics 
are expected. Gilbert (1989) discussed how some people attempt to correct their biased 
attributions. Thus, the model posits that some people may engage in an explicit process in which 
the default schema that was automatically applied is adjusted by applying a different schema (C) 
before making the final gender attribution. Different outcomes for gender attribution depend on 
the schema that the perceiver uses to interpret the target person’s biological characteristics 
relative to the target person’s gender identity. When target persons’ characteristics are 
interpreted as stereotype-inconsistent, some people may use a default schema (B) while others 
may adjust (C) for the default schema before making a final gender attribution (D). Schema 
adjustment is operationally defined as less rejection of a target person’s self-designed gender 
identity (D) specifically when the target person’s characteristics are perceived to be stereotype-
inconsistent. 
For example, if perceivers are told to determine the gender of "G" who identifies as a 
woman and has a penis, they would begin by processing their perceptions of G through gender 
visualization (A). If G identified as a man and had a penis, perceivers would easily and quickly 
visualize a penis and possibly imagine other biological features that are stereotypically 
associated with having a penis (e.g., having a beard). However, the stereotype-inconsistency 
between G identifying as a woman and G having a penis would slow down the visualization and 
schema application process in comparison to if G's characteristics were stereotype-consistent. At 
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first, all people will automatically apply a default schema (B) in which they rely on G's actual or 
imagined biological characteristics to help them arrive at a final gender attribution. Using this 
default schema, many perceivers will arrive at the conclusion that G is a man, which is a 
rejection of G's gender identity as a woman, because G has a penis. However, some people will 
adjust their schema (C). They will use the gender identity of G, rather than G's genitals, to make 
a final gender attribution (D).  
The model further suggests that individual differences (X) in cognitive processing, 
derived from measures of experience, personality, attitudes, and beliefs, directly moderate the 
relationship between engaging in schema adjustment in the first place (C) and making a gender 
attribution (D). The model additionally posits two moderating factors on schema adjustment 
processes. First, the presence of a distraction (Y) during visualization may weaken the likelihood 
that people will engage in schema adjustment (C) similar to the increase in sexist language 
caused by cognitive busyness in Cralley and Ruscher's (2005) study. Second, based on the notion 
that circumstance can alter judgments (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995), the interpretation of 
consistency or inconsistency between a target person’s gender identity and an additional gender 
characteristic (Z) may also weaken the likelihood that adjusters will engage in schema 
adjustment (C). 
To return to the example of G, perceivers will be more likely to engage in schema 
adjustment if they have the following individual differences (X): more contact with transgender 
people, fewer essentialist beliefs, fewer beliefs that biology determines gender, less 
authoritarianism, and less conservatism. In other words, they will be more likely to determine 
that G is a woman, which demonstrates acceptance of G's gender identity (D). However, if 
perceivers who typically engage in schema adjustment (C) are distracted (Y) during gender 
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visualization of G (A), then they will be less likely to engage in schema adjustment (C). 
Similarly, if an additional characteristic is described that is stereotypically-inconsistent with G's 
gender identity as a woman (Z), such as that G enjoys wearing tuxedos to formal events, then 
perceivers will also be less likely to engage in adjustment (C). Both of these factors—distraction 
(Y) and an additional stereotype-inconsistent characteristic (Z)—will lead perceivers who 
typically engage in schema adjustment to apply the default schema (B) and determine that G is a 
man (D). 
Research aims and Study Overview 
Drawing on the logic of this model and the literature outlined above, I conducted a 
program of research addressing several aims that correspond with the questions raised at the 
beginning this dissertation. In this research, I follow the suggestions of Moscovici (2001) by 
examining collective representations as they exist in the social discourse. I do so by defining 
these representations as the independent variables—manipulations of target gender 
characteristics (stereotype-inconsistent/consistent) that are then judged by perceivers. This 
experimental design is one methodological approach, among many, to studying social 
representations theory (see Wagner, et al., 1999). Each aim to these studies is outlined below: 
Aim 1:  Determine how perceived stereotype (in)consistencies between a target person’s 
gender identity and biological characteristics impact the extent to which 
perceivers (a) reject a target person’s gender (rejection scores); and (b) take time 
to judge the target person’s gender (response time). 
Aim 2: Describe the individual difference factors that impact the relationship between 
perceptions of the stereotype (in)consistencies in target peoples gender 
characteristics and perceivers’ (a) rejection scores; and (b) response time. 
Aim 3: Determine the impact of cognitive busyness/presence of a distraction on adjusters’ 
(i.e., according to the model these are people who engage in schema adjustment) 
rejection scores for target people’s perceived to have stereotype-inconsistent 
characteristics. 
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Aim 4: Determine the impact of an additional gender-related target characteristic (e.g., 
clothing) on adjusters’ rejection scores for target people perceived to have 
stereotype-inconsistent characteristics. 
 Five studies were conducted to address the above aims. Study 1 tested Aims 1 and 2. 
Study 1 examined the relationship between perceived stereotype-inconsistencies of a target 
person's gender characteristics and the perceiver's rejection of the target person's gender identity 
by rating the extent to which the target person is a woman or a man. The relationship between 
the time perceivers' took to judge target people’s characteristics (e.g., gender identity, genitals, 
and chromosomes) and stereotype-(in)consistencies of the target person was also determined. 
Lastly, the study explored the role of individual differences in these relationships. 
 Study 2 extended Study 1 by specifically addressing Aim 3. The study tested the impact 
of cognitive distraction on the gender ratings given to target people by perceivers who engage in 
schema adjustment ("adjusters"). This study expanded on Study 1 by allowing participants more 
flexibility on the rating scale used to determine target people’s gender, and by examining 
additional individual differences. Study 2 also restricted the gender characteristics describing the 
target to gender identity and genitals. 
 Similar to Study 2, Study 3 addressed Aim 3. However, Study 3 used a revised study 
design aimed at strengthening the distraction task and reducing the potential confound effect of 
rehearsal time between rating target people without a distraction present and rating them with a 
distraction present. 
 Study 4 piloted new target gender characteristics in order to test the extent to which 
certain gender-related characteristics (e.g., clothing) are socially represented as exclusively for 
women or exclusively for men and the extent to which these characteristics are socially 
desirable. The characteristics with the strongest ratings were used in the vignettes that described 
new target people in Study 5. 
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 Study 5 used findings from Study 4 to test Aim 4. This study examined the effect of 
manipulating a normative gender characteristic (e.g., clothing preference) that is perceived as 
stereotype-inconsistent with the target person's gender identity on adjusters' gender judgments. 
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Chapter 3: 
Study 1 – Secondary Data Analysis 
Kessler and McKenna (1978) concluded from their studies that certain biological 
characteristics of the target—particularly the genitals—are central to the gender attribution 
process. Study 1 aimed to experimentally test factors such as genitals and others that may 
contribute to the gender attribution process within US society today. As a part of this process, the 
current study attempts to link knowledge from research demonstrating asymmetry in people’s 
judgments of others marked as surprising and who become the “effect to be explained" to the 
tendency to misgender certain people over others (e.g., Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). Factors that 
may contribute to the asymmetrical misgendering of others were investigated to determine which 
ones were most strongly linked to misgendering. Since misgendering has to do with assigning a 
person to a gender to which they do not personally identify, the gender identity of the target was 
the primary factor used to determine when misgendering occurred. Thus, Study 1 investigated 
how perceived stereotype-(in)consistencies between a target person’s gender identity and 
biological characteristics affect the extent to which perceivers reject a target person’s gender.  
The research on asymmetrical judgments suggests that perceivers pay more attention to 
targets stereotypically perceived as surprising (e.g., Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). Research on 
schematic categorization has also found that the more dissimilar the features of a category are, 
the more time people take to categorize it (Rosch, 1978; Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, & 
Knippenberg, 2003). Study 1 assessed response time to help determine which combinations of 
stereotyped features of targets are processed more quickly than others. Based on research on the 
contact hypothesis (e.g., Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) and research that links personality traits to 
more positive experiences with outgroups (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 1997), I also hypothesized that 
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factors of the perceiver may attenuate the extent to which misgendering occurs.  For example, 
exposure to people who are more likely to have gender-related characteristics that are perceived 
as atypical (e.g., some transgender people), may lead to less misgendering and less time spent 
judging the target. The gender attributions people make, the amount of time they spend making 
those attributions, and individual factors related to the perceiver may shed light on the extent to 
which knowledge about gender is collectively represented and individually perpetuated. 
To test the above, Study 1 involved a secondary data analysis conducted on Dr. Sarit 
Golub’s research study on gender perception. Dr. Golub developed the design of the experiment 
and collected the data in her lab with a team of research assistants. I then conducted an analysis 
of the data based on post-hoc inquiry stemming from the model I proposed in Figure 1. I 
examined the relationship between stereotype-inconsistent gender-related target characteristics 
and perceiver “rejection” of the target’s gender identity. I also examined whether there were 
differences in response time when rating targets with stereotype-inconsistencies compared to 
those with stereotype-consistent characteristics. Furthermore, I tested contact with transgender 
people and specific Big 5 personality traits (e.g., openness and agreeableness) as covariates that 
might influence rejection or acceptance of a target's gender identity.  
Participants 
 Study 1 participants were 151 students from Hunter College in New York City (NYC) 
who received course credit for their participation in the study. Of these 151 students, 24 (15.3%) 
students did not pass the manipulation check, which was used to determine people’s basic 
knowledge about the stereotyped association between XX chromosomes and women as well as 
XY chromosomes and men. Therefore, the final sample used in Study 1 analyses was 127 
participants.  
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 Table 1 shows full demographic data on the 127 participants. Of 125 participants who 
responded to the question asking about their age, the sample ranged from 18 to 53 years old (M = 
21.10, SD = 4.61). The 127 participants were mostly female-identified, mostly straight-
identified, had diverse racial group representation, mostly grew up in NYC, had a diverse 
representation of household incomes, and the majority were Atheist, Catholic, or 
Protestant/Christian.  
Method 
 Study 1 was conducted in the research lab. Participants completed the study on the 
computer using MediaLab/Direct RT. Participants were presented with vignettes that they were 
asked to rate, filled out some additional measures, and then answered background information 
about themselves. 
 Vignettes. First, participants were asked to read a series of fictional vignettes and make an 
attribution about the gender of the target person described in each vignette. A total of 16 
vignettes included a description of four dichotomous gender-related characteristics (2x2x2x2) 
representing a single target individual: (a) chromosomes (XX or XY); (b) external genitals 
(vagina and labia or penis and scrotum); (c) gender identity (strong personal identity as a woman 
and wears skirts and heels to work at a law office or strong personal identity as a man and wears 
suits and ties to work at a law office); (d) sexual attraction (attracted to women and is currently 
in a relationship with a woman or attracted to men and is currently in a relationship with a man). 
The following is an example of one of these vignettes: 
L. H. has XX chromosomes, and a vagina and labia. L. H. has a strong personal 
identity as a man, and wears suits and ties to work at a law office. L.H. is attracted 
to women, and is currently in a romantic relationship with a woman. 
The initials used to describe each target were different for all 16 vignettes. Initials were used to 
avoid the possibility of communicating gender through the use of names with different gender 
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meanings. MediaLab/Direct RT software recorded participants’ responses and counterbalanced 
the order of presentation of vignettes and gender characteristics within each vignette.  
 Rejection scores. For each vignette, participants were asked to evaluate whether they 
thought the person described was a woman or a man on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = 
definitely a man, 7 = definitely a woman). In this within-subjects design, all participants were 
asked to evaluate all 16 vignettes using this rating system. Predictions for this study focused on 
determining the extent to which perceivers were misgendering of targets. Thus, a rejection of 
self-designated gender ("rejection") variable was operationalized as the degree of discrepancy 
between the target’s self-designated gender identity (e.g., L.H. has a strong personal identity as a 
man) and the participant’s rating of the target’s gender (e.g., the distance between the 
participant’s rating and a “1” on the scale).  For all vignettes, rejection scores were coded such 
that higher scores reflect greater rejection of target’s self-designated gender identity. The four 
within-subjects factors (gender identity, genitals, chromosomes, and sexual attraction) yielded 16 
distinct rejection scores. 
 Response time. As participants read and rated the vignettes, MediaLab/Direct RT 
software recorded the time it took them to respond and move on to the next question (response 
time). Response times were recorded in milliseconds (ms) and were converted to seconds (s) for 
the final results. 
Contact factor. Participants were asked the amount of contact they had with particular 
groups of people who are most likely to experience cisgenderism. They were asked the number 
of transgender people they know. They were also asked the number of lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
people they know. These questions were coded as dichotomous variables in which participants 
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either knew transgender people (1”) or not (“0”) and either knew lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
people (“1”) or not (“0”). 
Personality factors. The Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI; Gosling, Rentfrow, & 
Swann, 2008) was used as a brief measure of personality factors. This measure uses a Likert 
scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree) in which participants are given a set of 10 
different personality traits. This scale averages together 2 items out of the 10 to create the 
“agreeableness” variable and averages together 2 different items out of the 10 to create the 
“openness” variable. Participants’ scores for “openness” (M = 5.48, SD = 1.01) and 
“agreeableness” (M = 4.77, SD = 0.96) were used in analyses for Study 1 in which higher scores 
indicated more openness and agreeableness. 
Hypotheses and Analyses 
Three hypotheses were tested in Study 1: 
Hypothesis 1:  Rejection will be greater and response time will be slower when the target 
person’s characteristics are perceived as stereotype-inconsistent as 
opposed to stereotype-consistent. 
Hypothesis 2:  Stereotype inconsistency perceived between genitals and gender identity 
will have a stronger impact than stereotype-inconsistency perceived 
between chromosomes and gender identity on perceiver’s level of 
rejection and response time. 
Hypothesis 3: Contact and personality factors such as no contact with transgender people 
and less openness and agreeableness will strengthen the relationships 
found in Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. 
Since the study seeks to understand the factors that contribute to the rejection of a person's self-
designated gender, target gender characteristics were considered stereotype-inconsistent or 
consistent depending on the target's gender identity. Based on U.S. society's social 
representations of gender, chromosomes were considered stereotype-inconsistent with gender 
identity when XX chromosomes were paired with identifying as a man or when XY 
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chromosomes were paired with identifying as a woman in the vignettes. Genitals were 
considered stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity when having a penis was paired with 
identifying as a woman and having a vagina was paired with identifying as a man in the 
vignettes. Sexual attraction was considered stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity when 
attraction to women was paired with identifying as a woman and attraction to men was paired 
with identifying as a man. Additionally, genitals and chromosomes were considered stereotype-
inconsistent with each other when having a vagina was paired with XY chromosomes or having 
a penis was paired with having XX chromosomes. Henceforth, references to stereotype-
inconsistencies or stereotype-consistencies between gender-related characteristics describe 
participants' perceptions that those characteristics are either stereotype-inconsistent or –
consistent; not that they in reality are stereotype-inconsistent or stereotype-consistent.  
Framework for testing hypotheses. The first hypothesis was tested to determine how 
perceived stereotype (in)consistencies between target’s gender identity and biological 
characteristics impact rejection and response time. A 2 (gender identity:woman/man) x 2 
(genitals: vagina/penis) x 2 (chromosomes: XX/XY) x 2 (sexual attraction: to women/to men) 
repeated measures (within-subjects) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was 
conducted on rejection scores and response time. MANOVA is appropriate when independent 
variables are predicted to impact the pattern of responses on multiple dependent variables 
(Carey, 1998). Thus, this technique was applied since I predicted that rejection and response time 
would depend on the stereotype-(in)consistency of the targets' gender characteristics in each 
vignette. ANOVA is more preferable in cases where the dependent variables are highly 
correlated, but that was not the case for rejection and response time in this study. Another 
advantage to using MANOVA over ANOVA is that it diminishes the possibility of Type I error 
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(Stevens, 2009; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). In order to interpret the individual impact of both 
rejection and response time in this study, univariate (ANOVA) statistics were reported where 
multivariate significance was found, as suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (2001). 
Interaction effects specifically between gender identity and the other target 
characteristics—genitals, chromosomes, and sexual attraction—on rejection and response time 
were examined through the repeated measures MANOVA. No predictions were made for sexual 
attraction, but since it was a manipulated variable it was included in the analysis. The means of 
the two-way interaction effects between gender identity and genitals as well as gender identity 
and chromosomes were examined to interpret the predictions of Hypothesis 1. An examination of 
the means of these interactions would suggest the extent to which stereotype-consistency or 
stereotype-inconsistency between gender identity and the biological characteristics were 
responsible for significant changes in rejection and response time. The effect sizes of each of 
these interactions were examined to determine the extent of their influence and to interpret 
predictions of Hypothesis 2. Partial eta-squared effect sizes were calculated to analyze any 
differences between genitals and chromosomes on the outcomes. These effect sizes are 
operationalized as small (.01), medium (.06), and large (.14) effects (Richardson, 2011; Stevens, 
2009). For a comprehensive understanding of the full model, additional two-way interactions as 
well as three-way and four-way interactions were reported.  
Finally, a repeated measures multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was 
conducted on rejection and response time to address Hypothesis 3. Contact and personality 
factors were entered as between-subjects covariates. In order to determine the interaction effect 
of these covariates and the relationship between the relevant factors and the outcomes, only 
significant factors producing large effect sizes from the first analysis were included in the 
65 
 
MANCOVA. Three-way interaction effects between each covariate, gender identity, and each of 
the other factors were examined. An examination of the means would suggest the direction of the 
impact of knowing a transgender person and/or having an open and agreeable personality on the 
relationship between stereotype-(in)consistency of the target's characteristics and rejection and 
response time. 
Assumptions of MANOVA. The assumption of sphericity does not typically need to be met 
for MANOVA (O’Brien & Kaiser, 1985). Regardless, sphericity is trivial in the present study 
since the within-subjects factors only measured two levels (see Lewis, 1993). This means that 
different criteria for correcting violations of sphericity (e.g., Greenhouse-Geisser, Huynh-Feldt) 
produced the same univariate statistics, so I report univariate statistics regardless of correction. 
An examination of skew and kurtosis demonstrated moderate to heavy-tailed distributions on 
some of the factors—especially for the response times—in response to each vignette. There is 
consensus in the literature that the repeated measures MANOVA technique is robust to 
violations of normality (Bock, 1975, Cohen, 2008; Obrien and Kaiser, 1985, Stevens, 2009). 
Light-tailed distributions that are non-normal are typically robust in small to moderate sample 
sizes (Field, 2009). When there are heavy-tailed distributions, such as in the present study, 
sample size must be large (above 50 cases) in order to be robust to violations of normality 
(Stevens, 2009; Wilcox, 2005). Thus, assumptions of normality were not of concern even with 
extreme non-normality since all analyses in Study 1 involved a large sample size (N = 127).  
Nevertheless, to be certain that the non-normality of the data did not affect the results, 
attempts were made to normalize the data and compare the outcomes. Removal of outliers—e.g., 
people who took longer than 50 seconds to make a gender attribution (n = 7)—prior to 
conducting the RM MANOVA did not change the significant outcomes found without their 
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removal. A log transformation of the data prior to conducting the repeated measures MANOVA 
also did not change the significant outcomes found without transformation. These adjustments 
actually strengthened some of the outcomes found prior to outlier removal or transformation. But 
inclusion of outliers may be theoretically important to the hypotheses (Kruskal, 1960; Orr, 
Sackett, & DuBois, 1991). For example, outlier responses on response time may reflect the 
extent to which people find it difficult to process and interpret target gender characteristics 
especially when they are stereotype-inconsistent. Thus, outliers were included in the final 
analyses reported below. Also, since repeated measures MANOVA is robust to violations of 
normality and transformed data produced the same significant outcomes, non-transformed data 
were entered into the final analyses.  
Results 
Main effects. The repeated measures MANOVA produced no main effects for gender 
identity, genitals, chromosomes, or sexual attraction on rejection and response time. 
Two-way interaction effects. To test Hypothesis 1 and 2, the repeated measures 
MANOVA on rejection and response time produced several significant two-way interaction 
effects. Means and standard errors for significant results from this analysis are outlined in Table 
2. A significant two-way interaction effect was found between gender identity and genitals on 
both rejection and response time, F (2, 125) = 159.69, p <.001, ƞp2 = 0.72. Univariate tests 
(ANOVA) demonstrated rejection was significantly higher when genitals were stereotype-
inconsistent (woman/penis, man/vagina) compared to stereotype-consistent (woman/vagina, 
man/penis) with target gender identity, F (1, 126) = 306.87, p <.001, ƞp2 = 0.71.  Univariate tests 
demonstrated response time was significantly slower when genitals were stereotype-inconsistent 
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compared to stereotype-consistent with target gender identity, F (1, 126) = 19.29, p <.001, ƞp2 = 
0.13.   
A significant two-way interaction effect was also found between gender identity and 
chromosomes, F (2, 125) = 85.26, p <.001, ƞp2 = 0.58. This effect was driven by rejection scores, 
such that univariate tests demonstrated rejection was higher when chromosomes were stereotype-
inconsistent (woman/XY, man/XX) compared to stereotype-consistent (woman/XX, man/XY) 
with target gender identity, F (1, 126) = 171.67, p <.001, ƞp2 = 0.58. Univariate tests 
demonstrated no significant interaction between gender identity and chromosomes on response 
time. 
A significant two-way interaction effect was found between gender identity and sexual 
attraction, F (2, 125) = 3.68, p <.05, ƞp2 = 0.06. This effect was driven by rejection scores, such 
that univariate tests demonstrated rejection was higher when sexual attraction was stereotype-
inconsistent, but only for targets who identify as men, F (1, 126) = 5.10, p <.05, ƞp2 = 0.04. In 
other words, rejection was higher for targets who identify as men and are attracted to men than 
for targets who identify as women and are attracted to women. Rejection was also higher for 
targets who identify as men and are attracted to men than for targets whose attractions are 
stereotype-consistent regardless of gender identity (i.e., women attracted to men, men attracted to 
women). Univariate tests demonstrated no significant interaction between gender identity and 
sexual attraction on response time. 
A significant two-way interaction effect was found between genitals and chromosomes, F 
(2, 125) = 5.15, p <.01, ƞp2 = 0.08. This effect was driven by response time such that univariate 
tests demonstrated response time was slower when targets had a vagina and XY chromosomes 
compared to any other combination of characteristic regardless of gender identity (vagina/XX, 
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penis/XX, penis/XY), F (1, 126) = 9.42, p <.01, ƞp2 = 0.07.  Univariate tests demonstrated no 
significant interaction between genitals and chromosomes on rejection. 
There were no significant two-way interaction effects found between genitals and sexual 
attraction or chromosomes and sexual attraction. 
Three-way interaction effects. A significant three-way interaction effect was also found 
between gender identity, genitals, and chromosomes on rejection and response time, F (2, 125) = 
4.10, p <.05, ƞp2 = 0.06. Means and standard errors for this interaction are outlined in Table 
3.This effect was driven by a marginally significant effect of rejection and a significant effect of 
response time. As depicted in Figure 2, univariate tests revealed that rejection increased as the 
number of target biological characteristics that were stereotype-inconsistent with target gender 
identity increased, F (1, 126) = 3.71, p = .06, ƞp2 = 0.03. In other words, rejection was higher 
when just chromosomes or just genitals were stereotype-inconsistent (woman/XY/vagina, 
woman/XX/penis, man/XY/vagina, or man/XX/penis) compared to when both chromosomes and 
genitals were stereotype-consistent with target gender identity (man/XY/penis, 
woman/XX/vagina). Rejection was highest when both chromosomes and genitals were 
stereotype-inconsistent (man/XX/vagina or woman/XY/penis). Also depicted in Figure 2, 
univariate tests demonstrated that response time slowed differently across conditions depending 
on target identity as a woman or a man, F (1, 126) = 4.13, p < .05, ƞp2 = 0.03. When targets 
identified as women, response time was slower when either one or both biological characteristics 
(genitals and/or chromosomes) were stereotype-inconsistent (woman/penis, woman/XY) 
compared to stereotype-consistent (woman/vagina, woman/XX) with target gender identity. In 
contrast, when targets identified as men, response time was slower when genitals were 
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stereotype-inconsistent (man/vagina) compared to stereotype-consistent (man/pens) with target 
gender identity, regardless of chromosomes.  
There were no three-way interaction effects between gender identity, chromosomes, and 
sexual attraction, between gender identity, genitals, and sexual attraction, or between 
chromosomes, genitals, and sexual attraction.  
There was no four-way interaction found between gender identity, genitals, 
chromosomes, and sexual attraction (data not shown). 
Moderation effects. Since sexual attraction had only a small to moderate effect size in the 
original analyses and since it was not a variable of interest to the original hypotheses, sexual 
attraction was dropped in the moderation analyses depicted by Hypothesis 3. Means for the 
remaining three factors were collapsed across the sexual attraction factor. Thus, a three-way 
(gender identity, genitals, chromosomes) repeated measures MANCOVA was conducted on 
rejection scores and response times with transgender contact, openness, and agreeableness 
entered as covariates. The only significant interaction found was between gender identity, 
chromosomes, and transgender contact on rejection and response time, F (2, 122) = 5.97, p <.01, 
ƞp
2 = 0.09. This effect was driven by a significant effect of rejection and a marginally significant 
effect of response time. As depicted in Figure 3, univariate tests revealed that rejection was 
higher overall when chromosomes were stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity, but 
rejection was highest among people who had no transgender contact compared to people who 
did, F (1, 122) = 8.50, p < .01, ƞp2 = 0.07. In other words, rejection was higher for people who do 
not know at least one transgender person compared to people who do know at least one 
transgender person when chromosomes were stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity 
(woman/XY, man/XX), regardless of genitals. As depicted in Figure 3, the marginally significant 
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result from the univariate tests suggested that response time was slower among people who had 
no transgender contact compared to people who did, but this effect was strongest when 
chromosomes were stereotype-inconsistent with targets who identified as women, F (1, 122) = 
3.71, p = .06, ƞp2 = 0.03.  
No significant interactions were found on rejection or response time for gender identity, 
genitals, and transgender contact, gender identity, genitals, and openness, gender identity, 
chromosomes and openness, gender identity, genitals, and agreeableness, gender identity, 
chromosomes, and agreeableness (data not shown). 
Summary 
 Results supported the predictions of Hypothesis 1. Both genitals and chromosomes were 
found to individually affect people's gender judgments. In reflection of past research on 
asymmetry in the judgments of others (e.g., Hegarty & Pratto, 2001), people were more rejecting 
when genitals and chromosomes were stereotype-inconsistent rather than stereotype-consistent 
with gender identity. Both the interactions between genitals and gender identity as well as 
chromosomes and gender identity on rejection had very large effect sizes. The finding regarding 
chromosomes expands on the work of Kessler and McKenna (1978) who did not assess internal 
biological characteristics stereotyped to gender in their studies. People were also slower to make 
a gender judgment, but only when genitals were stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity. 
The interaction between genitals and gender identity on response time had a large effect size. 
Although previous research correlates dissimilar features of stimuli with increases in time spent 
categorizing (Rosch, 1978; Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, & Knippenberg, 2003), the present research 
suggests that this process is context-dependent. The time it takes to categorize gender in the face 
of dissimilar features is increased primarily by stereotype-inconsistent genitals and not by other 
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stereotype-inconsistent characteristics (e.g., chromosomes). Cognitive processing of genitals 
differ from other characteristic types because they may be more strongly socially represented.   
Hypothesis 2 was partially supported by the results.  Effect sizes for the interactions 
between genitals and gender identity and chromosomes and gender identity on rejection were 
both very large, although genitals and gender identity had a slightly larger effect size. The larger 
effect size on rejection and the only significant interaction on response time for genitals suggests 
some support for the prediction that genitals had a stronger impact on the gender attribution 
process than chromosomes. This confirmed the findings in Kessler and McKenna’s (1978) 
studies such that genitals were found to be a primary factor that people relied on when making 
gender attributions. However, this did not support their finding that beyond just genitals, gender 
attribution is penis attribution. Having a vagina and having a penis were similarly rated 
regardless of the gender identity of the target.  Results from the three-way interaction between 
gender identity, genitals, and chromosomes also did not provide further support for Hypothesis 2 
since the effect sizes were so small. The small effect of the differences between the gender 
identity of the target in this three-way interaction may suggest that the penis is less central to 
social representations of gender than it was when Kessler and McKenna (1978) conducted their 
studies. 
 Study 1 findings partially supported the predictions of Hypothesis 3. Amount of contact 
with transgender people was the only significant moderating covariate found. Thus, personality 
traits do not attenuate the processes that result in misgendering in the same way that they have 
been found to attenuate the processes that lead to prejudice (see Jackson and Poulsen, 2005). In 
support of previous research on the contact hypothesis, when chromosomes (regardless of 
genitals) were stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity, knowing a transgender person made 
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people less rejecting of targets overall. A marginally significant effect suggested that these same 
conditions made people slower at making a gender attribution specifically when the targets 
identified as women. There were medium effect sizes for the interaction between gender identity, 
chromosomes, and knowing a transgender person on rejection and on response time. 
Although no predictions were made about sexual attraction, the present study also found 
that people were more rejecting of target gender identity when the target identified as a man and 
was attracted to men compared to any other target type. But the effect size for this interaction 
between gender identity and sexual attraction on rejection was only small to medium. 
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Chapter 4: 
Study 2 – Replicating and Expanding on Study 1 
Study 2 replicated Study 1, but expanded on its methods and measures. Participants were 
given more flexibility on the rating scale used to determine target people’s gender, such that 
participants used separate scales to rate the degree to which the person was a woman and the 
degree to which the person was a man rather than rating them on one continuous scale from 
“definitely a woman” to “definitely a man.” The rating scale was split so as not to reinforce a 
binary view of gender (see a longer explanation in the section on Rejection Scores below). Since 
Study 1 found that the interaction between genitals and gender identity had the strongest impact 
on the gender attribution process, genitals and gender identity were isolated for examination of 
these factors in Study 2. Additionally, I revised and retested the contact with transgender people 
variable. According to previous research which linked ally status to less prejudice toward the 
allied groups (Stone, 2009; Stotzer, 2009), I tested the impact of perceiver’s identification as an 
ally to transgender people on the outcomes. Finally, Moscovici (1963) suggested that individual 
attitudes are linked to social values. Thus, attitudes/beliefs were measured (e.g., gender 
essentialism, biological gender beliefs, natural attitudes/beliefs about gender, authoritarianism, 
and conservatism) based on research suggesting their correlation with prejudice toward certain 
outgroups (Bastian & Haslam, 2007; Herek, 2000; Tee & Hegarty, 2006; Whitley, 1999). All 
tests related to the experiences and attitudes of the perceiver were measured for their moderating 
impact on stereotype (in)consistencies of target people’s characteristics and rejection and 
response time. 
Participants 
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 Study 2 participants were 202 individuals recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk9 
(MTurk) who completed the study online and received $0.50 each for their participation. MTurk 
parameters were set to exclude non-U.S. residents and non-English speakers because study aims 
and methods were developed based on assumptions about the ways in which social 
representations are communicated within Western, U.S.-based society with no cross-cultural or 
cross-lingual predictions. Furthermore, people under 18 years of age were excluded because 
study aims rely on the establishment of social representation at the cognitive level and no 
predictions are made with regard to the developmental processing of such social representations 
in childhood and adolescence. Additionally, people who have a low Human Intelligence Task 
(HIT) rating (below 90%) and have completed less than 50 HITs on MTurk were excluded 
because this ensured the data were of high quality (see Shapiro, Chandler, & Mueller, 2013). Of 
the 202 individuals recruited, 12 (6.0%) of the participants did not pass the quality checks which 
were embedded in the study to determine whether or not people were paying careful attention to 
each study item (see description in the Method section below). Therefore, the final sample used 
in Study 2 analyses was 190 participants.  
 Table 5 shows full demographic data on the 190 participants in Study 2. Participants 
ranged in age from 19 to 76 years old (M = 38.77, SD = 35.50). Participants were politically 
oriented slightly liberal or left of neutral/moderate (M = 3.32, SD = 3.00). Altogether, responses 
average around the midpoint of the scale (neither agree nor disagree) on the following 
attitudes/beliefs measures: gender essentialism (M = 4.55, SD = 1.31); biological gender beliefs 
                                                          
9 MTurk is an internet-based crowdsourcing service for recruiting participants that is increasingly being used by 
psychologists and other social scientists (Burmeister, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis, 
2013; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). Participation from MTurk users has been found to produce reliable, 
high-quality data at a rapid and inexpensive rate through the recruitment of more demographically diverse samples 
than regular internet samples or college student convenience samples (for a review see Burmeister, Kwang, & 
Gosling, 2011). 
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(M = 4.25, SD = 1.28); and natural attitudes/beliefs about gender (M = 4.05, SD = 1.34). 
Participants' authoritarian beliefs (M = 3.05, SD = 1.31) and morally traditional beliefs (M = 
3.21, SD = 1.56) averaged a bit below the midpoint of the scale, indicating slight to moderate 
disagreement with these scales. Participants egalitarian beliefs (M = 5.21, SD = 1.40) averaged a 
bit above the midpoint of the scale, indicating slight to moderate agreement with the scale. 
Participants reported having an average of 4.00 (SD = 2.50) bisexual, lesbian, or gay friends. The 
percentage of participants who reported having at least one transgender friend was 12.6% (n = 
24). Most participants did not have a gender identity independent from the gender assigned to 
them at birth, were assigned as female at birth, thought other people correctly perceive their 
gender, and had a constant and clear attraction to people who are the binary opposite of the 
gender assigned to them at birth. Participants described the area surrounding their current 
residence as suburban, they did not identify as Hispanic or of Latin American decent, they 
identified as White or Caucasian, and they had less than a 4-year college degree. On ally status, 
most participants did not consider themselves to be allies to transgender people while most did 
consider themselves to be allies to lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) people.  
Method 
Study 2 was conducted completely on the internet using MTurk which directed 
participants to a Qualtrics survey. Participants were presented with vignettes that they were 
asked to rate, filled out a series of Likert-scale measures, and then answered background 
information about themselves.  
Vignettes. Similar to Study 1, participants were asked to read a series of fictional 
vignettes and make an attribution about the gender of the target person described in each 
vignette. Vignettes included two gender-related characteristics and three other characteristics that 
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were used as filler information unrelated to gender. Filler information was meant to distract 
participants from determining that the only variables under examination were gender identity and 
genitals (2x2). Vignettes included the following information: (a) gender: identity (thinks of 
themself as a woman or man); (b) gender: genitals (has a vagina or penis); (c) filler: age (is an 
old or a young adult); (d) filler: transportation to work (takes the subway to work in a big city or 
takes the bus to work in the suburbs) (e) filler: food (likes to eat chicken or turkey). The 
following is an example of a vignette used in the study: 
J. S. is a young adult who enjoys eating chicken, has a penis, thinks of 
themself as a woman, and takes the bus to work in the suburbs. 
The initials used to describe each target were different for all vignettes. There was a 2 (thinks of 
themself as a woman/man) x 2 (has a vagina/penis) design yielding 4 vignettes used for analyses. 
Since the rest of the characteristics were used as filler information, these characteristics were 
deliberately paired such that target persons who identified as a woman were always described as 
a young adult, who enjoys eating chicken, and takes the bus to work in the suburbs and target 
persons who identified as a  man were always described as an older adult who enjoys eating 
turkey, and takes the subway to work in a big city. These pairings were applied regardless of 
whether or not target persons had a vagina or a penis. Each participant received all 4 vignettes. 
Qualtrics randomized the presentation of these vignettes across participants. 
Rejection scores. For each vignette, participants were asked to evaluate the target 
person’s gender on two separate scales: (1) the degree to which they thought the person 
described was a woman (Woman Attribution scale; 1 = definitely a woman, 7 = definitely not a 
woman); and (2) the degree to which they thought the person described was a man (Man 
Attribution scale; 1 = definitely a man, 7 = definitely not a man). Rejection of the target person’s 
self-designated gender was operationalized as the degree to which a participant evaluated the 
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target person’s gender as different from the description of the target person’s gender identity 
(e.g. definitely a man when the target person identifies as a woman). Rejection of a person’s self-
designated gender as a woman was the average score between the Woman Attribution scale and 
the Man Attribution scale, in which the Man Attribution scale was reverse coded. Similarly, 
rejection of a person’s self-designated gender as a man was the average score between both 
scales in which the Woman Attribution scale was reverse coded. The measures were separated in 
the study to capture nuance in the gender judgments people make and so as not to reinforce the 
binary assumption that the more we perceive a target as a man, the less we perceive that target as 
a woman. With separate dimensions, participants did not have to identify the target, for example, 
as a woman by denying a concurrent perception of the target as a man. Higher scores meant 
greater rejection.  
Response time. As participants read and rated the vignettes, Qualtrics recorded the time it 
took them to respond and move on to the next question (response time). Record of response time 
started when the page loaded and ended when the participant clicked to continue to the next 
survey page. Response times were recorded in seconds. 
Measures: Contact and Attitudes/beliefs. Study 2 tested the impact of seven potential 
moderators having to do with perceivers' contact with transgender people or perceivers' 
attitudes/beliefs that may predict the relationship between target gender characteristics and 
rejection scores or response time. Full measures, where applicable, can be viewed in the 
Appendix. 
Transgender friendships. The transgender friendships variable indicated participants' total 
number of friends who are transgender. This number was transformed into a binary variable of 
people who indicated having zero friends who are transgender (“0”) and people who indicated 
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having at least one friend who is transgender (“1”). For analyses involving participants' 
transgender friendships, there were 188 participants because two participants did not respond to 
this question. 
Transgender ally status. The dichotomous transgender ally status variable was based off 
of a binary question in which participants indicated that they either do not consider themselves to 
be an ally to transgender people (“0”) or they do consider themselves to be an ally to transgender 
people (“1”). For analyses involving participants' status as an ally to transgender people, there 
were 188 participants because two participants did not respond to this question.  
Gender Essentialism. The Essentialist Beliefs scale (Haslam & Levy, 2006) is a 15-item 
measure that was modified and factor analyzed to create a 9-item Gender Essentialism scale used 
in Study 2. The scale was originally developed to measure people’s essentialist beliefs about 
sexual orientation, i.e., beliefs about gay and straight people as distinct groups. However, 
modifications focused on essentialist beliefs about women and men as distinct groups. The scale 
was restricted to the original discreteness factor items and most of the original immutability 
factor items because the content of these items translated accurately from being about sexuality 
to being about gender.  
Participants rated Gender Essentialism items on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = very strongly 
disagree, 7 = very strongly agree). An example of an item from the scale is "Women and men 
each have necessary or defining characteristics, without which they would not be women or 
men." Qualtrics randomized the presentation of all items within the scale across all participants. 
The Gender Essentialism scale was factor analyzed with oblimin rotation. The Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was acceptable at .88 (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 
1999) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, X2 (36) = 866.36, p < .001. Based on these 
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test results, the Gender Essentialism scale was considered appropriate to assess further. The 
factor analysis revealed one gender essentialism factor with an Eigenvalue of 4.86 which 
explained 54.02% of the variance. Principal components analysis with oblim rotation produced 
all item loadings above λ = .50. The resulting Gender Essentialism scale was statistically reliable 
(α = .89). Relevant items were reverse coded so that higher scores indicated greater endorsement 
of gender essentialism.  
Biological Gender Beliefs. The full Trans Persons Belief scale (Tee & Hegarty, 2006) 
was used and then modified after reliability checks were made to its subscales. In Tee and 
Hegarty (2006), this scale originally produced two separate factors: biological gender beliefs and 
social gender beliefs. The biological gender beliefs factor was the only factor found to be 
statistically reliable. Participants rated Biological Gender Beliefs on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = 
very strongly disagree, 7 = very strongly agree). An example of an item from the scale is 
"Gender is determined by biological factors, such as genes and hormones, before birth." 
Qualtrics randomized the presentation of all items within the scale across all participants.  
Reliability checks for Study 2 results on this measure found that when the items were split 
according to these two factors, the Biological Gender Beliefs subscale had good reliability (α = 
.85) while the social gender beliefs subscale did not (α = .25). Therefore, only the Biological 
Gender Beliefs subscale was used in Study 2 analyses (see Appendix A for the items). Higher 
scores indicated greater endorsement of biological gender beliefs. 
Natural Attitudes/Beliefs About Gender. For Study 2 data, this 9-item scale had good 
reliability (α = .87). This scale was originally developed to assess for beliefs that correspond with 
Garfinkel’s (1967) natural attitudes about gender, e.g., that women and men are the only genders, 
that there is a clear distinction between women and men, and that the traits that make people 
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women and men are immutable. Participants rated natural attitudes/beliefs about gender on a 7-
point Likert scale (1 = very strongly disagree, 7 = very strongly agree). An example of an item 
from the scale is "There are only two genders, women and men." Qualtrics randomized the 
presentation of all items within the scale across all participants. Higher scores indicated greater 
endorsement of natural attitudes/beliefs about gender. 
 Authoritarianism. A modified, short version of the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale 
(RWA; Zakrisson, 2005) was used in Study 2. The original short version has 15 items, but item 
number 6 ("The society needs to show openness towards people thinking differently, rather than 
a strong leader, the world is not particularly evil or dangerous.") was removed due to confusion 
over this item voiced by research assistants who pre-tested Study 2. Therefore, a 14-item, short 
version of the RWA was used in Study 2 and had good reliability (α = .94). Participants rated 
authoritarianism on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = very strongly disagree, 7 = very strongly agree). 
An example of an item from the scale is "Our country needs a powerful leader, in order to 
destroy the radical and immoral currents prevailing in society today." Qualtrics randomized the 
presentation of all items within the scale across all participants. Relevant items were reverse 
coded so that higher scores indicated more authoritarianism.  
 Conservatism. The Conservatism scale (Brewer, 2003) was also used in Study 2. Its 
moral traditionalism subscale had good reliability (α = .90). Its egalitarianism subscale also had 
good reliability (α = .92). Participants rated both moral traditionalism and egalitarianism on a 7-
point Likert scale (1 = very strongly disagree, 7 = very strongly agree). An example of an item 
from the moral traditionalism subscale is "The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown 
of society." An example of an item from the egalitarianism subscale is "We have gone too far in 
pushing equal rights in this country." Qualtrics randomized the presentation of all items within 
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the subscales across all participants. Relevant items were reverse coded so that higher scores 
indicated more conservatism. 
Quality checks. Because this study was conducted online with little control over the 
quality of the data that participants provide, several questions were inserted into the above 
described measures to ensure that participants were paying attention to each item and the 
responses they made. Qualtrics set these items so they were not included in the randomization of 
measure items. They were set to always appear embedded within the list of items so they would 
not be randomized to appear first or last. The first quality check was an item appearing among 
the items for the Gender Essentialism scale (the first scale presented to participants after the 
vignette ratings). This item was: “People can get tired while filling out surveys, but if you're 
paying attention choose 'somewhat agree' for this question.” The second quality check was an 
item inserted into the Authoritarianism scale which was the penultimate scale completed by 
participants. This item was: “If you're paying attention, choose 'neither agree nor disagree' for 
this question.” Responding incorrectly resulted in removal of all of that participants’ data (n = 
12) in the final analyses. No differences were found between participants who passed and who 
did not pass these quality checks. 
Hypotheses and Analyses 
Two hypotheses were tested in Study 2. The first hypothesis is a repetition of the 
hypothesis from Study 1. The new hypothesis tested the moderating effects of previously 
untested individual difference factors on the relationships found in Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 1:  Rejection will be greater and response time will be slower when the target 
person’s characteristics are perceived as stereotype-inconsistent as 
opposed to stereotype-consistent. 
Hypothesis 2: Individual difference factors such as no friendships with transgender 
people, not identifying as an ally to transgender people, essentialist beliefs 
about gender, biological beliefs about gender, natural attitudes/beliefs 
82 
 
about gender, authoritarianism, and conservatism will strengthen the 
relationships found in Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. 
As in Study 1, this study sought to understand the factors that contribute to the rejection of a 
person's self-designated gender. Thus, target genitals were considered stereotype-inconsistent or 
consistent depending on the target's gender identity. Based on U.S. society's social 
representations of gender, genitals were considered stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity 
when having a penis was paired with identifying as a woman and having a vagina was paired 
with identifying as a man in the vignettes. Again, references to stereotype-inconsistencies or 
stereotype-consistencies between gender characteristics describe participants' perceptions that 
those characteristics are either stereotype-inconsistent or –consistent; not that they in reality are 
stereotype-inconsistent or stereotype-consistent.  
Framework for testing hypotheses. The first hypothesis was tested to replicate Study 1 
findings by specifically examining how perceived stereotype (in)consistencies between target’s 
gender identity and genitals impact rejection and response time. A 2 (gender identity: 
woman/man) x 2 (genitals: vagina/penis) repeated measures (within-subjects) multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted on rejection scores and response times. The 
interaction between gender identity and genitals was examined using this technique. The means 
of the two-way interaction effects between gender identity and genitals as well as gender identity 
and chromosomes were examined to interpret the predictions of Hypotheses 1. Examination of 
the means from these interactions would suggest the extent to which stereotype-consistency or 
stereotype-inconsistency between gender identity and genitals were responsible for significant 
changes in rejection and response time. The effect size of this interaction was examined to 
interpret its strength.  
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To address Hypothesis 2, a repeated measures MANCOVA on rejection and response 
time included several factors of the perceiver (transgender friendship, transgender ally status, 
gender essentialism, biological gender beliefs, natural attitudes/beliefs about gender, 
authoritarianism, moral traditionalism, and egalitarianism) entered as between-subjects 
covariates. Main effects and interactions were examined. In particular, three-way interaction 
effects between each covariate, gender identity, and genitals were examined to test the factors in 
Hypothesis 2. An examination of the means of the interactions would suggest the direction of the 
impact of the covariates on the relationship between stereotype-(in)consistency of the target's 
characteristics and rejection and response time. Median splits were created for any significant 
continuous variables and then they were assessed within the model to help interpret the direction 
of the variables' effect on the outcomes. By reporting on the effects of the continuous variable 
first, the strength of the variable could be assessed without a loss of power (see Fitzsimons, 
2008). The median-split then allowed for an interpretation of the direction of its effect. 
Assumptions of MANOVA/MANCOVA. For the same reasons depicted in Study 1 
analyses, assumptions of sphericty were determined to be trivial and the large sample size (N = 
190) in Study 2 made analyses robust to even extreme violations of normality. To be certain that 
the non-normality of the data did not affect the results, outliers were removed (n = 19) and log 
transformations were conducted and outcomes were compared. As in Study 1, adjustments did 
not change the outcomes that would have been derived prior to outlier removal or 
transformation. Outliers were included and non-transformed data were used in the final analyses.  
Testing for order effects. Analyses were also conducted to explore the impact of order 
effect for the gender identity of the target on rejection scores and response times. Dummy 
variables were created for vignettes presented first that described targets who identify as women 
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and vignettes presented first that described targets who identify as men (1 = first, 0 = not first). 
Independent samples t-tests examined differences between presentation of vignettes first or not 
first stratified by target gender identity on rejection and response time. Since response times 
were positively skewed and t-tests operate on the assumption of normality, log transformations 
were conducted and entered into the analyses. The order of presentation of vignettes was 
randomized in Study 2, so any significant results were not of concern to the outcomes of this 
study. Instead, results from these tests were considered in the design of the follow-up studies (see 
Study 3 and Study 5). 
Results 
Main effects. The two-way repeated measures MANOVA produced no main effects for 
gender identity or genitals on rejection and response time. 
Two-way interaction effects. To test Hypothesis 1, the two-way repeated measures 
MANOVA was examined for an interaction between genitals and gender identity on rejection 
and response time. Means and standard errors for this analysis are outlined in Table 6. A 
significant interaction effect was found between gender identity and genitals on rejection and 
response time, F (2, 188) = 403.34, p <.001, ƞp2 = .81. As depicted in Figure 4, univariate tests 
(ANOVA) demonstrated rejection scores were higher when gender identity and genitals were 
stereotype-inconsistent (woman/penis, man/vagina) compared to when gender identity and 
genitals were stereotype-consistent (woman/vagina, man/penis), F (1, 189) = 805.42, p <.001, ƞp2 
= 0.81. Univariate tests demonstrated response time was slower when gender identity and 
genitals were stereotype-inconsistent compared to when gender identity and genitals were 
stereotype-consistent, F (1, 189) = 18.85, p <.001, ƞp2 = 0.09. 
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Initial moderation analyses. To test Hypothesis 2, a two-way repeated measures 
MANCOVA was conducted to identify certain covariates as moderators of the relationship 
between genitals and gender identity on rejection and response time. To accomplish this, 
transgender friendship, transgender ally status, gender essentialism, biological gender beliefs, 
natural attitudes/beliefs about gender, authoritarianism, and the moral traditionalism and 
egalitarianism subscales were entered as covariates. The repeated measures MANCOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of gender essentialism on rejection and response time, F (2, 
184) = 60.38, p < .001, ƞp2 = 0.40. This analysis also revealed a significant main effect of 
transgender ally status on rejection and response time, F (2, 184) = 7.19, p < .01, ƞp2 = 0.07, such 
that rejection scores were higher for participants who did not identify as an ally to transgender 
people regardless of target genitals and gender identity. There were also significant three-way 
interactions between gender identity, genitals and gender essentialism, F (2, 184) = 35.34, p 
<.001, ƞp2 = 0.28, and gender identity, genitals, and transgender ally status, F (2, 184) = 6.96, p 
<.01, ƞp2 = 0.07. These interactions are described below after running analyses again excluding 
the following measures which all had no significant interactions with genitals and gender 
identity: natural attitudes/beliefs about gender, biological gender beliefs, authoritarianism, 
egalitarianism, or moral traditionalism.  
Moderation of gender essentialism. After initial analyses were conducted including all 
contact and attitudes/beliefs measures, another model was created in order to isolate the effect of 
the significant factors. Gender essentialism and transgender ally status were entered as the sole 
covariates in a two-way repeated measures MANOVA. There was a significant main effect of 
gender essentialism on rejection and response time, F (2, 184) = 60.38, p <.001, ƞp2 = 0.40. There 
was also a significant interaction effect between gender identity, genitals, and gender 
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essentialism on rejection and response time, F (2, 184) = 35.34, p <.001, ƞp2 = 0.28. Univariate 
tests (ANOVA) for the final model revealed that the three-way interaction between gender 
identity, genitals, and gender essentialism was driven by rejection, F (1, 185) = 71.07, p <.001, 
ƞp
2 = 0.28. Contrast effects in the MANOVA indicated a linear relationship for both rejection (p 
< .001) and response time (p < .01) in this three-way interaction. In order to interpret the 
significant three-way interaction effect, a dichotomous variable was created from a median split 
of gender essentialism. Means and standard errors for significant effects of this dichotomoized 
variable are outlined in Table 7. As depicted in Figure 5, the univariate tests on the interaction 
between gender identity, genitals, and the dichotomized gender essentialism variable revealed 
that when gender identity is stereotype-consistent with genitals (woman/vagina, man/penis), 
rejection is low and there is no effect of essentialist beliefs. However, when gender identity and 
genitals are stereotype-inconsistent (woman/penis, man/vagina), rejection is significantly higher 
among individuals with high essentialist beliefs, F (1, 185) = 16.59, p <.001, ƞp2 = 0.08 (see 
Figure 5). Univariate tests demonstrated no significant three-way interaction between gender 
identity, genitals, and essentialism on response time. 
Moderation of transgender ally status. Means and standard errors for significant effects 
of transgender ally status are outlined in Table 8. The same repeated-measures ANOVA that 
included the continuous essentialism variable revealed a significant main effect of transgender 
ally status on rejection and response time, F (2, 184) = 60.38, p <.001, ƞp2 = 0.07. There was also 
a significant interaction effect between gender identity, genitals, and transgender ally status on 
rejection and response time, F (2, 184) = 6.96, p <.01, ƞp2 = 0.07. As depicted in Figure 6, 
univariate tests revealed that when gender identity is stereotype-consistent with genitals, 
rejection is low and there is no effect of transgender ally status. However, when gender identity 
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and genitals are stereotype-inconsistent with genitals, rejection is significantly higher among 
individuals who did not identify as an ally to transgender people, F (1, 185) = 11.49, p <.01, ƞp2 = 
0.06 (see Figure 6). A repeated measures ANOVA demonstrated no significant three-way 
interaction between gender identity, genitals, and transgender ally status on response time. 
Order effects. Independent samples t-tests revealed no significant differences between 
order of vignette presented on rejection scores (data not shown). There were significant order 
effects on response time (see Table 9). Response times were faster on vignettes that described 
targets who identify as men when vignettes that described targets who identify as women were 
presented first. Response time was also faster on the vignette that described targets who identify 
as women and had a vagina when vignettes that described targets who identify as men were 
presented first. No order effect was found for vignettes that described targets who identify as 
women and had a penis when vignettes that described targets who identify as men were 
presented first.  
Summary 
First, Study 2 demonstrated a repetition of Study 1 results, but with isolated 
characteristics. Study 2 examined how perceived (in)consistencies between a target person’s 
genitals and gender identity affect perceivers’ rejection and response time. Results supported the 
prediction of Hypothesis 1. Rejection was greater when genitals and gender identity were 
perceived as stereotype-inconsistent as opposed to stereotype-consistent. The effect size of the 
interaction between genitals and gender identity on rejection was very large. Response time was 
slower when genitals and gender identity were perceived as stereotype-inconsistent as opposed to 
stereotype-consistent. There was a medium effect size for this interaction. Based on the findings 
from Study 1, these results from Study 2 were expected. 
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 Study 2 also expanded on the results of Study 1 by examining factors predicted to 
moderate the relationships found between target gender characteristics and the outcomes of 
rejection and response time. Some of the predicted factors described in Hypothesis 2 were found 
to affect the relationship between perceived stereotype-inconsistencies of the target 
characteristics and rejection, but not response time. First, stereotype-inconsistency between 
genitals and gender identity resulted in greater rejection among participants who scored high on 
gender essentialism. When testing essentialism as a continuous variable, its interaction with 
genitals and gender identity resulted in a very large effect size. This finding supports the research 
by Bastian and Haslam (2007) who identified that endorsement of essentialist attitudes is related 
to a preference for stereotype-consistency over stereotype-inconsistency when judging others. 
Second, stereotype-inconsistency between genitals and gender identity resulted in greater 
rejection among participants who did not identify as allies to transgender people. There was a 
medium effect size describing this three-way interaction. This finding may suggest that 
identifying as an ally to transgender people has similar benefits to reductions in misgendering as 
ally identification with other groups has on lower prejudiced attitudes toward those groups (see 
Stone, 2009; Stotzer, 2009). All other measures—biological gender beliefs, natural 
attitudes/beliefs about gender, authoritarianism, and conservatism—were not found to be 
significant moderators of the relationship between genitals and gender identity on rejection and 
response time. This may suggest that while these measures correspond to prejudiced outcomes 
toward certain groups, they may not similarly correspond to the processes involved in 
misgendering. 
Analyses were also conducted to test the order effect of target gender identity on rejection 
scores and response times. There were no order effects having to do with the target gender 
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identity on rejection scores. There were order effects on response times such that people were 
typically faster at responding the second time regardless of the gender identity of the target 
presented first. There was only one condition for which response time was not affected by order. 
Response time did not significantly change for targets who identify as women and have a penis 
when presented with targets who identify as men first. The key piece of this data that was applied 
to later studies is that rejection scores were not affected by presentation of targets who identify as 
one gender before another.  
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Chapter 5: 
Study 3 – Distraction During Schema Adjustment 
Study 3 extended Study 2 by examining individuals who accept rather than reject target 
people's self-designated gender, even when it conflicts with information about targets’ biological 
characteristics. The hypothesized model (Figure 1) predicts that all individuals automatically 
recognize stereotype-inconsistent target characteristics, but not all people necessarily respond 
with the same judgments (Ajzen, 2005; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Devine, 1989; Devine, Plant, 
Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002).  Gilbert (1989) has suggested that some individuals 
may "correct," or adjust, their initial automatic judgments (also see Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). 
Adjustments during the gender attribution process may lead to endorsement of gender labels that 
affirm a target’s self-designated gender. Researchers have claimed that this process of adjusting 
is unstable because it requires more cognitive resources than merely applying stereotypes and 
moving on (Bessenoff & Sherman, 2000; Boenke, 2003; Cooper, 2000; Devine, 1989). The 
stability of adjusting during the gender attribution process was assessed in Study 3 to better 
understand the extent to which stereotyped ways of thinking about gender are automatic and are 
only overcome by explicit cognitive attention applied to adjust such thinking. Therefore, Study 3 
examined whether or not those who adjust their attributions toward gender affirmation become 
more rejecting of a target’s gender identity when under cognitive load.  
 The design for this experiment was influenced by the impact of cognitive load on sexist 
language use among people who scored low on sexism in Cralley and Ruscher’s (2005) studies. 
Other studies have demonstrated similar effects of cognitive load on the tendency to engage in 
stereotyping (e.g., Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Harris & Perkins, 1995; Sherman, Macrae, 
Bodenhausen, 2011). Study 3 was designed to categorize people as adjusters through the gender 
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attributions they made on a first set of vignettes and then test the impact of a distraction task on 
their rejection scores and response times as they rated a second set of vignettes. This procedure 
for categorizing adjusters over other methods of categorization allowed for a strict test of the 
instability of adjustment processes when distracted. Changes in rejection scores while under 
cognitive load were assessed to find out if misgendering occurs—even among those least likely 
to misgender—as a result of the automaticity of gender stereotyping. Adjusters who fail to adjust 
when under cognitive load would demonstrate a cognitive reliance on stereotypes as the default 
method for making a gender attribution. Such stereotypes may be interpreted as central to our 
current social representations of gender if they represent the default to which all people turn (see 
Abric, 2001). Simultaneously, differences between adjusters and those who do not adjust were 
explored to help identify possible other methods for identifying adjusters in future research.  
Participants 
 Study 3 participants were 201 individuals from MTurk who received $0.50 each for their 
participation in the study. As in Study 2, the same parameters on MTurk were set to recruit 
participants. Of the 201 individuals recruited, 25 (12.44%) did not pass quality checks, similar to 
those used in Study 2, and were excluded. Also, one participant indicated being from "CA" 
which may have indicated that the participant was from either Canada or California. Without 
knowing for certain, and since this study was deliberate in its focus on United States participants, 
this one participant was excluded from analyses. Therefore, the final sample in Study 3 included 
175 participants.  
 Table 10 shows full demographic data on the 175 participants in Study 3. Participants 
ranged from 18 to 74 years old (M = 35.26, SD = 32.00). Participants were politically oriented 
slightly liberal or left of neutral/moderate (M = 3.08, SD = 3.00). Most participants did not have 
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a gender identity independent from the gender assigned to them at birth, they were assigned as 
female at birth, they thought other people correctly perceive their gender, and they had a constant 
and clear attraction to people who are the binary opposite of the gender assigned to them at birth. 
On demographics, participants described the area surrounding their current residence as 
suburban, they did not identify as Hispanic or of Latin American decent, they identified as White 
or Caucasian, and they had less than a 4-year college degree. Most participants considered 
themselves to be allies to transgender people and allies to lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) 
people. However, most participants did not personally know a transgender or genderqueer 
person. Of the participants who did personally know a transgender person, most knew at least 
one person who identified as a woman  
Method 
 Study 3 was conducted completely on the internet using MTurk, which directed 
participants to a Qualtrics survey. Participants received two sets of vignettes that they were asked 
to rate and then answered background information about themselves.  
Vignettes. In Study 3, participants were presented with two sets of vignettes each 
describing target people with gender-related characteristics and filler characteristics. Filler 
characteristics were meant to distract participants from determining that the only variables under 
examination were gender identity and genitals. The first set and second set of vignettes were 
identical to each other except the second set was presented with a distraction task. Study 3 
employed a different design for the vignettes and ratings than Study 2 in an attempt to reduce the 
possibility of rehearsal between each set of vignettes. If the vignettes were the same each time, 
participants may rehearse a particular rating method during the first set of vignettes and then 
apply this method to the second set of vignettes, despite the presence of the distraction. 
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Therefore, the design of the vignettes and vignette ratings described in Study 2 were altered in an 
attempt to reduce the potential impact of rehearsing responses to familiar gender characteristic 
combinations. 
First, descriptions of the target people included information about the age and personality 
of the target person in addition to information about the target person's gender in each vignette. 
Participants were asked to rate these filler characteristics on age and personality scales that were 
randomly presented in addition to the Woman Attribution and Man Attribution scales described 
in Study 2. Filler characteristics were asked to be rated in an attempt to remove participants 
primary focus away from the gender content of the study. The gender scales were the only ones 
used for analyses.  
Second, participants read the vignettes and made their ratings on separate screen pages. 
Participants were instructed to “form an impression” of the target person in each vignette 
because they were then asked questions about that target on the next page. Participants did not 
know what they would be asked on the next page; just that they may be asked about the 
participants' gender, age, or personality. They had to rely on the impression they formed about 
the target person on the page prior rather than have the description available to use as a reference 
when rating the target person’s gender. 
Third, results from Study 2 found that people tend to reject target people who identify as 
women and target people who identify as men in similar ways—e.g., they score higher on 
rejection when gender identity and genitals are stereotype-inconsistent than stereotype-
consistent. Furthermore, Study 2 found that there were no order effects related to rejection of 
targets gender identity. Thus, participants were presented with information about target people 
who identify as men in the first set and then about target people who identify as women in the 
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second set to further minimize rehearsal of responses between each set. This helped create 
parallel sets of ratings to test the effect of the presence of a distraction versus absence of a 
distraction on gender attributions. 
 Vignettes included the following information: (a) gender identity: personally thinks of 
themself as a woman/as a man; (b) genitals: has a vagina/ penis; (c) personality: likes attending 
big parties/spending time with one friend at a time on the weekend; and (d) age: enjoys reading 
the news on the internet/in the local newspaper for leisure. Gender identity was split between the 
first set (men) and the second set (women). Genitals were manipulated in both sets 
(vagina/penis). The rest of the characteristics, personality and age, were filler characteristics. The 
following is an example of a vignette that appeared in the first set: 
K. S. thinks of themself as a man and has a vagina. 
K. S. likes to hang out with one friend at a time on the weekends. 
For leisure, K. S. enjoys reading the news on the internet. 
A total of 6 vignettes were rated in the first set and 6 in the second set, but only 2 
vignettes each were relevant to analyses. The 2 vignettes in each set that were paired with the 
gender rating scales were used in analyses. For these vignettes, filler characteristics were held 
constant. The characteristics used for vignettes paired with gender ratings were always: (1) likes 
to attend big parties with friends on the weekends; and (2) enjoys reading the news on the 
internet for leisure. The remaining 4 vignettes were filler meant to make gender less salient for 
participants. Two vignettes were paired with age ratings and two with personality ratings, but 
these ratings were not used in the analyses. Filler characteristics for these vignettes were 
randomly distributed since age and personality ratings did not pertain to the research question.  
Distraction task. Before rating the second set of vignettes, participants were told that they 
were going to complete a similar task in which they simultaneously had to pay attention to a 
randomly blinking blue dot on the screen. Participants previewed the dot and indicated that they 
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did, in fact, see the dot blinking on the screen before continuing on. If participants indicated not 
seeing the dot blinking on the screen, they skipped the second vignette rating task and completed 
the rest of the study. If they did see the blinking dot, they were told they would have to count the 
number of times the dot blinked on the screen during their time spent on the page reading the 
vignette. They were informed that after they finished reading the vignette, the next screen would 
ask them to recall the number of times the dot blinked and then answer questions about the target 
person from the vignette on the previous page. They were told that their accuracy counted, but 
this was not actually calculated for this study since the dot was only meant to distract participants 
while they completed the vignette ratings. 
 The blue dot was designed as a 64x64 pixel GIF animation image (color: #00a3e8) using 
Adobe Photoshop CS6 software. The blinking of the dot was designed to be challenging, but not 
impossible to count in periphery on the screen while participants’ centralized attention was on 
reading the vignettes. With over 100 looped frames, the dot was designed to appear for 200 
milliseconds at a time and, using a random number generator, disappear for intervals varying 
from 200 to 1500 milliseconds. Each of the 6 vignettes had a separate dot assigned to it that 
blinked at different intervals. Each dot was placed left-aligned just above the rating scales and 
below the vignette descriptions so that participants could see the blinking dot even if scrolling 
down the page to click to continue on. The page after reading the vignettes asked participants to 
report the number of times the dot blinked and then make their ratings of target people on 
gender, age, or personality. 
Response time. Qualtrics was programmed to record two response times for participants 
that were averaged together to create one overall response time. These two times were: (1) the 
time it took perceivers to initially read the vignettes; and (2) the time it took perceivers to rate the 
96 
 
vignettes (response time). Record of time started when the pages loaded and ended when the 
participant clicked to continue to the next survey page. Response times were recorded in 
seconds. 
Rejection scores. For each vignette, participants were asked to evaluate the target person's 
gender on two separate scales: (1) the degree to which they thought the person described was a 
woman (Woman Attribution scale; 1 = definitely a woman, 7 = definitely not a woman); and (2) 
the degree to which they thought the person described was a man (Man Attribution scale; 1 = 
definitely a man, 7 = definitely not a man). Rejection of the target person’s self-designated 
gender was operationalized as the degree to which a participant evaluated the target person’s 
gender as different from the description of the target person’s gender identity (e.g. definitely a 
man when the target person identifies as a woman). Rejection of a person’s self-designated 
gender as a woman was the average score between the Woman Attribution scale and the Man 
Attribution scale, in which the Man Attribution scale was reverse coded. Similarly, rejection of a 
person’s self-designated gender as a man was the average score between both scales in which the 
Woman Attribution scale is reverse coded. The measures were separated in the study to allow 
participants the option to distinguish between judging a target person as neither a woman nor or 
man or as both a woman and a man. Higher scores meant greater rejection. 
Adjusters and Defaulters. The first set of vignettes produced rejection scores in which 
participants received no distraction task. Rejection scores from this first set were used to create a 
“schema group” of individuals called adjusters. Adjusters were considered to be people who 
engaged in schema adjustment or used an identity schema to make a gender attribution about 
target people who were perceived to have stereotype inconsistencies between their gender 
identity and genitals (e.g., a target person who identifies as a man and has a vagina). Participants 
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were categorized as adjusters when they scored low on rejection of target people's gender 
identity (1.00 to 1.99). In contrast, participants were categorized as defaulters when they scored 
high on rejection of target people's gender identity (2.00 to 7.00). Based on this criteria, a 
dummy-coded (binary) variable (“1” = adjusters, “0” = defaulters) was created indicating 25 
participants in the sample were adjusters and 151 were defaulters. 
Hypotheses and Analyses 
Study 3 sought to test the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1:  Rejection will be greater when adjusters are distracted as opposed to when 
they are not distracted when genitals are perceived as stereotype-
inconsistent with gender identity. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Rejection will be greater when defaulters judge stereotype-inconsistent as 
opposed to stereotype-consistent genitals and gender identity regardless of 
the presence or absence of a distraction task. 
 
The presence or absence of a distraction task represents the moderating cognitive factor 
described in the proposed model (Figure 1). The presence of the distraction task was predicted to 
make adjusters behave more like defaulters in the gender attributions they make. In other words, 
adjusters’ rejection scores were predicted to increase as a function of the distraction task being 
present as compared to the distraction task being absent. This outcome was expected to occur 
when adjusters were specifically judging target people who have stereotype-inconsistent genitals 
and gender identities as opposed to stereotype-consistent genitals and gender identities. As 
previously, genitals were considered stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity when having a 
penis was paired with identifying as a woman and having a vagina was paired with identifying as 
a man in the vignettes. Again, references to stereotype-inconsistencies or stereotype-
consistencies between gender characteristics describe participants' perceptions that those 
characteristics are either stereotype-inconsistent or –consistent; not that they in reality are 
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stereotype-inconsistent or stereotype-consistent.  No predictions were made about response time 
for this study. But since response time was relevant to processes of gender attribution in previous 
studies, response time was explored in the analyses. 
Framework for testing hypothesis. The hypothesis was tested with a 2 (genitals: 
stereotype-inconsistent/consistent) x 2 (distraction task: absent/present) repeated measures 
MANOVA on rejection and response time. This technique was first conducted among adjusters 
to test Hypothesis 1, then among defaulters to test Hypothesis 2. Since rejection scores from 
Task 1 (distraction task absent) were used to divide adjusters and defaulters into separate groups 
in the first place, they would logically have different rejection scores at that level. Thus, the 
groups were examined through separate analyses and the means and plots of their data were 
compared and contrasted. Main effects and two-way interaction effects were examined for each 
analysis. In particular, the two-way interaction between distraction task and target characteristics 
was examined to determine if adjusters’ rejection scores significantly increased during the 
distraction task when judging stereotype-inconsistent target characteristics. The effect size of this 
interaction was examined to interpret its strength. The separate repeated measures MANOVA for 
defaulters tested Hypothesis 2. The two-way interaction between distraction task and target 
characteristics was examined to determine if defaulters rejection scores did not significantly 
change during the distraction task as a function of stereotype-(in)consistent target characteristics. 
Non-parametric tests (Mann Whitney U) were conducted to explore differences between 
adjusters and defaulters on the outcome variables. In particular, differences in response time 
were explored when distraction was absent and differences in both response time and rejection 
were explored when distraction was present. Differences in rejection when distraction was absent 
were not reported since this measure was used to distinguish the two group in the first place. T-
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tests were also conducted to explore differences between adjusters and defaulters on various 
demographic variables and on other measures in the study (e.g., essentialism).  
Assumptions of MANCOVA. For the same reasons depicted in Study 1 and 2 analyses, 
assumptions of sphericty were determined to be trivial since there were 2 levels in each factor. 
The analyses were split into two groups with different sample sizes for this study. The group of 
defaulters had a large sample size (n = 150) making it robust to even heavy-tailed distributions 
(Wilcox, 2005). To be certain that the non-normality of the data did not affect the results, 
analyses were conducted both with outliers included and with outliers removed (n = 9). This 
helped outcome variables that were previously non-normal reach normality. As in Study 1 and 2, 
removal of outliers did not change the results in this study other than slightly strengthening the 
effect sizes of the significant outcomes that had been found. For the same reasons as in the 
previous studies (see Orr, Sackett, & DuBois, 1991), outliers were included in the final analyses. 
The adjusters group in the present study had a smaller sample size (n = 25). For this group, 
outcomes were only slightly non-normal and demonstrated light-tailed distributions. According 
to Fields (2009), regardless of the smaller sample size, the slight non-normality was not a 
concern for the robust MANOVA test. Thus, the MANOVA for adjusters was also conducted 
without removing outliers and without data transformation. Non-parametric tests (Mann Whitney 
U) were used when examining differences between adjusters and defaulters on rejection and 
response time. 
Results 
 Adjusters and Defaulters. Table 8 depicts values that describe differences between 
adjusters and defaulters on categorical variables. Adjusters ranged from 18 to 63 years old and 
were younger (M = 29.64, SD = 9.22) than defaulters (M = 36.10, SD = 12.41), t (1, 39.95) = -
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3.07, p < .01. Adjusters were politically oriented slightly more liberal (M = 2.33, SD = 2.00) than 
defaulters (M = 3.08, SD = 3.00), t (1, 174) = -2.73, p < .01. Adjusters were less gender 
essentialist (M = 3.34, SD = 1.74) than defaulters (M = 4.50, SD = 1.21), t (1, 27.94) = -3.22, p < 
.01. Adjusters were also less authoritarian (M = 2.48, SD = 1.52) than defaulters (M = 3.10, SD = 
1.24), t (1, 174) = -2.24, p < .001. Of the 25 adjusters, a significantly greater percentage than 
defaulters had a gender identity that was independent from the one assigned to them at birth, 
were assigned as female at birth, and had sexual attractions that were fluid, flexible, and gender-
irrelevant or included same-gender attractions (sometimes exclusively). Adjusters and defaulters 
did not differ significantly on how they think others perceive their gender. On demographic 
variables, adjusters and defaulters did not differ in the area surrounding their current residence, 
their ethnicity, race, or education. They also did not differ significantly by status as an ally, or 
personally knowing a transgender or genderqueer person. A greater percentage of adjusters than 
defaulters indicated personally knowing a transgender person who identifies as a man and 
personally knowing an individual who identifies as genderqueer. A greater, marginally 
significant percentage of adjusters than defaulters indicated personally knowing a transgender 
person who identifies in some other way not listed. Adjusters did not differ from defaulters on 
knowing transgender people who self-designate their gender as women.  
 Main effects among adjusters. The repeated-measures MANOVA was examined for main 
effects of schema group, target characteristics, and distraction task. Means and standard errors 
for these main effects are outlined in Table 11. The analysis demonstrated a main effect of target 
characteristics on rejection and response time, F (2, 23) = 6.95, p <.01, ƞp2 = .38. Univariate tests 
revealed rejection was greater when target characteristics were stereotype-inconsistent compared 
to stereotype-consistent, F (1, 24) = 11.56, p <.05, ƞp2 = .21. Univariate tests also revealed 
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response time was slower when target characteristics were stereotype-inconsistent compared to 
stereotype-consistent, F (1, 24) = 519.20, p <.01, ƞp2 = .25. 
 The repeated measures MANOVA demonstrated a main effect of distraction task on 
rejection and response time, F (2, 23) = 3.99, p < .05, ƞp2 = .23. This effect was driven by 
rejection such that univariate tests revealed rejection was greater when the distraction task was 
present compared to when it was absent, F (1, 24) = 12.96, p <.05, ƞp2 = .25. There was no 
significant main effect of distraction task on response time. 
Two-way interaction effects among adjusters. The repeated measures MANOVA was 
examined for two-way interactions between target characteristics and distraction task on 
rejection and response time. Means and standard errors for these interactions are outlined in 
Table 11. A significant interaction effect was found between target characteristics and distraction 
task on rejection and response time, F (2, 172) = 6.63, p <.01, ƞp2 = .37. As depicted in Figure 7, 
this effect was driven by a significant effect on rejection scores. Univariate tests revealed 
rejection was greater among adjusters when target characteristics were stereotype-inconsistent 
compared to stereotype-consistent, but only when the distraction task was present, F (1, 24) = 
13.80, p <.01, ƞp2 = 0.37. There was no significant interaction effect between target 
characteristics and distraction task on response time. 
Main effects among defaulters. The repeated-measures MANOVA was examined for 
main effects of target characteristics and distraction task. Means and standard errors for these 
main effects are outlined in Table 12. The analysis demonstrated a main effect of target 
characteristics on rejection and response time, F (2, 148) = 243.98 p <.001, ƞp2 = .77. This effect 
was driven by rejection such that univariate tests revealed rejection was greater when target 
characteristics were stereotype-inconsistent compared to stereotype-consistent, F (1, 149) = 
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478.48, p <.001, ƞp2 = .76. There was no significant main effect of schema group on response 
time. 
 The repeated measures MANOVA demonstrated a main effect of distraction task on 
rejection and response time, F (2, 148) = 3.25, p < .05, ƞp2 = .04. This effect was driven by a 
marginally significant effect on response time such that univariate tests revealed response time 
was faster when the distraction task was present (Task 2) compared to when it was absent, F (1, 
148) = 3.68, p = .06, ƞp2 = .02. There was no significant main effect of distraction task on 
rejection. 
Two-way interaction effects among defaulters. The repeated measures MANOVA was 
examined for two-way interactions between target characteristics and distraction task on 
rejection and response time. There were no significant interaction effects between target 
characteristics and distraction task on rejection or response time. Means and standard errors for 
interaction effects are outlined in Table 12. Figure 7 shows the non-significant interaction among 
defaulters alongside the significant interaction found for the same effect among adjusters. 
Comparing adjusters and defaulters. Non-parametric tests were conducted to explore 
differences between adjusters and defaulters in the absence of distraction on response time and in 
the presence of distraction on rejection and response time. There was a marginally significant 
difference between adjusters and defaulters on response time in the absence of distraction such 
that adjusters were faster than defaulters at making a gender attribution when the target had 
stereotype-inconsistent characteristics (U = 1448.00, p = .06). Adjusters were less rejecting than 
defaulters when targets had stereotype-inconsistent characteristics when distraction was present 
(U = 869.50, p < .001). There were no differences between adjusters and defaulters on response 
time when the distraction was present. 
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Summary 
Study 3 examined whether adjusters' rejection scores would increase when they were 
distracted compared to when they were not distracted while rating target people with stereotype- 
inconsistent genitals and gender identity. Results supported the prediction of Hypothesis 1. 
Adjusters became more rejecting under cognitive load when judging targets with stereotype-
inconsistent characteristics. The effect size for this effect was very large suggesting that the 
process of adjusting is unstable due to the cognitive attention required to adjust from otherwise 
automatic stereotypical thinking about gender (Bessenoff & Sherman, 2000; Boenke, 2003; 
Cooper, 2000; Devine, 1989). In support of the prediction in Hypothesis 2, defaulters remained 
just as rejecting under cognitive load as when no distraction was present. Defaulters were more 
rejecting when targets characteristics were stereotype-inconsistent regardless of the distraction 
task. This finding was expected considering the findings from the pervious studies and that 
defaulters made up such a large portion of the sample. 
 Interestingly, a marginally significant finding suggests that defaulters became faster at 
making a gender judgment in the presence of a distraction task compared to its absence. This 
outcome may be confounded by defaulters rehearsing the schema they applied during the first 
task making them more efficient at making gender attributions even in the presence of a 
distraction. But this effect was only marginally significant and had a small effect size.   
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Chapter 6: 
Study 4 – Pilot Testing Gender Expression (Clothing) Items 
 Study 4 piloted new target gender characteristics having to do with clothing preferences. 
Study 5 used results from this study to test clothing as the moderating target factor described in 
the proposed model (Figure 1). To ensure that the clothing preferences manipulated in the 
vignettes of Study 5 paralleled each other, I assessed the extent to which different articles of 
clothing and accessories are perceived to be exclusively worn by women or exclusively worn by 
men.  
 Articles of clothing may be considered peripheral elements of social representations 
about gender since trends in clothing for each gender change over time. While a strong 
association may be made between clothing items and particular genders, these associations may 
be confounded by the social desirability of what is considered appropriate for each gender in 
American society at a given point in time. To ensure that social trends of certain clothing items 
would not confound people’s perceptions when making gender attributions, I also assessed the 
extent to which wearing an item of clothing is socially desirable for women or for men. Thus, I 
was able to control for both gender exclusivity and social desirability in current judgments about 
target clothing preferences in Study 5 by identifying clothing items that were strong on both 
measures through this pilot study. The characteristics with the strongest ratings were used in 
vignettes describing clothing preferences of target persons in Study 5. Since the pilot was 
exploratory and sought to identify variables used in the follow-up study, no hypotheses were 
proposed. Below is an explanation of the study design, results, and brief interpretation of the 
results for their application in Study 5. 
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Participants 
 Study 4 participants were 84 individuals from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) who 
received $0.25 each for their participation in the study. As in Study 2 and Study 3, the same 
parameters on MTurk were set to recruit participants. Of the 84 individuals recruited, 16 (19.1%) 
of the participants did not pass the quality checks.  Therefore, the final sample used in Study 2 
was 68 participants.  
 Table 13 shows full demographic data on the 68 participants in Study 4. Participants 
ranged in age from 19 to 62 years old (M = 36.06, SD = 34.00). Participants indicated a political 
orientation that was slightly liberal leaning or left of moderate (M = 3.38, SD = 1.68). Most 
participants did not have a gender identity independent from the gender assigned to them at birth, 
were assigned as female at birth, thought other people correctly perceive their gender, had a 
constant and clear attraction to people who are the binary opposite of the gender assigned to 
them at birth, did not identify as Hispanic or of Latin American decent, identified as White or 
Caucasian, described the area surrounding their current residence as suburban, and had a 4-year 
college degree or higher.  
Method 
 For Study 4, participants were directed from MTurk to a Qualtrics survey where they 
were asked to determine the gender exclusivity and social desirability of various articles of 
clothing and accessories. These items are listed in Table 10. Items with the strongest ratings were 
considered for use in the vignettes describing target people' clothing preferences in Study 5.  
 Gender Exclusivity. The gender exclusivity measure asked participants to determine the 
extent to which each item was only worn by women (Exclusively for Women; 1 = Never, 7 = 
Always) and the extent to which each item was only worn by men (Exclusively for Men; 1 = 
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Never, 7 = Always). The strength of an article of clothing or accessory on its gender exclusivity 
was defined by the mean difference between these two scores. Exclusively for Men scores were 
subtracted from Exclusively for Women scores to produce mean difference scores that were 
either positive or negative. Items with positive scores that were the farthest away from 0 were 
considered to have the strongest gender exclusivity for women. Items with negative scores that 
were the farthest away from 0 were considered to have the strongest gender exclusivity for men. 
 Social Desirability. The social desirability measure asked participants to determine the 
extent to which each item is desirable for women to wear (Desirable for Women; 1 = Never, 7 = 
Always) and the extent to which each item is desirable for men to wear (Desirable for Men; 1 = 
Never, 7 = Always). The strength of an article of clothing or accessory on its social desirability 
was defined by the mean difference between these two scores. Desirable for Men scores were 
subtracted from Desirable for Women scores to produce mean difference scores that were either 
positive or negative. Items with positive scores that were the farthest away from 0 were 
considered to have the strongest social desirability for women. Items with negative scores that 
were the farthest away from 0 were considered to have the strongest social desirability for men. 
Results 
Mean difference scores on Gender Exclusivity suggested that bras and tuxedos had the 
highest gender exclusivity ratings for women and men, respectively (see Table 14). Mean 
difference scores on Social Desirability suggested that dresses and cologne had the highest social 
desirability ratings for women and men, respectively (see Table 14). Correlations between 
gender exclusivity and social desirability for dresses, tuxedos, bras, and cologne are expressed in 
Table 15. Dresses for women and tuxedos for men are more highly correlated than any of the 
following: bras for women and tuxedos for men, dresses for women and cologne for men. 
107 
 
Summary 
 Study 4 explored and attempted to identify two opposing characteristics that would be 
viewed as similarly socially desirable for women and men to be used in vignettes for Study 5. To 
identify these clothing characteristics the mean difference scores for items' gender exclusivity 
and social desirability ratings, the correlations between the most exclusive and socially desirable 
items, and some contextual features of the items as they are worn in American society were all 
considered. Dresses and tuxedos were chosen to include in the vignettes for Study 5 for several 
reasons. First, both received high ratings on gender exclusivity and social desirability. On gender 
exclusivity, dresses ranked sixth for women and tuxedos ranked first for men. On social 
desirability, dresses ranked first for women and tuxedos ranked second for men. Although bras 
for women had a higher correlation between gender exclusivity and social desirability than 
dresses, dresses for women were still highly correlated on both these measures as were tuxedos 
for men. In the end, either bras or dresses could have been chosen based on statistics alone, but 
dresses were preferred since they are complementary to tuxedos in several ways. They could 
easily be adapted into a parallel narrative in the vignettes because they both are articles of 
clothing rather than accessories, they are worn on the majority of the body rather than a part of 
the body, and they are visibly worn on the outside of the body rather than as a scent or 
undergarment. Thus, dresses and tuxedos were selected as the strongest fit for inclusion in the 
vignettes in Study 5. 
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Chapter 7: 
Study 5 – Gender Expression on Schema Adjustment 
 One way to understand the current state of social representations of gender in U.S. 
society is to assess the stability of adjusters’ gender schema under different conditions set by the 
characteristics of the target. The manipulation of cognitive load in Study 3 demonstrated that 
adjusters’ method for affirming target gender identity was destabilized by a cognitive 
manipulation. But does their method hold up when normative expectations of the target are 
manipulated? Kahneman and Miller (1986) suggested that social norms associated with a 
particular group can inform people’s visualizations of those groups. Adjusters supposedly use an 
identity-based schema when making gender attributions in the face of stereotype-inconsistencies 
between genitals and gender identity. New expectations based on their schema developed around 
the gender identity of the target have yet to be assessed. Research has suggested that expectations 
related to group norms often result in asymmetrical judgments between groups (e.g., Hegarty & 
Pratto 2001). If gender identity is a strong social representation of gender for adjusters, then 
adjusters should not become more rejecting when characteristics of the target (other than just 
genitals) are stereotype-inconsistent. If they do, then one interpretation is that adjustment using 
an identity-based schema results in the development of or strengthening of norms newly 
associated with gender identity.  
As defined in the proposed model (Figure 1), gender exclusive and socially desirable 
clothing items from Study 4 were used to test clothing preferences as an additional feature of the 
target that adjusters may associate with the targets’ gender identity (Figure 1). There were three 
reasons for examining the impact of clothing. First, Study 1 did not distinguish between gender 
identity and clothing. Clothing was described and stereotypically-paired with descriptions of the 
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target’s gender identity. But for a multiplicity of reasons people do not always prefer to dress 
stereotypically in accordance with their gender, so they may be misgendered as a result. Second, 
Kessler and McKenna (1978) described clothing as the "cultural genital" because the association 
of certain types of clothing with certain genders led people to expect certain genitals to be there 
even when unseen. I was interested in determining the simultaneous impact of "seeing" (reading 
about) both genitals and information about clothing on people's gender judgments. Third, 
clothing preferences, unlike genitals, have to do with social norms. As such, clothing was a 
reasonable choice for manipulating norms to test its effects on adjusters’ rejection. Study 5 tested 
what would happen if these clothing-based expectations did not stereotypically match up with 
the person's gender identity and, instead, matched up with the targets’ genitals. 
The added effect of clothing on rejection and response time was assessed in the context 
of targets who had stereotype-inconsistent genitals and gender identity. Study 5 specifically 
tested the extent to which adjusters' rejection scores and response times changed in this context 
when information about stereotype-inconsistent clothing was included. Originally, adjusters were 
grouped as such based on the fact that they had low rejection scores for targets with stereotype-
inconsistent gender identity and genitals. In this context, stereotype-inconsistency between 
gender identity and clothing was predicted to result in higher rejection scores among adjusters. In 
other words, the conclusion could be made that gender identity is not a central social 
representation of gender for adjusters if a social norm (clothing) is prioritized in their judgments. 
If gender identity is truly central for adjusters, they should not become more rejecting in the face 
of target clothing preferences that are stereotype-inconsistent with target gender identity. 
Participants 
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 Study 5 participants were 236 individuals from MTurk who received $0.50 each for their 
participation in the study. As in Study 2 through Study 4, the same parameters on MTurk were 
set to recruit participants. Of the 236 individuals recruited, 24 (10.17%) did not pass the quality 
checks, similar to those used in Study 2 and 3, and were excluded. Two participants also did not 
complete all of the conditions in the study. Therefore, the final sample used in Study 5 was 210 
participants.  
 See Table 16 for the full demographic data on participants in Study 5. Participants ranged 
from 18 to 74 years old (M = 38.05, SD = 35.00). Participants were politically oriented slightly 
liberal or left of neutral/moderate (M = 3.34, SD = 3.00). Most participants did not have a gender 
identity independent from the gender assigned to them at birth, were assigned as female at birth, 
thought other people correctly perceive their gender, and had a constant and clear attraction to 
people who are the binary opposite of the gender assigned to them at birth. On demographics, 
most participants described the area surrounding their current residence as suburban, did not 
identify as Hispanic or of Latin American decent, identified as White or Caucasian, and had less 
than a 4-year college degree. Most participants did not consider themselves to be allies to 
transgender people, but considered themselves to be allies to lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) 
people. Most did not personally know a transgender or genderqueer person. Of the participants 
who did know a transgender person, most knew at least one person who identifies as a woman.  
Method 
 Study 5 was conducted completely on the internet using MTurk which directed 
participants to a Qualtrics survey. Participants were presented with two sets of vignettes that they 
were asked to rate and then answered background information about themselves. 
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Vignettes. Study 5 employed the same design as Study 3 for the vignettes and ratings 
which attempted to reduce the possibility of rehearsal between each set of vignettes. Similar to 
Study 3, the design made gender less salient and rehearsal of a gender schema between sets was 
reduced in several ways: (a) participants rated targets on their personality and age, not just on 
their gender; (b) participants made ratings on a second screen page after forming an impression 
of the target person on the previous screen page; and (c) participants received two sets of 
vignettes describing target people with who identified as men in the first set and as women in the 
second set with genitals manipulated within each set (vagina/penis). The manipulation of genitals 
in each set resulted in genitals being stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity (woman/penis, 
man/vagina) or stereotype-consistent with gender identity (woman/vagina, man/penis).  
The first set of vignettes included the following information: (a) genitals: stereotype-
consistent/stereotype-inconsistent; (b) personality: likes attending big parties/spending time with 
one friend at a time on the weekend; and (c) age: enjoys reading the news on the internet/in the 
local newspaper for leisure. The second set of vignettes included the same characteristics plus 
another target characteristic: (d) clothing preference: prefers to wear a dress/prefers to wear a 
tuxedo. The following is an example of a vignette that appeared in the first set: 
K. S. thinks of themself as a man and has a vagina. 
K. S. likes to hang out with one friend at a time on the weekends. 
For leisure, K. S. enjoys reading the news on the internet. 
The following is an example of a vignette that appeared in the second set: 
J. P. thinks of themself as a woman and has a vagina. 
When attending formal engagements, J. P. prefers to wear a dress. 
J. P. likes to hang out with one friend at a time on the weekends. 
For leisure, J. P. enjoys reading the news on the internet. 
A total of 6 vignettes were rated in the first set, but only 2 vignettes were relevant to 
analyses. As in Study 3, the 2 vignettes in each set that were paired with the gender rating scales 
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were used in analyses. For these vignettes, filler characteristics were held constant. The 
characteristics used for vignettes paired with gender ratings were also the same as in Study 3: (1) 
likes to attend big parties with friends on the weekends; and (2) enjoys reading the news on the 
internet for leisure. The remaining 4 filler vignettes were paired with two age ratings and two 
personality ratings. Filler characteristics for these vignettes were randomly distributed since age 
and personality ratings did not pertain to the research question.  
A total of 12 vignettes were rated in the second set, more than the first set because of the 
inclusion of the additional clothing characteristic with two levels for each. Thus, 4 vignettes were 
relevant to these analyses. These 4 vignettes were paired with the gender rating scales. Filler 
characteristics were held constant—the same characteristics held constant in the first set. The 
remaining 8 vignettes were paired with 4 age ratings and 4 personality ratings. Filler 
characteristics for these vignettes were randomly assigned. 
Response time. Similar to Study 3, Qualtrics was programmed to record two response 
times for participants that were averaged together to create one overall response time. These two 
times were: (1) the time it took perceivers to first read the vignettes; and (2) the time it took 
perceivers to rate the vignettes. Record of time started when the pages loaded and ended when 
the participant clicked to continue to the next survey page. Response times were recorded in 
seconds. 
 Rejection scores. Rejection scores were calculated in the same way as Study 3. Higher 
scores indicated greater rejection. 
 Adjusters and Defaulters. The first set of vignettes produced rejection scores in which 
participants were not given the clothing preference of the target person. Rejection scores from 
this first set were analyzed to create the schema group called adjusters. Participants were 
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categorized as adjusters when they scored low on rejection of target people's gender identity 
(1.00 to 1.99). In contrast, participants were categorized as defaulters when they scored high on 
rejection of target people's gender identity (2.00 to 7.00). Based on this criteria, a dummy-coded 
(binary) variable (“1” = adjusters, “0” = defaulters) was created indicating 15 participants in the 
Study 5 sample were adjusters and 195 were defaulters. 
Hypothesis and Analysis 
Study 5 sought to test the prediction that adjusters’ rejection scores will increase in the 
context of additional stereotype-inconsistent information, e.g., clothing, specifically about a 
target with stereotype-inconsistent genitals and gender identity. Clothing represents the 
moderating target factor described in the proposed model (Figure 1). The addition of stereotype-
inconsistent clothing was predicted to result in greater rejection scores among adjusters in the 
context of targets whose genitals are stereotype-inconsistent and information about clothing is 
withheld or is stereotype-consistent. If this is the case, the interpretation can be made that 
clothing altered people's tendency to use an identity-based schema rather than a biology-based 
schema during the gender attribution process.  
As in previous studies, genitals were considered stereotype-inconsistent with gender 
identity when having a penis was paired with identifying as a woman and having a vagina was 
paired with identifying as a man in the vignettes. Based on U.S. society's social representations 
of gender, clothing was considered stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity when preference 
for wearing a dress was paired with identifying as a man or when preference for wearing a 
tuxedo was paired with identifying as a woman in the vignettes. Clothing was also manipulated 
to either be absent or present in the vignettes. Clothing was absent when clothing preference for 
wearing either a dress or wearing a tuxedo was not included as a characteristic in the vignette. 
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Clothing was present when clothing preference for wearing either a dress or a tuxedo was 
included as a characteristic in the vignette. 
Framework for testing the hypothesis. The hypothesis was tested on Study 5 data to 
determine the impact of information about clothing preference on adjusters' rejection scores. A 2 
(genitals: stereotype-consistent/stereotype-inconsistent) x 3 (clothing: absent/present and 
stereotype-consistent/present and stereotype-inconsistent) repeated measures MANOVA was 
conducted on rejection and response time. This technique was first conducted among adjusters to 
test the hypothesis, then among defaulters to explore other outcomes. Main effects of genitals 
and clothing and the two-way interaction effect between these terms were examined and 
reported. No predictions were made about response time for this study. But since response time 
was relevant to gender attribution processes in previous studies, response time was explored in 
the analyses. Particular to the hypothesis were the main effect of clothing and the two-way 
interaction effect on rejection scores. Post hoc comparisons of rejection and response time were 
performed by Bonferroni t-tests (2-tailed) to adjust for the multiple comparisons (see Field, 
2009; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). These comparisons on the main effect of clothing were 
examined to determine if rejection was greater for the presence of clothing that was stereotype-
inconsistent compared to stereotype-consistent with target gender identity. The interaction effect 
was also examined to determine if adjusters’ rejection scores significantly increased in the 
presence of information about clothing specifically when judging stereotype-inconsistent 
genitals. The effect size of this interaction was examined to interpret its strength.  
The same 2 x 3 repeated measures MANOVA on rejection and response time was then 
conducted among defaulters. Main effects of genitals and clothing and the two-way interaction 
effect between these terms were examined and reported. No predictions were made about 
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defaulters in this study. But their rejection scores and response times across factors were 
interpreted in light of the outcomes for adjusters. To further examine differences between 
adjusters and defaulters, non-parametric tests (Mann Whitney U) were conducted. Specifically 
differences in response time were explored when clothing was absent and differences in both 
response time and rejection were explored when clothing was present and stereotype-inconsistent 
or consistent. Differences in rejection when clothing was absent were not reported since this 
measure was used to distinguish the two group in the first place. Regular t-tests were also 
conducted to explore differences between adjusters and defaulters on various demographic 
variables and on other measures in the study (e.g., essentialism). 
Assumptions of MANOVA. In contrast to the previous studies, the present study examined 
a factor with more than 2 levels and the assumption of sphericity was not met. The assumption of 
sphericity does not need to be met for a repeated measures MANOVA (O’Brien & Kaiser, 1985), 
but univariate test statistics were reported and do require that the assumption of sphericity is met. 
Thus, I reference the Greenhouse-Geisser corrections for all univariate statistics in the analyses 
(see Field, 2009; Stevens, 2009). Adjusters had a small sample size (n = 15), but factors were 
only slightly non-normal on the outcomes and demonstrated light-tailed distributions. For the 
same reasons as described in Study 3, the MANOVA for adjusters was conducted without 
removing outliers and without data transformation. However, non-parametric tests were used 
when examining differences between adjusters and defaulters on rejection and response time. 
Results 
 Adjusters and defaulters. See Table 16 for values describing differences between 
adjusters and defaulters on the above variables. Adjusters ranged from 18 to 58 years old and 
were not significantly different in age (M = 34.87, SD = 12.52) in comparison to defaulters (M = 
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38.30, SD = 13.57), t (1, 208) = -0.95, ns. Adjusters were politically oriented slightly more 
liberal (M = 2.33, SD = 1.23) than defaulters (M = 3.43, SD = 1.75), t (1, 208) = -2.37, p < .05. 
Adjusters were less gender essentialist (M = 3.41, SD = 1.55) than defaulters (M = 4.63, SD = 
1.13), t (1, 208) = -3.92, p < .001. There were no significant differences on authoritarianism 
between adjusters (M = 2.64, SD = 1.20) and defaulters (M = 3.16, SD = 1.32), t (1, 208) = -.52, 
ns. Of the 15 adjusters, a greater, marginally significant percentage of adjusters than defaulters 
had sexual attractions that were fluid, flexible, and gender-irrelevant or included same-gender 
attractions (sometimes exclusively). A significantly greater percentage of adjusters than 
defaulters described the area surrounding their current residence as urban and a marginally 
significant greater percentage of adjusters than defaulters identified their race as Black or 
African American. Adjusters and defaulters were not significantly different on gender identity 
independence from birth-assignment, gender assigned at birth, how they think others perceive 
their gender, ethnicity,  education, status as an ally, or personally knowing a transgender or 
genderqueer person.  
 Since contact with transgender people affected rejection scores in Study 1, the gender 
identities of the people whom participants personally know may be important to understanding 
any differences on rejection between target person's who identify as women and target person's 
who identify as men. Thus, adjusters and defaulters were compared on differences in the gender 
identities of the transgender or genderqueer people they know. Of the participants who indicated 
personally knowing a transgender or genderqueer person, a greater percentage of defaulters than 
adjusters indicated personally knowing a transgender person who identifies as a woman. A 
greater percentage of adjusters than defaulters indicated personally knowing a transgender 
person who identifies as a man and a transgender person who identifies as genderqueer. 
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Adjusters did not differ from defaulters on knowing transgender people who identify in some 
other way.  
 Main effects among adjusters. The repeated-measures MANOVA was examined for main 
effects of genitals and clothing. Means and standard errors for these main effects are outlined in 
Table 17. The analysis demonstrated a main effect of genitals on rejection and response time, F 
(2, 13) = 4.27, p < .05, ƞp2 = .40. Univariate tests revealed rejection was higher when genitals 
were stereotype-inconsistent compared to stereotype-consistent with gender identity, F (1, 14) = 
8.66, p <.05, ƞp2 = .38. A marginally significant effect of response time was found such that 
univariate tests revealed response time was slower when genitals were stereotype-inconsistent 
compared to stereotype-consistent with gender identity, F (1, 14) = 4.12, p = .06, ƞp2 = .23. 
 The repeated measures MANOVA demonstrated a main effect of clothing on rejection 
and response time, F (2, 11) = 6.23, p < .01, ƞp2 = .69. Univariate tests revealed rejection was 
higher when clothing was present compared to when clothing was absent, F (1, 28) = 8.19, p < 
.01, ƞp2 = .37. Bonferroni comparisons indicated that rejection was not significantly different 
when clothing was present and stereotype-inconsistent compared to when clothing was present 
and stereotype-consistent. There was marginal significance suggesting that rejection was higher 
when clothing was present and stereotype-consistent than when clothing was absent (p = .06). 
Additionally, rejection was significantly higher when clothing was present and stereotype-
inconsistent compared to when clothing was absent (p < .05). Univariate tests also revealed 
response time was slower when clothing was absent compared to when clothing was present, F 
(1, 28) = 4.79, p < .05, ƞp2 = .26. Bonferroni comparisons indicated that response time was not 
significantly different when clothing was present and stereotype-inconsistent compared to when 
clothing was present and stereotype-consistent. Response time was faster when clothing was 
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present and stereotype-consistent than when clothing was absent (p < .05). Response time was 
not significantly different when clothing was present and stereotype-inconsistent compared to 
when clothing was absent. 
Interaction effects among adjusters. The repeated measures MANOVA was examined for 
interactions between genitals and clothing on rejection and response time. Means and standard 
errors for these interactions are outlined in Table 17. A significant interaction effect was found 
between schema group and genitals on rejection and response time, F (2, 11) = 6.94, p < .01, ƞp2 
= .72. As depicted in Figure 8, this effect was driven by a significant effect on rejection scores 
such that univariate tests revealed rejection was higher when genitals were stereotype-
inconsistent and clothing was present compared to stereotype-consistent and absent regardless of 
the stereotype-(in)consistency of clothing, F (1, 28) = 13.54, p < .01, ƞp2 = 0.49. There was no 
significant interaction effect between genitals and clothing on response time. 
Main effects among defaulters. The repeated-measures MANOVA was examined for 
main effects of genitals and clothing. Means and standard errors for these main effects are 
outlined in Table 18, The analysis demonstrated a main effect of genitals on rejection and 
response time, F (2, 193) = 388.81, p < .001, ƞp2 = .80. Univariate tests revealed rejection was 
higher when genitals were stereotype-inconsistent compared to stereotype-consistent with gender 
identity, F (1, 194) = 763.73, p < .001, ƞp2 = .80. Univariate tests revealed response time was 
slower when genitals were stereotype-inconsistent compared to stereotype-consistent with 
gender identity, F (1, 194) = 9.34, p < .01, ƞp2 = .05. 
The repeated measures MANOVA demonstrated a main effect of clothing on rejection 
and response time, F (2, 191) = 11.92, p < .001, ƞp2 = .20. Univariate tests revealed rejection was 
lower when clothing was present and stereotype-consistent than when clothing was absent, F (1, 
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388) = 9.91, p < .001, ƞp2 = .05. Bonferroni comparisons indicated that rejection was greater 
when clothing was present and stereotype-inconsistent compared to when clothing was present 
and stereotype-consistent (p < .001). There was marginal significance suggesting that rejection 
was higher when clothing was absent than when clothing was present and stereotype-consistent 
(p = .06). Additionally, rejection was not significantly different when clothing was present and 
stereotype-inconsistent compared to when clothing was absent. Univariate tests also revealed 
response time was slower when clothing was absent compared to when clothing was present, F 
(1, 388) = 12.47, p < .001, ƞp2 = .06. Bonferroni comparisons indicated that response time was 
not significantly different when clothing was present and stereotype-inconsistent compared to 
when clothing was present and stereotype-consistent. Response time was faster when clothing 
was present and stereotype-consistent than when clothing was absent (p < .001). Response time 
was also faster when clothing was present and stereotype-inconsistent compared to when 
clothing was absent (p < .01). 
Interaction effects among defaulters. The repeated measures MANOVA was examined 
for two-way interactions between genitals and clothing on rejection and response time. There 
were no significant interaction effects between genitals and clothing on rejection or response 
time. Means and standard errors for interaction effects are outlined in Table 18. Figure 8 shows 
the non-significant interaction among defaulters alongside the significant interaction found for 
the same effect among adjusters. 
Comparing adjusters and defaulters. Non-parametric tests were conducted to explore 
differences between adjusters and defaulters in the absence of clothing on response time and in 
the presence of clothing on rejection and response time. Adjusters were less rejecting than 
defaulters when targets genitals were stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity (U = 820.00, p 
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< .01). Adjusters were less rejecting than defaulters when targets genitals were stereotype-
inconsistent and clothing was stereotype-consistent with gender identity (U = 928.00, p < .05). 
There was a marginally significant difference between adjusters and defaulters on rejection when 
just clothing was stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity such that adjusters were less 
rejecting than defaulters (U = 1120.00, p = .08). There were no significant differences between 
adjusters and defaulters on response time in the presence or absence of information about 
clothing. 
Summary 
 Study 5 examined the effect of presence or absence of clothing preference on rejection 
and response time among adjusters. The addition of information about stereotype-inconsistent 
clothing preference was predicted to increase the degree of rejection only in the context in which 
genitals were also stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity. Interestingly, results suggest that 
when genitals were stereotype-inconsistent adjusters' rejection scores were higher as a function 
of the mere presence of information about clothing. Rejection scores were higher regardless of 
whether the information about clothing was stereotype-consistent or inconsistent, just as long as 
clothing information was included in the targets’ description. Comparisons reflected this finding 
such that no differences in adjusters' rejection scores were found between clothing that was 
stereotype-consistent and clothing that was stereotype-inconsistent. This suggests that the impact 
of clothing went beyond what was hypothesized to occur. The presence of clothing, regardless of 
stereotype-(in)consistency, resulted in higher rejection rather than the prediction that just 
clothing that was stereotype-inconsistent would result in higher rejection. No predictions were 
made about the impact of genitals on rejection for adjusters, but genitals that were stereotype-
inconsistent were found to result in higher rejection among adjusters regardless of clothing. 
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Together, these findings suggest that information about genitals was favored in the context of 
information about clothing for adjusters. Adjusters ended up expecting consistency between 
clothing and genitals similar to Kessler and McKenna's (1978) concept of the "cultural genital."  
 When comparing and contrasting adjusters and defaulters on rejection, defaulters were 
more rejecting when genitals were stereotype-inconsistent compared to stereotype-consistent 
with target gender identity. The magnitude of the effect size of genitals on rejection was much 
greater for defaulters than for adjusters. This suggests that genitals had a larger effect on the 
gender attribution process for defaulters than for adjusters. This makes sense considering 
adjusters were less rejecting than defaulters when targets’ genitals were stereotype-inconsistent 
in the first place before information about clothing was included. According to a marginally 
significant finding, defaulters, like adjusters, were more rejecting when clothing was stereotype-
inconsistent compared to when it was stereotype-consistent with gender identity  regardless of 
the stereotype-(in)consistency of target genitals. Stereotype-inconsistent clothing made 
defaulters somewhat more rejecting compared to when information about clothing was absent, 
but this finding was marginally significant. In other words, just stereotype-inconsistent clothing 
preferences made defaulters more likely to reject even when all else was stereotype-consistent. 
The magnitude of this effect of clothing on rejection was much smaller for defaulters than 
adjusters. In sum, adjusters’ rejection scores were more affected by clothing than genitals while 
the reverse was true for defaulters. Effect sizes suggested that defaulters’ rejection scores, in 
contrast, were more affected by genitals than by clothing.  
 No predictions were made about response times for adjusters or defaulters and findings 
were generally unsurprising. Findings for adjusters on response time had large effect sizes, while 
the findings for defaulters had small to medium effect sizes. Adjusters' response times were 
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slower and (marginal) defaulters' response times were slower (significantly) when genitals were 
stereotype-inconsistent compared to stereotype-consistent. Additional information about 
stereotype-consistent clothing made adjusters faster at making a gender attribution compared to 
when this information was absent, but not when it was stereotype-inconsistent. Since adjusters 
rely on gender identity to make their decision, they made a gender attribution more quickly when 
a greater number of stereotype-consistent characteristics were provided. In contrast, defaulters 
were faster at making a gender attribution when clothing was present rather than absent 
regardless of stereotype-(in)consistency. Since defaulters rely on genitals to make their decision, 
they rehearsed this default schema in the first set of vignettes so they were able to apply it more 
quickly to the second set of vignettes regardless of the clothing information. 
 To explore the data further, differences between adjusters and defaulters on 
demographics and other measures were examined. Adjusters and defaulters were different in 
political orientation, gender essentialist beliefs, sexual attractions, geographic location, and the 
transgender or genderqueer people they know. Adjusters were more liberal and less gender 
essentialist. Adjusters were more likely to have sexual attractions that were fluid, flexible, and 
gender-irrelevant or included same-gender attractions (sometimes exclusively). Adjusters were 
more likely to live in an urban area. Finally, adjusters were more likely to know transgender 
people who identified as men or as genderqueer, while defaulters were more likely to know 
transgender people who identified as women. 
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Chapter 8: 
Discussion 
This program of research examined how social representations, cognitive processes, and 
individual attitudes and experiences predict cisgenderist outcomes in the gender attribution 
process. To examine the links between these factors, I proposed a model (Figure 1) that describes 
the role of gender visualization and schema application in perceiving and determining a target 
person's gender. Specifically, this model hypothesized that gender is initially processed at the 
cognitive level through visualizing a target's characteristics which automatically activates a 
default, biology-based schema. People then decide whether or not to apply this schema and 
arrive at a final gender attribution. Individual contact with outgroups, certain personality traits, 
gender-related beliefs, and general beliefs about society were predicted to act as moderators to 
this process. The model predicted that some people may attempt to control their automatic 
judgment of the target by consciously engaging in schema adjustment before arriving at a final 
gender attribution (called "adjusters"). To examine the centrality of social representations in 
gender attributions at the cognitive level, adjusters were predicted to revert to using a default, 
biology-based schema when under conditions of cognitive load (a distraction) or when 
considering an additional, stereotype-inconsistent target characteristic (clothing preference).  
There were five different research studies conducted and analyzed to test the different 
pieces of this model. The results from these studies are described below in the context of the four 
research aims outlined in Chapter 2. In this section, I discuss study results as they relate to each 
of the study aims. Next, I discuss the limitations and future direction for research on this topic. I 
also discuss the implications of this research to the study of social representations and social 
124 
 
cognition. Last, I make some final conclusions with regard to experiences of cisgenderism in 
gender attributions. 
Findings and Implications by Aim 
 Aim 1 – Determine the relationships between target gender characteristics, 
rejection, and response time. One aim of this dissertation was to determine the effect of social 
representations about gender on people's tendency to misgender others. In these studies, social 
representations about gender were described by stereotype-(in)consistencies in target persons' 
gender characteristics. The tendency to misgender was operationalized as the extent to which a 
target's gender identity was rejected, i.e., saying that a target person is a man when she self-
identifies as a woman. Previously, Kessler and McKenna's (1978) studies found that people tend 
to rely on gender stereotypes associated with biological characteristics, particularly genitals and 
especially the penis, when making gender attributions about others (Kessler & McKenna, 1978). 
The current study found further support for what they found nearly 35 years ago. Genitals 
impacted the degree to which people rejected target people's self-designated gender. The current 
research also expanded on Kessler and McKenna's (1978) studies by examining the effects of 
chromosomes as a social representation affecting the tendency to misgender others. Perceivers' 
gender judgments were similarly affected by information about chromosomes as they were about 
genitals. 
 Results across multiple studies suggest that perceivers misgender others when biological 
characteristics (e.g., genitals and/or chromosomes) do not stereotypically match a target's gender 
identity. Speer (2005) found that when gender is perceived as ambiguous, people interpret 
contextual information about the target's gender to make an attribution. Similarly, the model 
proposed for the current research described how people use schemas to interpret gender 
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according to biology-based social representations of women and men. For example, the social 
representation that women have a vagina and XX chromosomes lead people to determine that a 
target who identifies as a woman and has a penis and/or XY chromosomes is "actually" a man. 
The effect sizes for both genitals and chromosomes on rejection of target gender identity were 
similarly large. The large effect sizes can be interpreted to mean that genitals and chromosomes 
define two core elements in Americans' social representations of gender. People consistently 
demonstrated a common sense understanding that women and men have distinct chromosomes 
and genitals and that they may view variations from these distinctions as not "real" (see 
Garfinkel, 1967). If people had instead thought that gender could only be determined by people's 
personal gender identities at any given point in time, then people would have been much less 
likely to misgender others.  
 Another aim of this dissertation was to expand on past research to learn more about the 
level of automaticity in people's cognitive processing of other people's gender. One of the ways 
the current research examined automaticity was through perceivers' response times as they 
judged different targets' genders. Past research on norm theory found that certain social groups 
are asymmetrically attended to because their characteristics and/or behaviors are seen as 
surprising or unexpected (Bruckmüller, Hegarty, & Abele , 2012; Hegarty, 2006; Hegarty & 
Buechel,2006; Hegarty & Pratto, 2001; Hegarty & Pratto, 2004; Miller, Taylor, & Buck, 1991; 
Pratto, Hegarty, & Korchmairos, 2007). Research on schemas has also found that stereotype-
inconsistencies tend to increase the amount of time people spend categorizing stimuli (Rosch, 
1978; Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, & Knippenberg, 2003). 
In contrast, biological characteristics that were stereotype-inconsistent with expectations 
of women and men in the current research were not always attended to for longer. For example, 
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Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, and Knippenberg (2003) found that dissimilar features of stimuli 
increase the time people spend making categorizations of that stimuli. But, as Augoustinos and 
Walker (1995) suggested, the present research found that this cognitive process may be context-
dependent. There was an increase in the time it took people to categorize gender when target’s 
genitals were stereotype-inconsistent, but not when other characteristics were stereotype-
inconsistent. For example, Study 1 found that people were more rejecting of stereotype-
inconsistent chromosomes and gender identity, but they did not need more time to make this 
judgment. One interpretation is that chromosomes may not need to go through processes of 
gender visualization as the model proposes (Figure 1). Chromosomes are internal and non-
physical perceivers, so they may have received little to no visualization time. In contrast, genitals 
are external, physical characteristics, so they received more visualization time. Differences in 
externality may explain why response time was not a factor for chromosomes when perceivers 
made a gender attribution, while response time was a factor for genitals. In partial contradiction 
to the proposed model, gender visualization may not always be a necessary procedure in the 
gender attribution process. Considering the very large effect sizes found for rejection; the effect 
sizes found for response time were negligible by comparison. This pattern was found across all 
studies. In general, people seemed to be quick to make a gender attribution, even when their 
expectations were not met.  
 Overall, results from the current research suggest a social-cognitive asymmetry in which 
people are more likely to misgender others when characteristics do not match up with 
stereotyped expectations. Response times suggest that gender attribution is generally a fairly 
quick process regardless of whether people's expectations are met. The quick speed at which 
people make judgments about other people's gender may suggest that gender attribution—
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particularly rejecting people's gender identity—has become so habituated and automatic that we 
do not even notice we are doing it.  
 Aim 2 – Determine the moderating effect of personality, transgender contact, 
transgender ally status, gender-related beliefs and general beliefs about society on the 
relationship between target gender characteristics, rejection, and response time. Another 
aim of the current research was to examine the impact of various perceiver characteristics on 
their tendency to misgender others. Study 1 examined personality traits such as openness to 
experience and agreeableness to find out if they make people less rejecting of other people's 
gender. Openness and agreeableness had no effect on rejection. This finding was surprising 
because openness and agreeableness have previously been found to mediate the relationship 
between contact with outgroups and prejudice (e.g., Asendorpf & Wilpers, 1998). Study 1 also 
examined whether or not knowing a transgender person would make people less rejecting. There 
was a medium effect size suggesting that participants who knew at least one transgender person 
were less rejecting when targets had stereotype-inconsistent chromosomes. They were also faster 
at making these judgments particularly for targets who identified as women, but the effect size 
for response time was small.  
 This finding is congruent with previous research linking contact with outgroups to lower 
prejudice (Allport, 1954/1979; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Knowing transgender people made 
people less rejecting when chromosomes were inconsistent with identity, but this effect was not 
found when genitals were inconsistent with gender identity. Perhaps interactions with 
transgender people caused them to view chromosomes as less changeable than genitals. Research 
has linked lower prejudice with perceiving group characteristics as immutable (see Haslam & 
Levy, 2006). Thus, participants who knew transgender people were less rejecting when 
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unchangeable characteristics conflicted with gender identity (e.g. chromosomes), but they were 
no different from people who did not know a transgender person when changeable 
characteristics conflicted (e.g., genitals). Considering the sample size for participants who knew 
a transgender person was small, the effect sizes for both rejection and response time suggest a 
trend worth further analysis in future studies. More contact with a diversity of individuals who 
self-designate their genders may increase understanding about the many different ways in which 
people express their genders regardless of the mutability of their characteristics. 
 In Study 2, knowing a transgender person was not found to be a significant moderator 
since chromosomes were not an assessed characteristic of the targets. But this study also 
assessed the extent to which identifying as a transgender ally makes participants less rejecting 
and judge faster. Participants who identified as an ally to transgender people were less rejecting 
in the context of targets whose genitals were stereotype-inconsistent with their gender identity. 
There were no differences with regard to response time. The finding for rejection was expected 
since past research has found that people are less prejudiced toward the groups to which they are 
allied (Stone, 2009; Stotzer, 2009). The effect size was medium for rejection, but there were no 
differences on response time. This finding suggests that decreases in rejection among allies were 
not due to differences in cognitive processing speed. Transgender allies were similar to non-
allies in the time they spent processing gender (in)consistencies when making judgments, but 
their final decisions were less rejecting of target's self-designated gender regardless. The 
differences in rejection scores despite similar response times may suggest that allies and non-
allies spend similar amounts of time processing gender, but at different stages of the gender 
attribution process. While non-allies may be trying to visualize the unexpected, stereotype-
inconsistent information, allies may be focusing on trying to adjust and apply a schema to be less 
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rejecting. This hypothesis is congruent with research suggesting that stereotype-inconsistent 
information is attended to for longer than stereotype-consistent information in inferential and 
categorization processing (Rosch, 1978; Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, & Knippenberg, 2003). Allies 
may be less likely to be slowed down by the stereotype-inconsistencies than non-allies 
considering their motivation to be gender-affirming. Their cognitive energy may, instead, be 
expended on applying a schema that will help them arrive at a less rejecting decision. If they 
were not motivated to put forth the cognitive effort to be less rejecting, they may end up rejecting 
in the same way that non-allies do. Efforts to reduce cisgenderism may try to focus on 
motivating people to be transgender allies so that they pay more attention to the schemas that 
they use that have a direct impact on misgendered groups.  
 Study 2 also measured the extent to which lower endorsement of gender essentialism 
makes participants less rejecting and judge gender faster. Participants with low endorsement of 
gender essentialism were less rejecting, but there were no differences with regard to response 
time. The effect on rejection is congruent with past studies which found that people who have 
essentialist beliefs tend to have a cognitive preference for stereotype-consistency over 
stereotype-inconsistency when making judgments about others (Bastian & Haslam, 2007). 
Similarly, participants with low gender essentialism were less rejecting in the context of targets 
whose genitals were stereotype-inconsistent with their gender identity. The effect size for the 
continuous variable of essentialism on rejection was very large, but response time was 
unaffected. The effect on response time has similar implications for those low in gender 
essentialism as it did for allies to transgender people. Decreases in rejection among people who 
endorse gender essentialism less were not due to differences in cognitive processing speed. 
Similar to allies, people low in gender essentialism may not respond the same way to stereotype-
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inconsistencies because of their motivation to be less gender essentialist. They may expend their 
cognitive efforts adjusting to and applying a schema that will be less rejecting. If they were not 
motivated to put forth this cognitive effort to be less rejecting, they may end up being more 
rejecting. Efforts to reduce cisgenderism may try to focus on motivating people to endorse less 
gender essentialism in the schemas that they apply during the gender attribution process 
  Study 2 also measured the extent to which biological gender beliefs and natural 
attitudes/beliefs about gender increased rejection and slowed down judgments. These were not 
found to be significant. Previously, biological gender beliefs were a predictor of support for 
transgender people's rights, and not natural attitudes/beliefs about gender (see Tee and Hegarty, 
2006). But these had never been tested on attribution processes that can lead to misgendering. 
Also, Study 2 measured the extent to which authoritarianism and conservatism increased 
rejection and slowed down judgments. These were not found to be significant either. Previously, 
these measures had been found to predict sexual prejudice or anti-trans prejudice (Herek, 2000; 
Tee & Hegarty, 2006; Whitley, 1999). Therefore, these measures do not relate to processes that 
result in misgendering.  
 Overall, knowledge derived from knowing a transgender person plays an important role 
in the extent to which people reject other's gender identities and how quickly their decision is 
made. The diversification of knowledge through exposure to individuals and groups with many 
ways of expressing gender may help reduce people's tendency to misgender. Also, the effects of 
identifying as a transgender ally or being low in gender essentialism on response time gave 
insight into the stages at which people focus their attention during the attribution process. If 
people are motivated to focus on the schemas used to make a gender judgment rather than on 
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visualizing the stereotype-inconsistencies of the target, they may become less rejecting  in their 
gender judgments. 
 Aim 3 – Determine the effect of cognitive distraction on adjusters’ rejection among 
target with stereotype-inconsistent gender characteristics. Building on the predictions and 
findings of the previous studies, another aim of this dissertation was twofold: The first was to 
identify individuals who engage in schema adjustment. Schema adjustment was considered to 
occur when people, called "adjusters," applied a schema that was based on affirming a target's 
gender identity (an "identity-based schema"). The second aim was to determine if adjusters 
would become more rejecting when distracted while making a gender judgment. Findings for this 
aim would lend credence to the idea proposed in Chapter 2 that people who are less prejudice 
will still demonstrate prejudice on an implicit level (see Gilbert, 1989). Study 3 found that, under 
conditions in which adjusters were cognitively distracted, their rejection scores increased. This 
finding was expected since past research on prejudice found that people who are otherwise less 
prejudiced become more prejudiced when under cognitive load (Cralley & Ruscher, 2005). In 
general, people who report less prejudice on self-report measures tend to demonstrate prejudice 
on implicit cognitive measures (Hoffman, Hawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Nosek, et al., 2007; Plant & Devine, 1998).  
people who are motivated to be less prejudiced tend to still be prejudiced at an implicit level 
(Ajzen, 2005; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Devine, 1989; Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, 
& Vance, 2002). Similarly, adjusters were less rejecting of targets with stereotype-inconsistent 
genitals and gender identity, but they became more rejecting when they judged target gender 
while being distracted.  
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 Interestingly, a marginally significant finding suggested that adjusters were faster than 
defaulters at making a gender attribution when they weren't distracted. Thus, adjusters may not 
be "adjusting" from a default schema to an identity-based schema as previously thought. If they 
were adjusting, they would have been the same speed or slower to apply an identity-based 
schema because they may have needed more time for the extra step of adjusting. Such a result 
would lend credence to the idea proposed in Chapter 2 that some people "correct" or adjust their 
attributions in a step-by-step process (see Gilbert, 1989). Gilbert (1989) described “correcting” 
as a sequential process in which people make an attribution first and then revise that attribution 
with a new one. Through the model depicted in Figure 1, I posited a similar process for gender 
attributions among adjusters. The faster response time among adjusters, although a marginally 
significant result, suggests that adjusters processed targets much more quickly than this 
sequential process would suggest. One interpretation of their faster response time is that adjusters 
were blocking information about genitals in order to more efficiently apply an affirming, 
identity-based schema to each target. Thus, adjusters may be more accurately called "blockers" 
than adjusters.  
This process of blocking contrasts with the findings for transgender allies and people low 
in gender essentialism. Transgender allies and people low in gender essentialism in Study 2 took 
a similar amount of time to process stereotype-inconsistencies as those who were not transgender 
allies and were high in gender essentialism. An interpretation of their similar response times 
suggests that these groups may have been engaging in sequential adjustment as I had originally 
proposed might be the case for adjusters. In short, these studies described two methods that 
different people may apply to make a gender attribution that is less likely to be misgendering: (1) 
people who adjust their initial default, biology-based schema toward an identity-based one that is 
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more gender-affirming; and (2) people who block information about biology to apply an identity-
based schema that is gender-affirming. 
 Blocking in Study 3 may have some similar characteristics to blocking as it is described 
in the literature on attention in learning (Kruschke, 2003). Kruschke (2003) posited that people 
learn methods that perfectly predict outcomes such that they tend not to associate new cues with 
that outcome; they block those cues out. In comparison, the process of blocking in Study 3 may 
suggest that some people have learned to associate gender identity as the perfect predictor of a 
person's gender. The difference between blocking in the literature on attention in learning and 
blocking in gender attributions is that, instead of blocking new cues, people block old and 
familiar cues that were presumably learned first (e.g., biological characteristics). Therefore, 
blocking may use up cognitive resources to a greater degree when making a gender attribution 
than when engaging in simple cognitive learning tasks. This may be why blocking was generally 
ineffective for people when the distraction task was present. The cognitive effort to block the 
default schema and apply an identity-based schema did not hold up when under cognitive load—
adjusters became more rejecting. 
 Adjusters higher rejection scores while under cognitive load revealed that, on an implicit 
level, adjusters may still be impacted by knowledge about biology-based social representations 
of gender. Blocking out the default schema in order to apply an identity-based schema seems to 
be an explicit, controlled process that depletes cognitive resources and makes people susceptible 
to the effects of cognitive load. Thus, psychologists' and activists' attempts to establish gender 
identity as a biological, immutable characteristic (e.g., Diamond, 2002; Ungar, 1979) may not 
have successfully established itself as a central element in people's social representations. If it 
had, Moscovici (1984) would suggest that gender identity would be able to stand the test of any 
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situation. But adjusters' identity-based model for gender attribution did not hold up under 
cognitive load. Future research on adjusters should explore the direct impact of habitually asking 
unfamiliar people their gender identity on their tendency to misgender others thereafter. Perhaps 
automating this practice would reduce the cognitive effort needed to block out the current 
biological premise upon which social representations of gender are based.  
 Aim 4 – Determine the effect of an additional stereotype-inconsistent gender 
characteristic on adjusters' rejection. The final aim of this dissertation explored adjusters 
(suggested to be "blockers" in the conclusions for Study 3) further by adding a socially-normed 
gender characteristic that they would additionally have to be de-prioritized in order to apply an 
identity-based schema. While the previous study uncovered the instability of schema adjustment 
because of a cognitive distraction, Study 5 sought to expose the instability of schema adjustment 
because of a social norm. Kahneman and Miller (1986) suggest that social norms get associated 
with particular groups. Research has found that these associations often result in asymmetrical 
judgments about groups (e.g., Hegarty & Pratto 2001). Adjusters typically categorize people 
according to their gender identity. Such categorizations may still lead people to make normative 
or stereotyped associations based on those categorizations. Since Kessler and McKenna (1978) 
described clothing as the "cultural genital," clothing preferences were manipulated in Study 5 to 
determine their impact on adjusters’ judgment of targets who they otherwise categorize 
according to their gender identity.  
I predicted that adjusters would be more rejecting when clothing was stereotype-
inconsistent with gender identity in the context of stereotype-inconsistent genitals. I assumed that 
they would not be more rejecting when clothing was stereotype-consistent with gender identity 
in the context of stereotype-inconsistent genitals. Results from the study only supported this first 
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prediction. In the context of stereotype-inconsistent genitals, adjusters were more rejecting of 
target gender identity regardless of whether clothing was stereotype-inconsistent or stereotype-
consistent. The presence of clothing caused adjusters’ stereotyped expectations about genitals to 
emerge. This may suggest an expansion on past research into the impact of norms on the 
judgments people make. At least for some people (in this case, adjusters), the mere presence or 
absence of certain stimuli may change the parameters upon which other stimuli get associated 
with stereotypes and then categorized. 
 Caution should be exercised when deriving conclusions from the above results. Recall 
that gender identity of the target was split between the first set of vignettes (clothing absent) and 
second set of vignettes (clothing present) in order to distinguish adjusters from the sample. 
Although somewhat post hoc, results may have been confounded by the fact that the gender 
identity of the target was not counterbalanced between presence or absence of clothing 
preference. Attempts were made to ensure that the clothing characteristics were both rated highly 
on gender exclusivity and social desirability. Attempts were also made to reduce the salience of 
these gender ratings in the design of the study. But the effect of order could not be discerned for 
certain and was not controlled for in this study. While order effects were not significant when 
testing vignettes that described target gender identity and genitals (see Study 2), order effects 
were not specifically tested on vignettes that included information about clothing.  
 Further exploration of the data revealed that adjusters were still less rejecting than 
defaulters in the presence of information about clothing. Both adjusters' and defaulters' gender 
judgments were influenced by information about genitals in the presence of information about 
clothing, but adjusters were influenced by genitals to a lesser degree than defaulters. The effect 
sizes for the impact of genitals on rejection for adjusters and defaulters were both very large, but 
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much larger among defaulters. These results may be explained by differences between adjusters' 
and defaulters' in the gender identities of the transgender people they know. The sample sizes 
were too small to test the effects of knowing transgender people on the outcomes, but adjusters 
tended to know more transgender people who self-designate their gender as genderqueer than 
defaulters did. Genderqueer is a category sometimes used to define one's gender as independent 
from a binary identification as a woman or a man (see Nestle, Howell, & Wilchins, 2002). 
People who identify as genderqueer may express their genders (e.g., through clothing) in ways 
that are not easily categorized according to binary social representations of gender and that may 
change in their gender stereotyped-consistency over time and across contexts. Thus, adjusters 
may have interpreted certain targets as examples of people who are genderqueer—not distinctly 
a woman or distinctly a man—when they learned that their clothing preferences were 
inconsistent. 
 People have many reasons for self-identifying within the gender binary while expressing 
their gender in contrast to it (Ansara, 2010; Wilchins, 1997; Serano, 2007; Stone, 1991). Some 
people who, for example, identify as women and have a penis, may express their gender in 
masculine ways to protect themselves from violence because they do not easily "pass" as a 
woman or they cannot afford gender affirming hormones or surgeries to help them pass. 
Alternatively, violence may not be a factor—they may simply just like to express themselves as a 
masculine woman. If adjusters had greater exposure to the multiplicity of reasons people have 
for self-identifying their genders within the binary and continuing to express their genders in 
contrasting ways, they might not have become more rejecting in the presence of information 
about clothing.  
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 Overall, adjusters’ identity-based schema did not hold up in the presence of information 
about clothing. Underlying stereotypes based on the biological determination of gender emerged 
in the presence of this socially-normed characteristic regardless of its stereotype-consistency or 
inconsistency. Knowledge about genderqueer identities may have influenced adjusters becoming 
more rejecting, but still not as rejecting, as defaulters. In the end, both groups were rejecting of 
targets who had characteristics that were stereotype-inconsistent. Both adjusters and defaulters 
may benefit from exposure to more diverse knowledge about the various ways in which people 
express their gender—including those who self-identify within the gender binary—and the 
reasons why they do. Such knowledge could help broaden people's understanding about others to 
whom they have less exposure, which may also reduce the effects of cisgenderism in all people's 
gender attributions. 
Implications for research on social representations and social cognition 
 Rateau, Moliner, Guimelli, & Abric (2012) wagered that future research combining social 
representations and sociocognitive processes would "...be crucial to the development of our 
knowledge about the psychosocial functioning of individuals and groups" (p. 494). The above 
studies combined these two fields of thought by empirically manipulating different social 
representations of gender and testing their impact on cognitive processes. Social representations 
theory provided the framework for testing collective assumptions and expectations about gender 
through different combinations of stereotyped characteristics that described various target 
persons. Social cognition provided the focus on the attributions that perceivers made and the 
length of time it took them to make an attribution. This design allowed for a deeper 
understanding of the processes associated with both theories.  
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 Cognitive manipulations and interpretation of their effects helped explain the current 
state of social representations of gender. Moscovici (1969; 1984) explained that social 
representations are generally stable over time, but have the ability to evolve through challenges 
made by individuals. Cognitive manipulations in the present studies were useful for 
understanding the extent to which gender identity is becoming integrated into people's collective 
social representations of gender. For a subgroup of the samples, gender identity predicted 
people's gender attributions regardless of stereotype-inconsistency with genitals, but only under 
conditions in which they were easily in control of the judgments they were making. Cognitive 
load was manipulated to determine the automaticity of making a gender judgment that affirmed 
target gender identity in this subgroup. Cognitive load caused this group to be more likely to 
misgender the target when genitals and gender identity were stereotype-inconsistent. In other 
words, this subgroup became much like the rest of the sample who relied on biological 
characteristics to make their gender judgments. This research suggested that biological 
characteristics are central to shared knowledge about gender, even among those who may be 
beginning to challenge these assumptions. 
 Social representations of gender via the manipulation of target characteristics helped 
emphasize the impact of context on the cognitive processing of gender. Research on norms found 
that people can be asymmetric in their judgments of others when they are marked as unexpected 
or surprising (e.g., Hegarty & Pratto). Asymmetries were similarly found in the current research, 
but the strength of these asymmetries depended on which features of the target were more 
strongly associated with social representations. There was a larger effect of genitals than 
chromosomes such that people were more likely to misgender when genitals were stereotype-
inconsistent. Additionally, research on schema categorization has found that the more dissimilar 
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the features of a category are, the more time people take to categorize it (Rosch, 1978; 
Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, & Knippenberg, 2003). Meta-analyses have found inconsistencies in 
the findings regarding response time in categorization (Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992; Stangor & 
McMillan, 1992). The current research found that response time was relevant only to certain 
manipulations of certain types of target gender characteristics. Genitals rather than chromosomes 
made people slower at forming their judgments. Overall, genitals were processed differently than 
chromosomes at the cognitive level. This may have to do with the effort that goes into 
cognitively visualizing genitals especially when they are stereotype-inconsistent.  This extra 
visualization process may be unnecessary for chromosomes since they are internal biological 
characteristics associated with gender while genitals are external. Chromosomes may be less 
strongly relevant and more quickly processed as a result. 
 Taken together, social representations theory and social cognitive processes 
complemented each other through both design and interpretation of the findings. Future research 
into complex sociological phenomenon (e.g., gender) may wish to integrate these two 
approaches in similar ways or using improved methods such as the suggestions described in the 
next section. 
Limitations and future directions 
 This program of research involved several overarching as well as study-specific 
limitations. First, all studies involved issues of external validity since they had participants make 
judgments about fictional target people described in vignettes rather than make judgments about 
real people observed in everyday settings. However, being among the first of their kind, these 
studies attempted to isolate and manipulate variables previously found to be relevant to the 
gender attribution process (e.g. genitals; Kessler & McKenna, 2005) and test new variables (e.g., 
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chromosomes) so that their specific impact in relation to gender identity could be examined. In 
this way, these studies married the methods of social cognitive research while contextualizing the 
findings within social expectations and assumptions about gender. 
 A few limitations to the studies have to do with the methods of analysis. For one, the 
rejection scores derived from the two Attribution rating scales in Studies 2, 3, and 5 limited 
analyses to understanding the extent to which people rejected, but not the reasoning behind their 
judgments. A benefit of the two separate scales that perceivers could attribute targets to being a 
woman and/or a man separately. They had the option to judge the target to be a woman and a 
man or neither a woman nor a man if they wanted.  I took the average of these two rating scales 
together since any rejection of a target’s self-designated gender would be an instance of 
misgendering. This includes the suggestion through these rating scales that a target who 
identifies as a single gender (as a woman or as a man) is either both these gender simultaneously 
or neither of these genders. Nevertheless, I was unable to distinguish between judging the target 
as both or as neither by averaging the two scales together. Future studies may seek to examine 
differences in nuance between the judgments that people make by interpreting differences in the 
reasoning behind their judgments and subsequent ratings. 
 Research is needed to further understand who “adjusters” are, what causes adjusters to be 
more rejecting, and how schema adjustment and/or "blocking" operates across different 
information provided about the target person’s gender. Since the identity schema did not hold up 
when under cognitive load and when additionally learning about a target person’s clothing 
preference, this calls into question the distinctiveness of adjusters from defaulters across 
contexts. Although this finding implies that schema adjustment and/or blocking may be even 
rarer and more unstable than previously thought, continuing to identify and explore the instances 
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in which certain people do engage in schema adjustment or blocking will help build an 
understanding of the social representations that act implicitly to perpetuate or reduce cisgenderist 
outcomes in our gender attributions.  
 Future studies should counterbalance gender identity of the target in order to accurately 
determine the effect of clothing preference on adjusters' rejection of the target's gender identity. 
Alternatively, future studies could identify a group of likely adjusters/blockers prior to testing 
and then test the effects of clothing and genitals on rejection for both targets who identify as men 
and targets who identify as women. Circular reasoning was at risk when I chose to distinguish 
adjusters as such strict “accepters” of target gender identity using the same measure that was 
used in the main analyses. Distinguishing adjusters in this way, however, ensured that the group I 
was assessing truly represented the group that was the least rejecting in the sample. Future 
studies may attempt to avoid the risk of circular reasoning by recruiting a larger sample and/or 
focusing recruitment efforts on populations who are more likely to be adjusters/blockers. The 
demographic differences between adjusters/blockers and defaulters found in Study 3 and 5 may 
help with recruitment strategizing to this end.  
 Findings from this research also provide a foundation upon which to test additional target 
characteristics' impact on gender attributions. Future studies can test the extent to which gender 
attributions are affected by differences in the tone of people's voices, in presence/absence or 
coarseness of hair on peoples bodies, in the structure of people's faces, and other external 
attributes associated with gender. These studies were also limited by their focus on targets who 
think of themselves on the gender binary as either a woman or a man. A more diverse spectrum 
of gender identities may be used. Open-ended questions may ask people to indicate the target's 
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gender allowing for more flexibility in their responses by way of removing the possible priming 
effect of anchoring target gender along a continuum of being a woman or being a man.  
 Future studies may retest characteristics of the target used in the current studies in order 
to determine their centrality to social representations across time and across cultures. Mosocivici 
(1981) emphasized that social representations are mutable and transformative across time as 
objectification processes incorporate new information that push assumptions and common sense 
realities in novel directions. Chromosomes may be an example of this in U.S. society today since 
people responded to chromosomes differently than genitals on rejection and response time. Also, 
social representations are central to the communications and knowledges of cultures. Therefore, 
taking these same or similar studies and applying them cross-culturally may reveal 
characteristics other than biological ones (e.g., "spirit gender" in indigenous North American 
cultures; Jacobs, Thomas, Lang, 1997) that influence people's gender judgments. 
 The current research also provided a foundation upon which to test additional 
characteristics of the perceiver and their impact on the gender attribution process. For one, the 
design of these studies did not include direct measures of participants' emotional response, e.g., 
anger and disgust, in reaction to the targets gender characteristics. The reason for excluding 
measures of affect were described in Chapter 2, but future research should propose and test a 
model that includes affect as a potential moderator to the gender attribution process. 
Cisgenderism has been differentiated from measures of emotion-laden forms of prejudice such as 
transphobia (see Ansara & Hegarty, 2012). Social representations that lead to cisgenderist 
responses are said to operate implicitly on the gender attribution process, regardless of emotional 
response. Therefore, this study predicted cisgenderist responses to be found both among people 
more likely to have positive emotions toward individuals affected by misgendering (e.g., allies to 
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transgender people) as well as those with potentially more negative feelings toward those 
individuals (e.g., people with authoritarian beliefs). But these were indirect tests of emotional 
response. At the extreme end of the spectrum, past research has found that people are motivated 
to respond violently toward transgender people as a result of their negative emotions toward 
them (Stotzer, 2009). But are people motivated to misgender people as a result of having these 
kinds of negative emotions? Some research has suggested that people are motivated to misgender 
in order to socially maintain a heteronormative status quo (see Schilt & Westbrook, 2009). To 
further understand the role of emotions in the gender attribution process, future studies may 
focus deliberately on people's emotional responses to targets with stereotype-inconsistent and 
stereotype-consistent gender characteristics. Hill & Willoughby's (2005) self-report measure of 
transphobia may be a starting point for this analysis. 
Final conclusions regarding cisgenderism in gender attributions 
 For this dissertation, cisgenderism was defined as the delegitmization of people’s 
designations of their own genders by relying on social representations to make that designation 
for them. As expected, the vast majority of participants in the current research misgendered 
others because they made stereotyped associations about their biological characteristics. 
Surprisingly, genitals and chromosomes were similar bases upon which people's genders were 
judged. They also rejected others' genders fairly quickly despite the unexpectedness of a target's 
characteristics. Knowing people who are misgendered (e.g. transgender people) lessened people's 
tendency to misgender others and even helped them make a judgment faster. At the same time, 
the knowledge communicated through these interactions sometimes limited people's judgments 
in new ways. While they were less rejecting toward some people (e.g., people with stereotype-
inconsistent chromosomes), they were still rejecting toward others (e.g., people with stereotype-
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inconsistent genitals). Both identifying as an ally to transgender people and having less gender 
essentialist beliefs were associated with less rejection. People with these characteristics may 
have been less rejecting because they were consciously trying to overcome the stereotype-
inconsistencies in the target's gender that they automatically recognized. This hypothesis was 
supported when people who tended to be more gender affirming of others became more rejecting 
when conditions (via distraction) constrained their cognitive efforts not to misgender.  
 These findings illuminate the ways in which cisgenderism may operate implicitly, or 
beyond our control, on the gender judgments that we make. Social representations of gender 
cause people to judge gender based on biological characteristics above or instead of personal 
gender identity, unless they consciously attempt to disregard those social representations. But 
attempts to disregard them were found to be easily destabilized. The reliance on biology-based 
social representations will need to be replaced by a new model in order to stabilize people's 
efforts to be more gender affirming. To overcome the implicit effects of cisgenderism, current 
social representations will need to be replaced by a new schematic model that prioritizes people's 
own gender self-designations. Ultimately, social representations need to allow people the right to 
designate their own genders, without institutionalized barriers, throughout the lifespan.  
 Efforts to work toward this goal may start by challenging and falsifying people's common 
sense understandings that women and men are biologically distinct and that gender is simple and 
stable in humans (e.g., Garfinkel, 1967). For example, educational efforts at the institutional and 
interpersonal levels could focus on increasing awareness around the many kinds of chromosomal 
combinations and the spectrum of genital size, shape, color, etc. in humans (see Fausto-Sterling, 
2000). Additionally, educational efforts may draw attention to the multiplicity of gender self-
designations and expressions in humans (see Wilchins, 2004). The potential benefits of these 
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efforts are supported by the findings in this dissertation. Exposing people to new knowledge to 
motivate them to be less gender essentialist may contribute to lowering people's tendency to 
reject others' gender identities. Additionally, familiarizing people with the experiences of others 
who have unfamiliar gendered backgrounds may contribute to lowering people's tendency to 
reject others' gender identities.  
 Efforts to work toward this goal may also attempt to motivate people to focus their 
attention on counteracting the assumptions that they make about other people's genders in every 
day social interactions. A sense of social responsibility could be instilled to act in accordance 
with ethical guidelines put forth by the APA (2008) encouraging the social and legal recognition 
of people's gender identities. In keeping with these guidelines, the practice of asking people their 
gender identities, and affirming those identities, should become common practice in everyday 
interactions between individuals and with social services or government organizations. This 
dissertation's findings suggest that we may have automated the process of assigning people to a 
gender without asking them first. However, if we take the time to ask the person's gender 
identity, we may be able to reverse this process. People, including those who are resistant to the 
practice at first, may find that their automatic assumptions about people's genders are incorrect 
more often than they would have known them to be otherwise. For example, people may not be 
so quick to judge the gender of people like Balpreet Kaur whose story was described in Chapter 
1 of this dissertation. Instead, gender attributions could be based on the personal gender identities 
of the individual rather than on any other ascribed characteristics. Over time, a cultural  
prioritization of self-designations of gender may help reduce the effects of cisgenderism both 
institutionally and interpersonally. 
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Appendix A: 
Full measures used in moderation analyses for Study 1 & Study 2 
 
Gender Essentialism scale (modified Essentialist Beliefs scale, Haslam& Levy, 2006) 
 
1. Gender is a category with clear and sharp boundaries: People are either women or men. 
2. Women and men each have necessary or defining characteristics, without which they 
would not be women or men. 
3. Women and men are not fundamentally different. (*) 
4. People who do not consistently act like one gender are fooling themselves and should just 
make up their minds 
5. Knowing that someone is a woman or a man tells you a lot about them 
6. Gender is caused by biological factors for women and men. 
7. Whether a person is a girl or boy is set early on. 
8. People cannot change their gender. 
9. Gender has innate and genetically-based characteristics. 
(*) counter-balanced items 
 
Beliefs about gender scale (Tee &Hegarty, 2006) 
 
1. There are only two genders, women and men 
2. Only these two genders are morally acceptable and legitimate in our society 
3. All adults identify as either women or men 
4. If you are either a woman or a man, then you are that gender for all time 
5. All women have a vagina and all men have a penis. 
6. It is just a social norm to assign babies to a gender based on what their bodies are like 
7. Anyone who is not naturally a woman or a man is a freak of nature 
8. If someone says they are changing their gender, they are most likely just making a joke or 
play acting  
9. Even a person with ambiguous genitalia is still either female or male 
10. Possession of a vagina, even one that is man-made through surgery, entitles a person to 
consider themselves female 
 
Trans persons beliefs scale (Tee &Hegarty, 2006) 
 
1. Gender is determined by biological factors, such as genes and hormones, before birth  
2. Whether a person sees himself/herself as male or female is largely a matter of upbringing  
3. Transvestites are people who gain pleasure from cross-dressing  
4. Transsexual people are basically transvestites who wear the clothes of the opposite sex all 
of the time  
5. All mammals have a physical sex, but only humans have a gender identity  
6. If someone wants a sex reassignment, their doctor or psychologist can talk them out of it  
7. Male to female transsexuals are practically all attracted to men and not to women  
8. Transsexual people are fooling themselves in believing that they, and not their bodies, 
determine what their gender identity should be  
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9. There are only three factors that determine gender: internal gonads (e.g. testes), external 
genetalia (e.g. penis) and chromosomes ( i.e. xx—female and xy—male)  
10. If someone has a sex change operation they have genuinely changed their gender  
11. Transsexual people should be tolerated but it is difficult to accept them as normal people  
12. In countries where sex reassignment surgery is not readily available, nobody worries 
about their gender identity 
 
Right-wing authoritarianism, short version, modified (RWA, Zakrisson, 2005) 
 
1. Our country needs a powerful leader, in order to destroy the radical and immoral currents 
prevailing in society today. 
2. Our country needs free thinkers, who will have the courage to stand up against traditional 
ways, even if this upsets many people. (*) 
3. The ‘‘old-fashioned ways’’ and ‘‘old-fashioned values’’ still show the best way to live. 
4. Our society would be better off if we showed tolerance and understanding for 
untraditional values and opinions. (*) 
5. God's laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed before it 
is too late, violations must be punished. 
6. It would be best if newspapers were censored so that people would not be able to get hold 
of destructive and disgusting material. 
7. Many good people challenge the state, criticize the church and ignore ‘‘the normal way 
of living’’. (*) 
8. Our forefathers ought to be honored more for the way they have built our society, at the 
same time we ought to put an end to those forces destroying it. 
9. People ought to put less attention to the Bible and religion, instead they ought to develop 
their own moral standards. (*) 
10. There are many radical, immoral people trying to ruin things; the society ought to stop 
them. 
11. It is better to accept bad literature than to censor it. (*) 
12. Facts show that we have to be harder against crime and sexual immorality, in order to 
uphold law and order. 
13. The situation in the society of today would be improved if troublemakers were treated 
with reason and humanity. (*) 
14. If the society so wants, it is the duty of every true citizen to help eliminate the evil that 
poisons our country from within. 
(*) counter-balanced items 
 
Conservatism (Brewer, 2003) 
 
Egalitarianism subscale 
1. Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal 
opportunity to succeed;  
2. we have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country(*) 
3. This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are(*) 
4. It is not really that big a problem if some people have more of a chance in life than 
others(*) 
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5. If people were treated more equally in this country we would have many fewer problems;  
6. One of the big problems in this country is that we don’t give everyone an equal chance. 
 
Moral traditionalism subscale 
1. The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of society 
2. The world is changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those 
changes(*) 
3. We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral 
standards even if they are very different from our own(*) 
4. This country would have fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional 
family ties 
(*) counter-balanced items 
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Appendix B: 
Clothing items rated in Study 4 
 
Sun hats 
Fine jewelry 
Panties 
Boxers 
Bras 
Briefcase 
Dresses 
Ties 
Baseball Caps 
Loafers 
Cuff links 
High heels 
Tuxedos 
Purse 
Tight jeans 
Cologne 
Muted colors 
Ballet flats 
Stockings 
Sneakers 
V-neck sweater 
Pants 
Loose jeans 
Swim trunks 
Bright colors 
Perfume 
Bikini 
Collared dress shirt 
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Table 1  
Study 1 Descriptives of Categorical Participant Characteristics, N = 127  
 
Total Sample  
n (%) 
Gender   
 
Female 84 (66.1) 
 
Male 40 (31.5) 
MTF 1 (0.8) 
 
Questioning 2 (1.6) 
Sexuality   
 Bisexual 6(4.7) 
 
Gay/Lesbian 6(4.7) 
Straight 88 (69.3) 
 
Did not respond/Refused to answer 27 (21.3) 
Race 
 
 
Asian 34 (26.8) 
 
Black or African American 18 (14.2) 
Hispanic 26 (20.5) 
 
Middle-Eastern/Indian 9 (7.1) 
White or Caucasian 36 (28.3) 
 Other 1 (0.8) 
 
Did not respond/Refused to answer 3 (2.4) 
Grew up in NYC  
 
Yes 83 (65.4) 
 
No 44 (34.6) 
Household income  
 Under 25,000 23 (18.1) 
 
25,001-50,000 43 (33.1) 
 
50,001-75,000 27 (21.3) 
75,001-100,000 20 (15.7) 
 
Over 100,000 15 (118) 
Current Religion  
 
Atheist/Agnostic/None 37 (29.1) 
Buddhist 4 (3.1) 
 
Catholic 28 (22.0) 
 
Hinsu/Jain 3 (2.4) 
 
Jewish 10 (7.9) 
 
Muslim 5 (3.9) 
 
Protestant/Christian 34 (26.8) 
 
Spiritual 3 (2.4) 
 
Did not respond/Refused to answer 3 (2.4) 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Study 1 Means (M) and Standard Errors (SE) for 2x2 Interactions Between Target Gender Characteristics on Rejection and Response 
Time, N = 127 
a,b,c significant differences between values are represented  by different superscripts 
Rejection Scores 
 Genitals  Chromosomes  Sexual attraction   
 Vagina M (SE) 
Penis 
M (SE) 
 XX 
M (SE) 
XY 
M (SE) 
 To women 
M (SE) 
To men 
M (SE) 
 Row 
M (SE) 
Woman identity 2.11a (.08) 4.10b (.12)  2.24a (.08) 3.97b (.13)  3.14a (.08) 3.07a (.09)  3.10 (.08) 
Man identity 4.26b (.12) 2.18a (.08)  4.11b (.13) 2.32a (.08)  3.10a (.09) 3.33b (.09)  3.22 (.08) 
Vagina - -  3.25 (.08) 3.12 (.09)  3.18 (.08) 3.19 (.08)  3.18 (.07) 
Penis - -  3.10 (.10) 3.17 (.08)  3.07 (.09) 3.20 (.09)  3.14 (.08) 
XX Chromosomes - -  - -  3.13 (.08) 3.23 (.09)  3.18 (.08) 
XY Chromosomes - -  - -  3.12 (.08) 3.17 (.08)  3.14 (.08) 
Column - - - -   3.12 (.08) 3.20 (.08)   
Response Times (s) 
Woman identity 19.64a (1.11) 22.18b (1.00)  19.92 (.97) 21.91 (1.27)  20.71 (1.02) 21.11 (1.05)  20.91 (.92) 
Man identity 22.69b (1.28) 18.63a (.98)  20.77 (1.13) 20.55 (1.07)  21.41 (1.31) 19.91 (.93)  20.66 (.98) 
Vagina - -  19.32a (.97) 23.00b (1.37)  21.08 (1.22) 21.24 (1.20)  21.16 (1.07) 
Penis - -  21.36a (1.14) 19.46a (.87)  21.04 (1.07) 19.77 (.95)  20.41 (.84) 
XX Chromosomes - -  - -  20.22 (1.11) 20.46 (.97)  20.34 (.92) 
XY Chromosomes - -  - -  21.90 (1.21) 20.56 (1.02)  21.23 (.99) 
Column - -  -   21.06 (1.02) 20.51 (.90)   
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Table 3 
 
Study 1 Means (M) and Standard Errors (SE) for 2x2x2 Interactions Between Target Gender Characteristics on Rejection and 
Response Time, N = 127 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: a,b,c significant differences between values are represented  by different superscripts; x,y,z marginally significant differences 
between values are represented by different superscripts (p < 1.0) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Rejection Scores 
 Genitals   
 Vagina  Penis   
 Chromosomes  Chromosomes   
 XX M (SE) 
XY 
M (SE) 
 XX 
M (SE) 
XY 
M (SE) 
 Row 
M (SD) 
Woman identity 1.24 (.05) 2.98 (.14)  3.24 (.14) 4.95 (.16)  3.10 (.08) 
Man identity 5.26z (.15) 3.26y (.14)  2.97y (.15) 1.38x (.07)  3.22 (.08) 
Column 3.25 (.08) 3.12 (.09)  3.10 (.10) 3.17 (.08)   
Response Time (s) 
Woman identity 16.38a (1.12) 22.89c (1.76)  23.45c (1.32) 20.92b (1.26)  20.91 (.92) 
Man identity 22.26 (1.36) 23.11 (1.64)  19.27 (1.49) 17.99 (1.02)  20.66 (.98) 
Column 19.32 (1.10) 23.00 (1.37)  21.36 (1.14) 19.46 (.87)   
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Table 4 
 
Study 1 Means (M) and Standard Errors (SE) for the 2x2x2 Interaction Between Target Gender Identity, Chromosomes, and 
Transgender Contact, N = 127 
a,b,c significant differences between values are represented  by different superscripts; x,y marginally significant differences between 
values are represented by different superscripts (p < 1.0) 
 
 Rejection Scores 
   Transgender contact   
   Yes  No   
 Transgender contact Chromosomes  Chromosomes   
 Yes M (SE) 
No 
M (SE) 
XX 
M (SE) 
XY 
M (SE) 
 XX 
M (SE) 
XY 
M (SE) 
 Row 
M (SD) 
Woman identity 2.66 (.14) 3.26 (.08) 2.16a (.15) 3.15b (.24)  2.27a (.09) 4.24c (.14)  2.96 (.08) 
Man identity 2.96 (.15) 3.30 (.09) 3.56b .24) 2.36a (.16)  4.30c (.14) 2.31a (.09)  3.13 (.09) 
Column 2.81 (.13) 3.28 (.08) 3.18 (.07) 3.14 (.08)  3.18 (.08) 3.14 (.08)   
Response Time (s) 
Woman identity 18.59 (1.80) 21.69 (1.04) 20.10x (1.91) 17.07x (2.47)  19.85x (1.11) 23.53y (1.43)  20.14 (1.04) 
Man identity 18.54 (1.92) 21.37 (1.11) 18.23 (2.24) 18.86 (2.12)  21.62 (1.30) 21.12 (1.23)  19.96 (1.11) 
Column 18.56 (1.71) 21.53 (.99) 19.16 (1.82) 17.96 (1.92)  20.74 (1.05) 22.33 (1.11)   
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Table 5 
Study 2 Descriptives of Categorical Participant Characteristics, N = 190 
 
Total Sample 
n (%) 
Gender Identity independent from birth-assignment 
 
 
Yes 7 (3.7) 
 
No 180 (94.7) 
 
Unsure of gender identity 1 (.5) 
 
Did not respond 2 (1.1) 
Gender assigned at birth   
 
Female 100 (52.6) 
 
Male 84(44.2) 
 
Intersex 1(.52) 
 
I was not assigned a gender 3 (1.6) 
 
Did not respond 2 (1.1) 
How they think others perceive their gender 
 
 
Correctly 185 (97.4) 
 
Incorrectly 3 (1.6) 
 
Did not respond 2 (1.0) 
Sexual attraction 
 
 
A constant and clear attraction to other gender 153 (80.5) 
 
A constant and clear attraction to same gender 7 (3.7) 
 
A constant and clear attraction to both women and men 8 (4.2) 
 
A variable or fluid attraction to women and men 9 (4.7) 
 
A constant, clear attraction to people regardless of gender 
identity/expression 8 (4.2) 
 
I am asexual/have no attraction to any gender 1 (.5) 
 
I am unsure about which gender(s) I am attracted to 2 (1.1) 
 
Did not respond 2 (1.1) 
Area surrounding current residents 
 
 
Urban 65 (34.2) 
 
Suburban 85 (44.7) 
 
Rural 38 (20.0) 
 
Did not respond 2 (1.1) 
Ethnicity 
 
 
Hispanic or of Latin American decent 10 (5.3) 
 
Not Hispanic or of Latin American decent 176 (92.6) 
 
Unknown 2 (1.1) 
 
Did not respond 2 (1.1) 
Race 
 
 
American Indian or Alaskan Native 2 (1.1) 
 
Black or African American 10 (5.3) 
 
Asian 4 (2.1) 
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Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 1 (.5) 
 
White or Caucasian 165 (86.8) 
 
Other (Persian, Multi-racial, Hispanic, Arab) 6 (3.2) 
 
Did not respond 2 (1.1) 
Education 
 
 
Less than a 4-year degree 103 (54.2) 
 
A 4-year degree or higher 85 (44.8) 
 
Did not respond 2 (1.1) 
Consider themselves to be an "ally" to Transgender people 
 
 
Yes 93 (48.9) 
 
No 95 (50.0) 
 
Did not respond 2 (1.1) 
Consider themselves to be an "ally" to LGB people 
 
 
Yes 113 (59.5) 
 
No 75 (39.5) 
 
Did not respond 2 (1.1) 
 
 
Table 6 
Study 2 Means (M) and Standard Errors (SE) for Main Effects of and Interaction between Target Gender Identity and Genitals on 
Rejection and Response Time time, N = 190 
 Rejection  Response time  
 Vagina 
M (SE) 
Penis 
M (SE) 
Row  
M (SE) 
Vagina 
M (SE) 
Penis 
M (SE) 
Row M (SE) 
Woman M (SE) 1.19a (.05) 5.26b (.13) 3.22 (.07) 17.87a (0.92) 23.56b (1.97) 20.72 (1.12) 
Man M (SE) 5.33b (.13) 1.15a (.05) 3.24 (.07) 23.53b (1.27 18.08a (0.98) 20.81 (0.89) 
Column M (SE) 3.26 (.07) 3.20 (.07)  20.70 (0.83) 20.82 (1.18)  
a,b significant differences between values are represented  by different superscripts 
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Table 7 
Study 2 Means (M) and Standard Errors (SE) for Main Effects of and Three-Way Interaction Between Perceiver Gender Essentialism, 
Target Gender Identity and Target Genitals on Rejection and Response Time, n = 188 
 Rejection 
  Low Essentialism 
M (SE) 
High Essentialism 
M (SE) 
 
 Vagina 
M (SE) 
Penis 
M (SE) 
Vagina 
M (SE) 
Penis 
M (SE) 
Vagina 
M (SE) 
Penis 
M (SE) 
Row  
M (SE) 
Woman M (SE) 1.20a (.06) 5.38b (.12) 1.13a (.08) 4.81b  (.17) 1.28a (.08) 5.95c (.18) 3.29 (.06) 
Man M (SE) 5.47b (.12) 1.18a (.05) 4.80b (.16) 1.12a (.07) 6.14c (.17) 1.24a (.08) 3.33 (.06) 
Column M (SE) 3.34 (.06) 3.28 (.06) 2.96 (.08) 3.65 (.08)  
 Response time (s) 
  Low Essentialism 
M (SE) 
High Essentialism 
M (SE) 
 
 Vagina 
M (SE) 
Penis 
M (SE) 
Vagina 
M (SE) 
Penis 
M (SE) 
Vagina 
M (SE) 
Penis 
M (SE) 
Row  
M (SE) 
Woman M (SE) 17.30a (1.01) 24.88b (2.16) 16.32 (1.37) 22.70 (2.95) 18.29 (1.47) 27.06 (3.16) 21.09 (1.23) 
Man M (SE) 22.66b (1.40) 18.61a (1.08) 22.80 (1.91) 18.36 (1.48) 22.53 (2.05) 18.87 (1.58) 20.64 (.99) 
Column M (SE) 19.98 (.91) 21.75 (1.29) 20.05 (1.22) 21.69 (1.30)  
a,b,c significant differences between values are represented  by different superscripts 
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Table 8 
Study 2 means (M) and standard errors (SE) for main effects of and three-way interaction between perceiver transgender ally status, 
target gender identity, and target genitals on rejection and response time, n = 188 
 Rejection 
  Ally  Not Ally  
 Vagina 
M (SE) 
Penis 
M (SE) 
Vagina 
M (SE) 
Penis 
M (SE) 
 Vagina 
M (SE) 
Penis 
M (SE) 
Row  
M (SE) 
Woman M (SE) 1.20a (.06) 5.38b (.12) 1.21a (.08) 4.70b (.18)  1.19a (.08) 6.06c (.17) 3.29 (.06) 
Man M (SE) 5.47b (.12) 1.18a (.05) 4.88b (.17) 1.27a (.08)  6.07c (.16) 1.08a (.07) 3.33 (.06) 
Column M (SE) 3.34 (.06) 3.28 (.06) 3.02 (.08)  3.60 (.08)  
 Response time (s) 
  Ally  Not Ally  
 Vagina 
M (SE) 
Penis 
M (SE) 
Vagina 
M (SE) 
Penis 
M (SE) 
 Vagina 
M (SE) 
Penis 
M (SE) 
Row  
M (SE) 
Woman M (SE) 17.30a (1.01) 24.88b (2.16) 17.81 (1.46) 28.54 (3.14)  16.79 (1.38) 21.22 (2.97) 21.09 (1.23) 
Man M (SE) 22.66b (1.40) 18.61a (1.08) 23.54 (2.04) 19.79 (1.57)  21.79 (1.93) 17.44 (1.49) 20.64 (.99) 
Column M (SE) 19.98 (.91) 21.75 (1.29) 22.42 (1.29)  19.31 (1.22)  
a,b significant differences between values are represented  by different superscripts (p < .001); Ally = identified as an ally to 
transgender people; Not Ally = did not identify as an ally to transgender people 
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Table 9 
 
Study 2 Order Effects of Vignettes Presented First on Response Time (Log Transformed) for Each Subsequent Vignette  
 
 Vignette: Targets who identify as women 
 
 First  Not first     
 M SD n  M SD n t df p 
MP response time 1.12 .20 89  1.26 .20 101 -4.78 188 < .001 
MV response time 1.22 .20 89  1.36 .26 101 -3.93 185.03 < .001 
 Vignette: Targets who identify as men 
 
 First  Not first    
 M SD n  M SD n t df p 
WV response time 1.13 .20 89  1.26 .23 101 -4.29 188 < .001 
WP response time 1.26 .24 89  1.30 .28 101 -1.23 188 ns 
Note: Degrees of freedom in italics were derived from a significant Levene's Test such that equal variance 
was not assumed; MP = vignette describing targets who identify as men and has a penis; MV = vignette 
describing targets who identify as men and has a vagina;  WV = vignette describing targets who identify as 
women and has a vagina; WP = vignette describing targets who identify as women and has a penis 
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Table 10 
Study 3 Descriptives of Categorical Participant Characteristics and Differences Between 
Adjusters and Defaulters, N = 176 
 
Total Sample  
(N = 176) 
n (%) 
Defaulters 
(n = 151) 
n (%) 
Adjusters 
 (n = 25) 
n (%) 
X2 for Defaulters 
and Adjusters 
Gender Identity independent 
from birth-assignment 
 
 
  
 
Yes 4 (2.3) 2 (1.3) 2 (8.0) 4.30* 
 
No 172 (97.7) 149 (98.7) 23 (92.0) 
Gender assigned at birth      
 
Female 91 (51.7) 73 (48.7) 18 (72.0) 
4.67* 
 
Male 84 (47.7) 77 (51.3) 7 (28.0) 
 
Did not respond 1 (0.6) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
How they think others perceive 
their gender 
 
 
  
 
Correctly  174 (98.9) 150 (99.3) 24 (96.0) 2.13 
 
Incorrectly 2 (1.1) 1 (0.7) 1 (4.0) 
Sexual attraction 
 
   
 
A constant and clear 
attraction to other gender 151 (85.8) 134 (88.7) 17 (68.0) 
14.09* 
 
A constant and clear 
attraction to same gender 10 (5.7) 8 (5.3) 2 (8.0) 
 
A constant and clear 
attraction to both women 
and men 1 (0.6) 1 (0.7) 0 (0.0) 
 
A variable or fluid 
attraction to women and 
men 2 (1.1) 1 (0.7) 1 (4.0) 
 
A constant, clear attraction 
to people regardless of 
gender identity/expression 11 (6.3) 7 (4.6) 4 (16.0) 
 
I am unsure about which 
gender(s) I am attracted to 1 (0.6) 1 (0.0) 1 (4.0) 
Area surrounding current 
residence 
 
 
  
 
Urban 49 (27.8) 42 (27.8) 7 (28.0) 
0.06 
 
Suburban 96 (54.5) 82 (54.3) 14 (56.0) 
 
Rural 31 (17.6) 27 (17.9) 4 (16.0) 
Ethnicity 
 
   
 
Hispanic or of Latin 
American decent 11 (6.3) 10 (6.6) 1 (4.0) 0.43 
 
Not Hispanic or of Latin 164 (93.2) 140 (92.7) 24 (96.0) 
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American decent 
 
Unknown 1 (0.6) 1 (0.7) 0 (0.0) 
Race 
 
   
 
American Indian or 
Alaskan Native 1 (0.6) 1 (0.7) 
0 (0.0) 
0.27 
 
Black or African American 13 (7.4) 11 (7.3) 2 (8.0) 
 
Asian 17 (9.7) 15 (9.9) 2 (8.0) 
 
Native Hawaiian or Other 
Pacific Islander 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 
 
White or Caucasian 138 (78.4) 118 (78.1) 20 (80.0) 
 
Other (Persian, Multi-
racial, Hispanic, Arab) 7 (4.0) 6 (4.0) 1 (4.0) 
Education 
 
   
 
Less than a 4-year degree 101 (57.4) 87 (57.6) 14 (56.0) 0.02 
 
A 4-year degree or higher 75 (42.6) 64 (42.4) 11 (44.0) 
Trans ally status     
 
Yes 106 (60.2) 88 (58.3) 18 (72.0) 1.69 
 
No 70 (39.8) 63 (41.7) 7 (28.0) 
LGB ally status 
 
   
 
Yes 123 (69.9) 105 (69.5) 18 (72.0) 0.06 
 
No 53 (30.1) 46 (30.5) 7 (28.0) 
Knows or has known a trans or 
genderqueer person(s) 
 
 
  
 
Yes 57 (32.4) 47 (31.1) 10 (40.0) 0.77 
 
No 119 (67.6) 104 (68.9) 15 (60.0) 
  
Know transgender 
person who identifies 
as woman 46 (80.7) 37 (78.72) 9 (90.0) 0.67 
  
Know transgender 
person who identifies 
as man 24 (42.1) 15 (31.91) 9 (90.0) 11.05** 
  
Know transgender 
person who identifies 
as genderqueer  14 (24.6) 8 (17.02) 6 (60.0) 8.22** 
  
Know transgender 
person who identifies 
some other way 4 (7.0) 2 (4.26) 2 (20.0) 3.03ƚ 
ƚ = marginal significance (p < 1.0); * p< .05, **p < .01 
 
  
 
 
Table 11 
Study 3 Means (M) and Standard Errors (SE) Among Adjusters for Main Effects and 2x2 Interaction Between Target Characteristic  
and Distraction Task on Rejection and Response Time, n = 25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: a,b significant differences between values are represented  by different superscripts 
 
 
 Rejection Scores 
 
 
 
Distraction Task 
  
   Absent M (SE) 
Present 
M (SE) 
 Row 
M (SE) 
Genitals Consistent  1.32a (.21) 1.10a (.06)  1.21a (.12) 
Inconsistent  1.06a (.03) 2.72b (.48)  1.89b (.25) 
 Column  1.19a (.09) 1.91b (.12)   
 
 Response Times (s) 
Genitals Consistent  16.62 (1.61) 15.88 (1.23)  16.25a (1.25) 
Inconsistent  20.51 (1.98) 21.10 (2.05)  20.80b (1.77) 
 Column  18.56 (1.42) 18.49 (1.38)   
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Table 12 
Study 3 Means (M) and Standard Errors (SE) Among Defaulters for Main Effects and 2x2 Interaction Between Target Characteristic  
and Distraction Task on Rejection and Response Time , n = 150 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: a,b significant differences between values are represented  by different superscripts 
 
 Rejection Scores 
 
 
 
Distraction Task 
  
   Absent M (SE) 
Present 
M (SE) 
 Row 
M (SE) 
Target 
Characteristics 
Consistent  1.52 (.08) 1.53 (.09)  1.52a (.07) 
Inconsistent  5.12 (.14) 4.88 (.16)  5.00b (.13) 
 Column  3.32 (.07) 3.20 (.09)   
 
 Response Times (s) 
Target 
Characteristics 
Consistent  29.20 (5.41) 19.91 91.60)  24.56 (2.98) 
Inconsistent  25.94 (1.69) 23.57 (1.86)  24.76 (1.43) 
 Column  27.57 (2.94) 21.74 (1.65)   
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Table 13  
Study 4 Descriptives of Categorical Participant Characteristics, N = 68 
 
Total Sample  
n (%) 
Gender Identity independent from birth-assignment    
 
Yes  4 (5.88) 
 
No 64 (94.12) 
Gender assigned at birth 
 
 
Female  28 (41.2) 
Male 38 (55.9) 
 Intersex 1 (1.5) 
 I was not assigned a gender 1 (1.5) 
How they think others perceive their gender 
 
 
Correctly 67 (98.51) 
 
Incorrectly 1 (1.49) 
Sexual attraction 
 
 
A constant and clear attraction to other gender 52 (76.47) 
 
A constant and clear attraction to same gender 3 (4.41) 
 
A constant and clear attraction to both women and men 3 (4.41) 
 
A variable or fluid attraction to women and men 3 (4.41) 
 
A constant, clear attraction to people regardless of gender 
identity/expression 2 (2.94) 
I am unsure about which gender(s) I am attracted to 1 (1.47) 
 
I am asexual/have no attraction to any gender 1 (1.47) 
Area surrounding current residence 
 
 
Urban 14 (20.6) 
 
Suburban 33 (48.5) 
 
Rural 21 (30.9) 
Ethnicity 
 
 
Hispanic or of Latin American decent 6 (8.8) 
 
Not Hispanic or of Latin American decent 60 (88.2) 
 
Unknown 2 (2.9) 
Race 
 
 
American Indian or Alaskan Native 2 (2.9) 
 
Black or African American 2 (2.9) 
 
Asian 3 (4.4) 
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 2 (2.9) 
 
White or Caucasian 58 (85.3) 
 
Other (Mixed) 1 (1.5) 
Education 
 
 
Less than a 4-year degree 33 (48.6) 
 
A 4-year degree or higher 35 (51.4) 
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Table 14 
Study 4 Mean Differences for Clothing Items on Gender Exclusivity and Social Desirability, N = 
68 
 Gender Exclusivity Social Desirability 
Clothing item MD MD 
Dresses 5.05 5.49 
Bras 5.41 5.36 
Purse 5.07 5.22 
High Heels 5.12 5.42 
Panties 5.13 5.32 
Perfume 5.13 5.26 
Ballet Flats 4.50 4.99 
Stockings 4.69 5.09 
Fine Jewelry 2.68 2.54 
Sun Hats 3.50 4.02 
Bikini 5.18 4.96 
Bright Colors 1.39 1.56 
Tight Jeans 2.42 2.57 
Pants -0.52 -0.45 
Muted Colors -0.56 -0.15 
Sneakers -0.51 -0.49 
V-neck Sweaters 0.34 0.67 
Collared Dress Shirt -1.80 -1.01 
Baseball Caps -2.01 -1.26 
Loose Jeans -1.57 -1.40 
Briefcase -2.33 -1.93 
Loafers -2.46 -1.86 
Boxers -3.90 -3.31 
Ties -3.74 -3.50 
Cuff Links -4.25 -3.49 
Swim Trunks -4.20 -3.90 
Cologne -4.44 -4.05 
Tuxedos -4.48 -4.00 
 
 
 
Table 15 
 
Study 4 Correlations Between Gender Exclusivity and Social Desirability of Dresses, Tuxedos, Bras, and Cologne for Women and 
Men, N = 168 
 Gender Exclusivity 
Gender exclusivity 
Dresses for 
women 
Tuxedos for 
women 
Dresses for 
men 
Tuxedos 
for men  
Bras for 
women 
Cologne for 
women 
Bras for 
men 
Cologne for 
men 
Dresses for women - -.20 -.12 .61**  .52** -.20 -.21 .41** 
Tuxedos for women - - .54** -.35**  -.61** .48** .63** -.41** 
Dresses for men - - - -.15  -.42** .17 .57** -.11 
Tuxedos for men - - - -  .33** -.19 -.35** .34** 
Bras for women - - - -  - -.39** -.67** .46** 
Cologne for women - - - -  - - .35** -.70** 
Bras for men - - - -  - - - -.33** 
Cologne for men - - - -  - - - - 
 Social Desirability 
Gender exclusivity 
Dresses for 
women 
Tuxedos for 
women 
Dresses for 
men 
Tuxedos 
for men  
Bras for 
women 
Cologne for 
women 
Bras for 
men 
Cologne for 
men 
Dresses for women .53** -.27* -.44* .28*  .47** -.25* -.34** .29** 
Tuxedos for women -.47** .44** .41** -.24*  -.42** .15 .30** -.39** 
Dresses for men -.34** .22* .39** -.13  -.28* .09 .28* -.27* 
Tuxedos for men .34** -.30** -.44** .71**  .38** -.31** -.38** .27* 
Bras for women .74** -.32** -.44** .45**  .74** -.09 -.35** .57** 
Cologne for women -.42** .35** .42** -.30**  -.37** .49** .29** -.48** 
Bras for men -.49** .25* .56** -.34**  -.45** .17 .46** -.57** 
Cologne for men .50** -.24* -.17 .41**  .41** -.39** -.10 .51** 
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Table 15 (continued) 
 
Study 4 Correlations Between Gender Exclusivity and Social Desirability of Dresses, Tuxedos, Bras, and Cologne for Women and 
Men, N = 168 
 Social Desirability 
Social Desirability 
Dresses for 
women 
Tuxedos for 
women 
Dresses for 
men 
Tuxedos 
for men  
Bras for 
women 
Cologne 
for women 
Bras for 
men 
Cologne for 
men 
Dresses for women - -.27* -.44** .28**  .47** -.25* -.34** .29** 
Tuxedos for women - - .41** -.24*  -.42** .15 .30** -.39** 
Dresses for men - - - -.13  -.28* .09 .28* -.27* 
Tuxedos for men - - - -  .38** -.31** -.38** .27* 
Bras for women - - - -  - -.09 -.35** .57** 
Cologne for women - - - -  - - .29** -.48** 
Bras for men - - - -  - - - -.57** 
Cologne for men - - - -  - - - - 
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Table 16 
Study 5 descriptives of categorical participant characteristics and differences between adjusters 
and defaulters, N = 210 
 
Total Sample 
(N = 210)  
n (%) 
Defaulters 
(n = 195) 
n (%) 
Adjusters 
(n = 15) 
n (%) 
X2 for 
Defaulters 
and 
Adjusters 
Gender Identity independent from 
birth-assignment 
 
   
 
Yes  0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0.00 No 210 (100.0) 195 (100.0) 15 (100.0) 
Gender assigned at birth      
 
Female 120 (57.1) 112 (57.4) 8 (53.3) 0.10 
 
Male 90 (42.9) 83 (42.6) 7 (46.7) 
How they think others perceive 
their gender 
 
   
 
Correctly  208 (99.0) 193 (99.0) 15 (100.0) 0.16 
 
Incorrectly 2 (1.0) 2 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 
Sexual attraction 
 
   
 
A constant and clear attraction 
to other gender 179 (85.2) 170 (87.2) 9 (60.0) 
11.37* 
 
A constant and clear attraction 
to same gender 6 (2.9) 5 (2.6) 1 (6.7) 
 
A constant and clear attraction 
to both women and men 7 (3.3) 6 (3.1) 1 (6.7) 
 
A variable or fluid attraction 
to women and men 5 (2.4) 4 (2.1) 1 (6.7) 
 
A constant, clear attraction to 
people regardless of gender 
identity/expression 11 (5.2) 9 (4.6) 2 (13.3) 
 
I am asexual/have no 
attraction to any gender 2 (1.0) 1 (0.5) 1 (6.7) 
Area surrounding current residence 
 
   
 
Urban 66 (31.1) 57 (28.9) 9 (60.0) 
6.12* 
 
Suburban 97 (45.8) 93 (47.2) 4 (26.7) 
 
Rural 47 (22.4) 45 (23.1) 2 (13.3) 
Ethnicity 
 
   
 
Hispanic or of Latin 
American decent 14 (6.4) 12 (6.1) 2 (13.3) 
1.21 
 
Not Hispanic or of Latin 
American decent 193 (92.1) 180 (92.4) 13 (86.7) 
 
Unknown 2 (1.0) 2 (1.0) 0 (0.0) 
 
Did not respond 1 (0.5) 1 (0.5) 0 (0.0) 
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Race 
 
   
 
American Indian or Alaskan 
Native 3 (1.4) 3 (1.5) 
0 (0.0) 
9.03ƚ  
Black or African American 10 (4.8) 7 (3.6) 3 (20.0) 
 
Asian 6 (2.9) 6 (3.1) 0 (0.0) 
 
White or Caucasian 187 (89.0) 175 (89.7) 12 (80.0) 
 
Other (Dominican , Latin, 
Mixed-White and American 
Indian/Alaskan Native) 4 (1.9) 4 (2.1) 0 (0.0) 
  
   
Education 
 
   
 
Less than a 4-year degree 124 (59.0) 115 (59.0) 9 (60.0) 0.01 
 
A 4-year degree or higher 86 (41.0) 80 (41.0) 6 (40.0) 
Trans ally status 
 
   
 
Yes 116 (55.2) 104 (53.3) 12 (80.0) 4.01 
 
No 94 (44.8) 91 (46.7) 3 (20.0) 
LGB ally status 
 
   
 
Yes 137 (65.2) 124 (63.6) 13 (86.7) 3.18 
 
No 73 (34.8) 71 (36.4) 2 (13.3) 
Knows or has known a trans or 
genderqueer person(s) 
 
 
  
 
Yes 56 (26.7) 50 (25.1) 7 (46.7) 3.30 
 
No 154 (73.3) 147 (74.9) 8 (53.3) 
  
Know transgender 
person who identifies 
as woman 44 (78.6) 41 (83.7) 3 (42.9) 
6.06* 
  
Know transgender 
person who identifies 
as man 20 (35.7) 15 (30.6) 5 (71.4) 
4.44* 
  
Know transgender 
person who identifies 
as genderqueer  10 (17.9) 6 (12.2) 4 (57.1) 
8.42** 
  
Know trans person who 
identifies some other 
way 2 (3.6) 1 (2.0) 1 (14.3) 
2.67 
ƚ = marginal significance (p < 1.0); * p< .05, **p < .01 
 
 
 
Table 17 
Study 5 Means (M) and Standard Errors (SE) for Main Effects and 2x2 Interaction Between Genitals  and Clothing Among Adjusters 
on Rejection and Response Time, n = 15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: a,b significant differences between values are represented by different superscripts; ƚ marginal significance (p < 1.0) was found 
between values 
 
 
 
 
 
Rejection Scores 
 
 
 
Clothing 
  
   Absent M (SE) 
Present and Consistent 
M (SE) 
Present and Inconsistent 
M (SE) 
 Row 
M (SE) 
Genitals Consistent  1.33a (.5) 1.07a (.07) 1.33a (.21)  1.24a (.15) 
Inconsistent  1.10a (.05) 3.40b (.66) 3.33b (.63)  2.61b (.43) 
 Column  1.22a (.13) 2.23b (.34) 2.33b (.32)   
 
 
 
Response Times (s) 
Genitals Consistent  20.32 (1.57) 15.86 (1.98) 14.52 (1.17)  16.90ƚ (.96) 
Inconsistent  24.11 (3.92) 15.34 (1.41) 21.67 (2.96)  20.37ƚ (1.78) 
 Column  22.21a (2.07) 15.60b (1.30) 18.10 (1.63)   
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Table 18 
Study 5 Means (M) and Standard Errors (SE) for Main Effects and 2x2 Interaction Between Genitals  and Clothing Among Defaulters 
on Rejection and Response Time, n = 195 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: a,b significant differences between values are represented  by different superscripts; ƚ marginal significance (p < 1.0) was found 
between values 
 
 
 
Rejection Scores 
 
 
 
Clothing 
  
   Absent M (SE) 
Present and Consistent 
M (SE) 
Present and Inconsistent 
M (SE) 
 Row 
M (SE) 
Genitals Consistent  1.56 (.09) 1.38 (.06) 1.81 (.09)  1.58a (.06) 
Inconsistent  5.15 (.11) 4.96 (.13) 5.21 (.12)  5.11b (.10) 
 Column  3.35ƚ (.07) 3.17ƚa  (.07) 3.51b (.07)   
 
 
 
Response Times (s) 
Genitals Consistent  22.82 (1.96) 17.98 (1.33) 19.36 (.91)  20.05a (.93) 
Inconsistent  26.75 (1.17) 19.95 (.89) 22.01 (1.30)  22.90b (.85) 
 Column  24.78a (1.21) 18.97b (.90) 20.69b (.94)   
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Figure 1 
(In)consistency processing model of gender attribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
Individual differences in cognitive processing 
1. Contact with transgender 
2. Openness to experience & agreeableness 
3. Essentialism 
4. Biological gender beliefs 
5. Authoritarianism 
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Identity determines gender 
Gender visualization (automatic) 
Consistency between target biology and identity 
Gender attribution (Outcome) 
1. Rejection of target gender identity 
2. Acceptance of target gender identity 
Default Schema (automatic) 
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Moderating cognitive factor  
Presence of distraction 
Moderating target factor  
Consistency between additional target 
characteristic and identity 
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Figure 2 
 
Study 1 Interaction Between Chromosomes, Genitals, and Gender Identity Interaction on Rejection and Response Time 
 
Note : XX = XX chromosomes; XY = XY chromosomes; V = vagina, P = penis; W = identifies as a woman; M = identifies as a man
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Figure 3 
 
Study 1 Interaction Between Transgender Contact, Chromosomes and Gender Identity on Rejection and Response Time 
 
  
Note: C = contact with transgender people, NC = no contact with transgender people; XX = XX chromosomes. XY = XY 
chromosomes; W = identifies as a woman; M = identifies as a man
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Figure 4 
Study 2 Interaction Between Target Gender Identity and Genitals on Rejection and Response 
Time
 
Note: The lines depicting targets who identify as women and targets who identify as men may be 
difficult to distinguish because they are so similar. W = identifies as a woman; M = identifies as 
a man; V = has a vagina; P = has a penis 
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Figure 5 
Study 2 Interaction Between Essentialism, Target Gender Identity, and Genitals on Rejection and 
Response Time
 
Note: The lines for rejection are included for both targets who identify as women and targets 
who identify as men in this graph, but they may be difficult to distinguish because they are so 
similar. LE = low essentialism; HE = high essentialism; W = identifies as a woman; M = 
identifies as a man; V = Vagina; P = Penis 
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Figure 6 
 
Study 2 Interaction Between Transgender Ally Status, Target Gender Identity and Genitals on 
Rejection and Response Time 
 
 
Note: The plot for rejection among targets who identify as women is included in this graph, but it 
is difficult to distinguish from the plot for rejection among targets who identify as men because 
they are so similar. A = Identifies as an ally to transgender people; NA = Does not identify as an 
ally to transgender people; W = identifies as a woman; M = identifies as a man; V = Vagina; P = 
Penis
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Figure 7 
 
Study 3 Interaction Between Schema Group, Target Characteristics, and Distraction Task on Rejection and Response Time 
 
Note: C = Target characteristics were stereotype-consistent (woman/vagina, man/penis); INC = Target characteristics were stereotype-
inconsistent (woman/penis, man/vagina)
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Figure 8 
 
Study 5 Interactions Between Genitals and Clothing on Rejection and Response Time for Adjusters and Defaulters  
 
 
 
Note: C = Stereotype-consistent with gender identity; INC = Stereotype-inconsistent with gender identity
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